

Commentary

November 2005

*60th
Anniversary
Issue*

Defending and Advancing Freedom *A Symposium*

*Paul Berman • Max Boot • William F. Buckley, Jr. • Eliot A. Cohen
Niall Ferguson • Aaron L. Friedberg • Francis Fukuyama • Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.
Reuel Marc Gerecht • Victor Davis Hanson • Owen Harries • Mark Helprin
Daniel Henninger • Stanley Hoffmann • Josef Joffe • Paul Johnson
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Sailing to Ithaca
Hillel Halkin

God, Man, the Devil—and Thomas Mann
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American Jewish
Committee
E. Robert Goodkind,
President

Letters from Readers

Middle East Studies

TO THE EDITOR:

I am writing to correct an egregious error in Efraim Karsh's article about the controversy at Columbia University over allegations of classroom bias against pro-Israel students ["Columbia and the Academic Intifada," July-August]. Mr. Karsh writes that "in December [2004], faced with growing public indignation, Columbia's president, Lee H. Bollinger, grudgingly announced the appointment of a committee to review student complaints. The committee's composition gave a clear signal of Bollinger's own disposition," with "three of the five members [being] known critics of Israel."

I was in contact with Bollinger on virtually a daily basis during the time the committee was formed, and I can testify that he was the opposite of "grudging" about creating an entity to investigate student complaints. The composition of

the committee was determined through a very complex series of negotiations that had little to do with the subject of the Middle East and a great deal to do with the relationship between the Columbia faculty's self-governance bodies and the administration. Indeed, it was not simply a technicality that the committee was formed by the faculty of arts and sciences, and reported to the vice president for arts and sciences and the provost rather than to the president of the university.

Contrary to Mr. Karsh's implication, Bollinger is a true and devoted friend of the state of Israel. He has spoken out in defense of Israel on many occasions both in his former post at the University of Michigan and at Columbia. And he has been an avid and enthusiastic supporter of the expansion of Israel studies at Columbia, including through the creation of a new chair in the field, which was in the works before this year's crisis

broke out. (I chair the search committee.)

In general, the reporting on this whole matter has been dominated on all sides by ideological self-interest rather than a desire for accuracy. I hope that Mr. Karsh will correct his mischaracterization of Lee Bollinger's stance.

MICHAEL STANISLAWSKI
Center for Israel and Jewish Studies
Columbia University
New York City

TO THE EDITOR:

We very much enjoyed Efraim Karsh's overview of the controversy we were a part of at Columbia, but he misses the point in two important respects. First, he fails to recognize the role played by students. As the founders of Columbians for Academic Freedom, the student organization that led the protests, we are disappointed that he never once mentions the activism that forced the university to take its problem seriously. Mr.

Karsh writes that "it will take more than a single student protest to undo the rot that has settled into the study of the Middle East." He is right—it will take many.

Mr. Karsh also argues that the real issue at Columbia is not whether professors respect their students but "whether they should be permitted, under the guise of academic freedom, to pass off personal and open political partisanship as scholarly fact." But the two issues are intertwined. The intimidation that Zionist students experienced did not occur in a vacuum. There was bullying because there is an environment of intellectual orthodoxy in Middle Eastern studies. When nearly an entire department holds that Zionism is racism, it becomes very easy to treat Zionist students as people who do not deserve a voice in the classroom.

Mr. Karsh and his sympathetic colleagues certain-

ly do have an impact when they criticize their peers in the academy, but criticism from the pages of COMMENTARY does not change—at least for the foreseeable future—the reality on Columbia's campus.

BARI WEISS

ARIEL BEERY

DANIELLA KAHANE

AHARON HORWITZ

New York City

TO THE EDITOR:

Efraim Karsh, our fellow member of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, has written a refreshingly honest and scholarly appraisal of conditions in the field of Middle Eastern studies. He is undoubtedly correct that the teaching in Columbia's department of Middle Eastern and Asian Languages and Cultures (MEALAC) "is emblematic of the pervasive prejudice that has afflicted the field . . . for quite some time." Would that only Middle Eastern studies were so afflicted! Unfortunately, the Israel-bashing that Mr. Karsh finds in such abundance in the published writings of the MEALAC faculty is widespread today throughout the humanities and social sciences, at Columbia as well as at many other universities.

Our late colleague Edward Said, the father of the academic *intifada*, was a professor of English and comparative literature. His claim that scholarship is merely an exercise of power has liberated his disciples and successors in many liberal-arts departments from the burdens of fact-checking and consideration of context. But without a commitment to bear those burdens, why have a university at all? Or at least, why pay university tuition?

In classes that have nothing to do with the Middle East, many professors bash Israel as an aside, as an example, or in tones of indignation and conviction; they do it to show their credentials as members of the academic club. Students who are knowledgeable (and foolhardy) enough to ask questions are routinely silenced, and in any case, the sheer volume of lies tends to overwhelm students' resources.

Many students, even Jewish students, come to college with little knowledge of Israel; many cannot even find Israel on a map, and have no reason to question the views of the Jewish state that they encounter in their classes. The Columbia students who brought the abuses in MEALAC to light in the film *Columbia Unbecoming* were well informed, but even they faced self-doubt as well as hostility and denial from faculty, the administration, and other students when they tried to get a hearing for their grievances.

JUDITH S. JACOBSON

AWI FEDERGRUEN

RUTH RAPHAELI-SLIVKO

NEIL S. SHACHTER

Columbia University

New York, New York

TO THE EDITOR:

I joined the faculty at Columbia as an assistant professor of surgery in September 2002. In an effort to reach objective conclusions about the MEALAC controversy, I attended meetings on campus of both the pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel sides, read as much as I could, and spoke with many students. I also assumed that at a university like Columbia I would have the opportunity to hear from

scholars who would educate me and challenge my long-held beliefs about the Middle East. To date, and to my disappointment, my beliefs have not been challenged; or rather, the challenges have not been terribly interesting or educational.

Take for example the recent "conference" sponsored by Qanun, the Middle East law students' association at Columbia. At one presentation, Rashid Khalidi, director of the university's Middle East Institute, commented that Israel "systemically prevents the growth of the Palestinian population." It took less than three minutes on the Internet to learn from the websites of both the UN and the World Bank that the Palestinians have one of the highest fertility rates in the world—higher than that of Europe, the U.S., Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. Evidently, Israel is either not preventing population growth or is not doing a very good job of it. In his own remarks, Joseph Massad of MEALAC called Israel a "racist apartheid state" more than 35 times in less than twenty minutes. Ilan Pappé, the instigator of the failed British academic boycott of Israel, stated that Israel committed a "Holocaust against the Palestinians."

In the wake of the MEALAC controversy, and perhaps to try and appease the faculty, the trustees of Columbia have decided to establish a chair in Israel studies. The problem is that the president has appointed Khalidi to be on the selection committee. Also on the committee is Lila Abu-Lughod, a Palestinian-American professor who signed a petition calling for divestment from Israel.

The Columbia students who stood up for themselves and for their beliefs should be applauded. The sad truth is that they have shown far more courage than most of their professors. I can only feel sadness, shame, and deep remorse at how we have failed our students and what a poor example we are setting for the greater academic community.

MARC S. ARKOVITZ

Columbia College of Physicians
and Surgeons

New York City

TO THE EDITOR:


Efraim Karsh's excellent article neglects to mention that Columbia's department of Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures, along with seventeen other Middle Eastern studies programs on our nation's campuses, is largely funded by the beneficence of the U.S. taxpayer. There was a specific legislative intent behind this gift of the American people to the American academy, but it has long been obscured in a vapor of political correctness.

The Middle Eastern studies programs (as well as their Asian, African, and Latin equivalents) are a result of Title VI of the 1965 Higher Education Act. During the cold war, Congress realized that our nation's young people were woefully ignorant of foreign languages and cultures. It therefore set aside a pot of money, now over \$100 million a year, for international-studies centers at which they could acquire the skills that would make them better able to serve America's national-security interests.

What has resulted instead are departments around the country that view international studies through Ed-

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
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


AMERICA AND THE CHALLENGES OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Robert Wuthnow

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ward Said's paradigm of "orientalism," with the United States as a colonial, hegemonic monster. Needless to say, these programs present the history of Israel in the most egregious light imaginable.

Legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Patrick Tiberi (R-Ohio), aimed at setting up an expert advisory board to ensure that students are exposed to a diversity of perspectives and that the objectives of the original Title VI funding are met. The academy, predictably, has responded with hysteria.

SARAH N. STERN
American Jewish Congress
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR:

Efraim Karsh quotes the writings of Columbia professors Hamid Dabashi, George Saliba, and Joseph Massad in order to demonstrate their lack of academic objectivity. For instance, Dabashi's account of a visit he made to Israel in 2004, published in the English-language edition of *al-Abram*, descends into rank anti-Semitism—no fine sense of smell needed—that leaves one quite nauseated.

I have no doubt that Mr. Karsh is right about the trio, but surely the more important thing for a not undistinguished university is their paucity of scholarly publications, which leaves one to wonder how Columbia could have ended up with such a crew. It is not the least of the afflictions of Arab countries that they are often ill-served by academics who publish nothing but strident newspaper articles and Arab-nationalist polemics. The last thing needed in the United States

is to import such standards of scholarship.

Mr. Karsh mentions a syllabus of Massad's that contained but one work on Israel, by Maxime Rodinson, and complains that its title, *Israel, a Colonial-Settler State?*, betrays a lack of objectivity. Yet by Rodinson's standards—though only his—that book is amazingly objective. Compare, say, his "*Sionisme et Socialisme*" in the February 1953 edition of *La Nouvelle Critique*, in which he describes the joyous freedoms of the Jews in the Soviet Union under Stalin's benevolent rule before denouncing Zionist "criminal doctors" and, of course, Israel itself.

Columbia's authorities missed the opportunity to toss out the offenders and replace them with more serious scholars, choosing instead to have them judged by their sympathizers and thus exonerated. Jews and Israelis, along with serious students of whatever origin or persuasion, including Arabs and Muslims, are well advised to take their studies elsewhere. There are better schools and better scholars. If the standards of Dabashi, Massad, and Saliba suffice, why not save hugely on tuition by studying in Cairo, a fascinating city full of warmly hospitable people and academics just like them?

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK
Chevy Chase, Maryland

EFRAIM KARSH writes:

Michael Stanislawski tells us that Lee H. Bollinger, Columbia University's president, is "a true and devoted friend of the state of Israel [who] has spoken out in defense of Israel on many occasions." If this is indeed the case, then it is all the more regrettable that on the

one occasion when speaking out would have made a real difference—not as a friend of the state of Israel but as a university head responsible for ensuring intellectual integrity in his own institution—Bollinger not only remained conspicuously mute but, in order to investigate the situation, permitted the formation of the most hostile committee conceivable. The committee's report, a predictable whitewash, was then applauded by Bollinger as "a very thoughtful and comprehensive review that . . . help[s] sustain our trust in the absolutely critical norm of peer review."

Mr. Stanislawski does not dispute the committee's blatant bias, but he claims that Bollinger had little to do with its formation, done exclusively by the faculty of arts and sciences "through a very complex series of negotiations." In his eagerness to exonerate his boss, however, he unwittingly exposes the pervasiveness of anti-Israel sentiment among the Columbia faculty. For if it took a "very complex series of negotiations" to produce so deeply prejudiced and dysfunctional a committee, hostility to the Jewish state must extend well beyond the department of Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures (MEALAC), whose professors were the subject of the committee's investigation.

This in turn may help explain Bollinger's reluctance to toss out the offenders and replace them with more serious scholars, a course suggested here by Edward N. Luttwak. It also raises a question about the real motives behind Columbia's much-publicized decision to create a chair in Israel

studies. Let us assume that this initiative reflects a sincere interest in the expansion of the field rather than a cynical ploy to pacify indignant students, alumni, and donors and fend off the inquisitive media. Given his weak and ineffectual handling of the MEALAC scandal, what guarantee is there that Bollinger will not be upstaged yet again by his faculty? None whatsoever.

As my correspondent Marc S. Arkovitz notes, of the six-member selection committee for the new chair, only two have done any research on Israel, while another two are harsh critics of the Jewish state: Rashid Khalidi, who considers Israel an illegitimate "colonial entity" and openly advocates its destruction, and Lila Abu-Lughod, a Palestinian-American professor who has joined in calling for university divestment from Israel. Still another member chaired the shambolic MEALAC committee. It takes no great imagination to figure out the likely results of this committee's deliberations.

Moreover, even if the committee were to do the unthinkable and select a serious, bona-fide scholar, he or she would be operating virtually single-handedly in enemy territory. As evidenced by the MEALAC scandal, and as experienced first-hand by Columbia professors Judith S. Jacobson, Awi Federgruen, Ruth Rappaheli-Slivko, and Neil S. Shachter, Israel-bashing is endemic to the humanities and the social sciences at Columbia (as it is at numerous other universities throughout the United States and Europe), ensuring the greatest degree of conformity and suffocating dissent.

It is no mere accident

Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society




John Haygarth, FRS (1740–1827): *A Physician of the Enlightenment*

Christopher Booth

John Haygarth, MD, FRS (1740–1827) hailed from an obscure valley in the Yorkshire dales in the north west of England. Educated at Sedburgh School, Cambridge, and Edinburgh, he became a physician in Chester in 1767. There he introduced separate wards in the Chester Infirmary where patients with fever could be isolated and cared for. It

was the stimulus for the development of the fever hospitals of nineteenth-century England. Haygarth moved to Bath in 1798, where he continued to write on medical matters. He also played a major role in the foundation of the Bath Provident Institution for Savings, a model for the savings-bank movement in England.

Vol. 254 0-87169-254-6/978-0-87169-254-2 \$60 Printed July 2005



Emil von Behring *Infectious Disease, Immunology, Serum Therapy*


Derek S. Linton

In 1901 Emil von Behring received the first Nobel Prize in medicine for serum therapy against diphtheria, a disease that killed thousands of infants annually. Diphtheria serum was the first major cure of the bacteriological era and its development generated novel procedures for testing, standardizing, and regulating drugs. Since the introduction of antibiotics Behring and his work have largely been forgotten. In the first English-language scientific biography of Behring, Derek S. Linton emphasizes Behring's seminal contributions to the study of infectious diseases, the formation of modern immunology and in-

novative research on specific remedies, and vaccines against deadly microbial infections. This biography explores his complex relations to the rival bacteriological schools of Robert Koch in Berlin and Louis Pasteur in Paris, the emergent German pharmaceutical industry, and the institutionalization of experimental therapeutic research. The second part of the volume contains translations of thirteen key articles by Behring and his associates on infectious diseases, immunology, drug testing, and therapeutics spanning thirty years of his remarkable scientific career.

Vol. 255 0-87169-255-4/978-0-87169-255-9 \$65 Printed September 2005

Transactions of the American Philosophical Society



The Shortest and Most Convenient Route *Lewis and Clark in Context*

Robert Cox (ed.)

Based on papers delivered at the Bicentennial Conference for Lewis and Clark, held in Philadelphia in August 2003 to explore new approaches to understanding "Meriwether Lewis in Philadelphia," these essays grapple with the motives underlying the Corps of Discovery and the impact on American culture. Most of the essays in this volume began in that invigorating three-day exchange. The

multiple contributions address and shed light on how the nation's foremost urban center, Philadelphia, helped to shape this quintessential errand into the wilderness. The authors use the question of failure as a means of interrogating the intellectual and cultural context in which the expedition was framed and in which its results were distributed.

Vol. 94, Pt. 5 0-87169-945-1 \$24 Printed November 2004



The Opening of the Maritime Fur Trade at Bering Strait *Americans and Russians Meet the Kanjigmiut in Kotzebue Sound*

John R. Bockstoe

The maritime fur trade was an important commercial force in the Bering Strait region from the early nineteenth century until to outbreak of the Second World War; nevertheless, its origins are not well understood. Two important documents—which have received little scholarly attention—shed considerable light on the genesis of this trade. These manuscripts describe the voyages of the American

trading brigs General San Martin in 1819 and Pedler in 1820, and they provide valuable information on the complicated relationships that existed between the American maritime traders and the Russian officials in Kamchatka and Alaska, as well as with the inhabitants of the Bering Strait region in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

Vol. 95, Pt. 1 0-87169-951-6 \$24 Printed June 2005

Vergilius Redivivus *Studies in Joseph Addison's Latin Poetry*

Estelle Haan

Virtually ignored by modern scholarship, Addison's Latin verse has failed to receive the critical attention it deserves. Addison's current reputation rests almost exclusively on his role as the accomplished essayist of the *Spectator* and *Tatler* papers, as the author of the

drama *Cato*, and as the composer of a body of minor English verse. Estelle Haan examines the intricate inter-textual relationships between some of Addison's neo-Latin poems and the poetic corpus of one Augustan poet: Virgil (in particular, the *Georgics*).

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
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that, as I noted in my COMMENTARY article, the Columbia scandal was exposed by aggrieved students rather than by their professors. Indeed, much as Bari Weiss, Ariel Beery, Daniella Kahane, Aharon Horwitz, and their fellow Columbians for Academic Freedom are to be commended for standing up for their rights, their personal predicament is only the tip of the iceberg, the existence of which the Columbia authorities continue to deny.

The problem, to repeat, is not the professional misconduct of this or that individual; it goes without saying that professors should treat their students with due respect and that those who fail in this elementary duty should be disciplined. But even the most courteous and affable professor must not be permitted, under the guise of academic freedom, to pass off personal bias and open political partisanship as scholarly fact. Even if the offending MEALAC professors had forgone their derogatory asides and so averted exposure, Columbia students would still have been fed on a false diet of Middle Eastern and Arab-Israeli history.

This stark situation has not improved one iota as a result of the Columbia fiasco, and is unlikely to change by the creation of a chair in Israel studies. Only when the rot that has settled into the study of the Middle East in Western universities has been eradicated will Israel stand a chance of getting a fair hearing, and students real value for their money.

In the Eurozone

TO THE EDITOR:

For a Central European of my generation (I was born in 1946) it has been especially painful to see the widening fissure between the U.S. and much of Europe since 9/11. Most of the blame can be ascribed to the European side—but not all of it. On the American side there seems to be an abysmal lack of factual information about Europe and about the European Union in particular, leading at times to blind anti-Europeanism. Unfortunately, Michel Gurfinkiel's article on the rejection of the European Constitution by French and Dutch voters shows that even a magazine of COMMENTARY's quality is not immune to this trend ["Europe's 'No,'" July-August].

Consider Mr. Gurfinkiel's treatment of the European Commission—the eternal bogeyman of ill-informed outsiders. Like others, he presents the commission as comprising unelected bureaucrats who foist their burdensome regulations on hapless European citizens. But its members are elected, and are impeachable.

What about the commission's power? Mr. Gurfinkiel writes that it is in charge of setting wages and prices, and that it is in some respects more powerful than its constituent nation-states. This assertion is a tragic mixture of truth and falsehood. The commission has no power to set wages, except those of its own staff. Nor can it set market prices.

What it can do, following the general guidelines of the Council of the European Union, is manage import tariffs and subsidies to

agricultural producers within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. The CAP is indeed an abomination—just like farm subsidies in the U.S.—but it is a creation of the constituent nation-states and not of the commission itself.

The states gave the European Commission the power to enforce their commitments to each other. Once a directive or regulation is adopted by those states and the European Parliament, the commission can sue any state that fails to implement it. Any other arrangement would either make the EU a sham or open the door to endless bickering among states accusing each other of breaching the agreed-upon rules.

Describing the 2004 "Bolkestein affair" that reinforced sentiment in France to vote no, Mr. Gurfinkiel writes that Bolkestein, the EU's market commissioner, "had issued a directive effectively deregulating the service sector"—as though he himself had promulgated a new law that was binding on all citizens in the EU. But Bolkestein had only proposed his directive to the member states and the European Parliament. And it was member states—France and Germany—that killed it.

In these dangerous times, we cannot afford such misunderstandings about the European Union.

PAVEL BRATINKA
Prague, Czech Republic

TO THE EDITOR:

Michel Gurfinkiel's article provides a knowledgeable description of the thinking that guided the "founding fathers" of the European Union when they created the basic EEC in-





stitutions in the 1950's. I agree with him that the French and Dutch voters' rejection of the constitution was a belated reaction against the European elite's tendency to impose new structures regardless of public opinion.

The evolution of EU institutions has been marked by uncomfortable compromises between liberalization and centralization. The constitution and the euro represent attempts to impose a centralizing, one-model-fits-all structure on a union consisting of 25 member states and 450 million inhabitants. But Europe is not a homogeneous entity, and developments across the Eurozone diverge. One fails to capture variety if one subsumes too much under the label "Europe."

Mr. Gurfinkiel's own economic analysis demonstrates how such generalizations prevent clarity. His statement that the euro has been a "prescription for zero growth" for the countries that adopted it, while countries that resisted it, "like Britain and Sweden, are in good shape," is more than partly wrong and less than partly right.

True, the growth rates in real GDP of the UK and Sweden have been consistently higher than the Eurozone average, and their unemployment rates approximately half of the Eurozone average. But Ireland, which belongs to the Eurozone, has higher growth and lower unemployment than either country. Little of this is related to the euro.

Mr. Gurfinkiel's conclusion that the prospects for continent-wide economic growth "can hardly be said to be bright" is too sweeping. Countries in "New Eu-



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
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rope" have introduced flat taxes with low uniform rates. Relying on market forces, they have become magnets for international investment and have achieved growth rates rivaling those of China and India. The pressure of competition from Eastern Europe and East Asia has also forced Old Europe to act. Even in slow-reforming countries like France and Germany, one sees a lot of corporate restructuring. Decentralized wage-formation is spreading, and regulatory burdens have been lightened to allow companies greater flexibility to hire and fire.

Politicians like Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand may have had visions for Europe, but in their ambitions they were notoriously unconcerned about getting the economics right. That must change.

PETER STEIN
Stockholm, Sweden

TO THE EDITOR:

Michel Gurfinkiel writes that "it is not the constitution itself that the French and the Dutch were bent on rejecting" with their no vote, "nor was it even the concept of European unity. Rather, it was the impact on their lives, direct and indirect, of actual EU governance under the Maastricht regime." This is probably true, but I would add to it.

Many French conservatives (and some radicals) deeply need a *patria*, a fatherland, to identify with. Europe could become a state, perhaps even a world power, but could it become a country? To French conservatives, the Europe proposed by the constitution seems like an absurd "community." It lacks a common territory, a common histo-

ry, and a common culture, and its notion of political correctness bans the Judeo-Christian tradition and makes it blind to the problems posed by Islamism.

At the same time, French radicals, following Rousseau, believe that political freedom is achieved only by the creation, through the "social contract," of a single sovereign, in whose activities all citizens may and ought to take part equally. Those in France who favor such an arrangement would be willing to participate in a radical European republic, but such an entity being impossible, they prefer to go no farther than a radical French republic.

Conservatives dislike the EU's liberal ethic and political correctness. Radicals dislike the EU's free-market and free-enterprise principles. Combined, the two groups outnumber the Europeans.

HENRI HUDE
Paris, France

TO THE EDITOR:

Michel Gurfinkiel describes Europe's "Islamist threat" as a "crushing problem" that looms "in the background" of the no vote on the European Constitution. On a recent trip to Europe, I found the Islamist threat very much in the foreground for the intellectuals I met.

Of all the decisions taken by senior European officials in recent decades, few have been as historically consequential as the one permitting the entry of large numbers of Muslims, many of whom reject assimilation into their host countries. In a widely discussed 2004 interview in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Bernard Lewis stated that "Europe will be

Muslim by the end of the century." Other observers see a possible Muslim majority in France by mid-century. Already, the Muslim population's influence can be seen in the EU's foreign policy, especially vis à vis Israel, as well as in domestic politics. As Mr. Gurfinkiel concludes, Europe's prospects for escaping "from its massive, self-inflicted harm" are not very bright.

RICHARD L. RUBENSTEIN
Fairfield, Connecticut

TO THE EDITOR:

Michel Gurfinkiel's excellent article affirms the popular wisdom in the vote on the European Constitution. The form of the constitution foretold the content, and its content the downfall.

A product of the French bureaucracy, the constitution was swollen with no fewer than 448 articles, differentiating areas that are the exclusive competence of the European Union (like monetary policy, common commercial policy, and the customs union), areas that are the exclusive competences of member states (like industry, health, education, youth, culture, and civil protection), and areas that are "shared competences." What is behind the third category? This provision: "Member states shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its competence."

In other words, with regard to things like security, transportation, energy, social policy, employment, the environment, consumer protection, and other matters, the European Union could make decisions without the states. What patri-

ot, of the Left or the Right, could agree to this? What socialist could give such a free hand to the elites who would rule?

YVES ROUCAUTE
*University of Paris
Paris, France*

TO THE EDITOR:

Michel Gurfinkiel's article features a crucial insight that is worth underscoring. "The problem of Europe," he writes, "was that Monnet's twist—economics first—led to a bizarre, quasi-political arrangement." The reference is to Jean Monnet, the planning commissioner of postwar France and a strong advocate of a "United States of Europe." Indeed, Monnet worked to erect an economic house of Europe that, he hoped, would in time be crowned by a political rooftop.


Despite the extraordinary accomplishments gained through this pragmatic method, it contained a paradox that is now proving fatal to the project. As the "Common Market" tried to turn itself into a political entity, it encountered the sovereign will of the peoples of Europe, who had generally assented, but never consented, to the changes being wrought in their name. Having finally been consulted, the French and the Dutch have now toppled the entire edifice.

LAURENT MURAWIEC
*Hudson Institute
Washington, D.C.*

MICHEL GURFINKIEL
writes:

Pavel Bratinka groups me with "outsiders" on European issues, so I should probably begin by pointing out that I am a citizen of France, born in Paris in 1948 and still living there.

by Kenneth Westhues



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As for my familiarity with the workings of Europe yesterday and today, let us proceed to test it.

Under present provisions, the members of the European Commission (EC) are not "elected," as Mr. Bratinka contends, but rather nominated by the various member states and then formally appointed by the European Council, the main decision-making body of the EU. They are then confirmed or rejected by the European Parliament: this is a comparatively recent dispensation, reminiscent of the screening of judicial nominees by the U.S. Senate. Nor are they "impeachable," but merely subject to review by the Parliament. One commission in the past—chaired by Jacques Santer of Luxembourg—was so damaged in the reviewing process as to resign en masse.

I did not say that the EC was in charge of setting wages and prices, as Mr. Bratinka maintains. On the contrary, I acknowledged the EU's "longstanding commitment to a single, highly competitive European market." Nevertheless, by enforcing unified VAT rates throughout the EU and similar measures, the commission does exert considerable leverage on the economies of member states, including wages and prices.

Mr. Bratinka's remarks about the so-called Bolkestein directive do not comport either with my own words or with the facts. EU directives and regulations are usually engineered by the EC, then approved by the Council. Although not laws in their own right, they must be passed into law by the member states, and once formally promulgated they

take precedence over existing domestic provisions. True enough, the Bolkestein directive was stopped by the government of France—but only after a French Euroskeptic, Philippe de Villiers, made an issue of it, as I explained in my article. More often than not, directives are passed with little debate or no debate at all, no matter how disruptive or blatantly absurd they may be.

I do indeed believe that, in Mr. Bratinka's paraphrase, "the commission is in some respects more powerful than its constituent nation-states." This, after all, was the main point of my essay. As I wrote, Jean Monnet and the other founding fathers of Europe had to reconcile the need for immediate European cooperation in the postwar period with the unfeasibility of an early political federation or confederacy that would have included Germany. They therefore deliberately "circumvented politics," i.e., the normal workings of democracy, by devolving as much power as they could to the EC. Their strategy worked quite beautifully for a time, but in the long run it undermined the entire political culture of Europe, and is largely accountable for the severe difficulties the European nations are facing today. Both the French and the Dutch "no's" to the draft European Constitution were essentially an attempt to restore sovereignty to the European peoples.

Peter Stein raises a very interesting question about Ireland. A Eurozone member, it is currently as prosperous as Britain and Sweden, which stayed out. Does that mean, as Mr. Stein asserts, that the economic

squalor of most other Eurozone countries, France and Germany included, is unrelated to the single currency, and that other factors are at play? In theory, yes. In practice, no.

The euro is basically a very tight, deflationist currency. It may work in Ireland, which by European standards is a libertarian paradise with a small government, few regulations, low taxes, very limited welfare, no industrial tradition, and no unions. It cannot work at all in continental Europe, the locus classicus of big government, regulations, taxes, welfare, industry, and unions.

Where the state pays for a lot of things, you need a flexible currency. If you don't have it, you either collapse or end up fudging your real figures on inflation and the deficit. France, Germany, Italy, and others are both deteriorating and fudging.

The secret dream of some euro-fanatics is to force continental Europe overnight into a drastic conversion to economic libertarianism. As committed as I am to market freedom and to reform, I do not think this is a practical option. Regarding "new Europe," I am prepared to share some of Mr. Stein's optimism. Still, with the possible exception of Poland, these are very small countries. And, mind you, they are still out of the Eurozone.

Henri Hude's remarks about the *patria* deficit in the European Union are very much to the point. So are Richard L. Rubinstein's stern comments on the Islamicization of the Old Continent. Many Europeans feel there is a correlation between these two

trends, and would like both of them to be resisted.

I thank Yves Roucaute and Laurent Murawiec for their readings of the European constitutional crisis, which complement mine, only with greater alacrity and talent.

Class Dismissed

TO THE EDITOR:

Bruce Bartlett has written a useful and mostly accurate assessment of the evidence concerning intergenerational income mobility in America ["Class Struggle in America?," July-August]. But there remain several issues that he treats inaccurately or does not discuss.

Contrary to what he writes, the research documented in the book *Unequal Chances: Family Background and Economic Success* (which I co-edited) does not support either of two points he attributes to the *New York Times*'s recent series on class in America. First, the idea that "although individuals may appear to demonstrate income mobility over the course of their lives, eventually they end up in the same . . . income class as their parents" is quite far from the truth, and I do not know of any competent researcher who would assert it. In fact, children of families in the middle of the national income distribution are almost equally likely to end up in any income decile; for them, there is virtually no inheritance of economic position.

Second, *Unequal Chances* makes no claim that "whatever the degree of mobility in American society, it is no greater now than it has been

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
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in the past." Rather, it presents strong evidence that the degree of mobility has been severely underestimated in past studies, which did not have the benefit of detailed data that have become available in the past decade.

To give a flavor of the actual numbers (taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, consisting of a representative sample of 6,273 white and black families observed over 32 years and in two generations), the correlation between parents' and children's income is a modest .42, but the child of a family in the top decile has a 22.9 percent chance of remaining there while the child of a family in the bottom decile has only a 1.3 percent chance of moving to the top. Similarly, the child of a family in the bottom decile has a 31.2 percent chance of remaining there while the child of a family in the top decile has only a 2.4 percent chance of moving to the bottom.

My point is simply this: even a fairly high degree of mobility on average is compatible with extreme inequality between the relatively poor and the relatively well-off. This is a serious social problem. It is not fair that the accident of one's birth family entails a fifteen-fold difference in one's probability of attaining success. In a decent society, individuals are not so severely handicapped by the vagaries of birth.

Mr. Bartlett disagrees. "What is truly important for a society," he writes, "is how people in general perceive their circumstances"—as opposed, presumably, to what those circumstances really are. But the way middle- and upper-class people

feel about their circumstances cannot be averaged in with the objective circumstances of the poor.

It is time that conservatives took the plight of the poor seriously, and proposed effective measures to reduce our society's extreme disparity in rates of success. The assertion by conservatives that poverty is caused by welfare is in part true, but only in part. Appropriate redistributive policies can promote self-reliance and can isolate the minority of families that are truly incapable of caring for themselves. The absence of a dialogue on the Right focused on this problem only reinforces the stereotype that conservatives are hard-hearted and uncaring.

HERBERT GINTIS

Santa Fe Institute

Santa Fe, New Mexico

TO THE EDITOR:

Bruce Bartlett rejects the idea that the rich have gotten richer while the poor have gotten poorer, using income and polling data to validate his argument. He points out that due to widespread home ownership and the vast run-up in real-estate assets, "aggregate wealth has become much more evenly distributed" in America. This is correct, but therein lies the problem.

The wealth effect from the current boom/bubble in real estate is what keeps our spend-without-saving economy muddling along. We are spending 80 percent of the world's savings and borrowing \$2 billion every day from savers outside the U.S. to keep our standard of living at the top of the heap.

Incredibly, Mr. Bartlett comments that if we "base our calculations" about liv-

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
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
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
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ing standards “on expenditures rather than savings,” then “living standards are much more equal among rich and poor.” I always thought that what made someone rich was the size of his bank account, not the number of cars or cell phones in his possession. Is someone who has a million dollars in the bank but lives in a modest home worse off than his counterpart living in a four-carport mansion with a million dollars in credit-card debt? With over \$37 trillion in total debt and rising, we are heading for a serious economic decline, with the poor likely to bear the brunt of the fallout.

Consumers are taking out home-equity loans, sometimes with interest-only payments, and using the proceeds to purchase more consumables. If we get to a point where the housing bubble bursts, the middle class and the poor, many of whom have borrowed to the hilt, will find themselves in a deep financial crater. The gap between the rich who are not leveraged and all others will become enormous, and the disequilibrium could lead to social unrest and dissatisfaction among a great majority of the population.

I am as much opposed to high tax rates as is Mr. Bartlett, but if we are going to lower taxes across the board, fiscal policy-makers should encourage a diminution of government spending and foster a policy that encourages the less well off to pay down their debt loads rather than the opposite.

FRED EHRLMAN
New York City

TO THE EDITOR:

Bruce Bartlett claims that “it is clear that Americans

continue to believe in the Horatio Alger model, according to which everyone, no matter how humble his beginnings, has a chance to make it big.” But this model for upward mobility in today’s America is flawed. Vast advances in technology have not translated into wealth for every individual. The cost of living in many of our metropolitan areas has soared, making it difficult for the middle class and for new immigrants to climb the economic and social ladder. From New York to San Diego, real-estate prices continually reach new highs, making it hard for first-time buyers to purchase a home.

Mr. Bartlett’s assertion that the wealthy will provide “the capital that will eventually raise productivity and wages across the economy” is largely untrue. The new phenomenon of outsourcing, and the flight of our manufacturing industry to Asia and Latin America, has had negative consequences for American workers. Wages in this country have remained stagnant for the past five years, and the minimum wage still hovers at an embarrassing \$5.15 an hour. Gallup tells us that only 3 percent of Americans describe the economy as “excellent,” and only 33 percent describe it as “good.” The wealthy invest in globalization, not in America. Upward mobility seems like an unreachable dream for many people.

NICK GATSOULIS
Astoria, New York

TO THE EDITOR:

Bruce Bartlett presents impressive data to refute the *New York Times’s* assertions in its “Class Matters” series. If I have any criticism of his

article, it is that he does not sufficiently focus on the illogic inherent in the *Times’s* reporting in order to expose the fallacy of its reporters’ conclusions.

Perhaps the most egregious example occurred in the article titled “When Richer Weds Poorer, Money Isn’t the Only Difference.” This article highlights the marriage of Cate Woolner, a relatively wealthy woman, and Dan Croteau, identified as a member of the lower middle class. Woolner had met Croteau and asked him out for coffee provided he was “not involved with someone, not a Republican, and not an alien life form.” (How the *Times* goes about finding these “representative” subjects could make a fascinating article in itself.)

Both spouses have children from previous marriages, but the article depicts Woolner’s sons as having many opportunities that Croteau’s daughters do not have. One of her sons took “a couple of semesters away [from college] to study in India and to attend massage school while working in a deli near home.” He “fantasizes about opening a brewery-cum-performance-space, traveling through South America, or operating a sunset massage cruise in the Caribbean.” In general, the sons are “easygoing young men, neither of whom has any clear idea what he wants to do in life.” In contrast, one of Croteau’s daughters “is in graduate school in educational administration at the University of Vermont” while the other “is working three jobs while in her second year of law school at American University.”

The article unintentionally makes clear that the supposedly disadvantaged

daughters are in a far better position to improve themselves economically and in other aspects of their lives than the relatively privileged but unfocused sons. The daughters are excellent examples of the upward mobility that is possible in American society, yet the reporter repeatedly portrays them as somehow trapped by their class.

PAUL ROTHSTEIN
Falls Church, Virginia

BRUCE BARTLETT writes:

I am pleased to see Herbert Gintis point out that income mobility has tended to be underestimated in past studies. His statement that a high degree of income mobility is perfectly compatible with a high degree of income inequality is, of course, correct. But, as Anthony Shorrocks and others have shown, there is a huge difference between an unequal society in which there is no mobility and one in which there is a high degree of mobility. As Shorrocks puts it, “the existence of mobility causes inequality to decline.”

Mr. Gintis also argues that conservatives should take the plight of the poor more seriously. I heartily agree. But the issue of inequality and the plight of the poor are not the same thing, though they are often assumed to be. Policies that would improve the lot of the poor by increasing the rate of economic growth, for example, are often opposed by people like Mr. Gintis because the rich would benefit too much, thereby increasing inequality even as the poor are made better off. I think an effective strategy of helping the poor would concentrate on their absolute level of well-being and not

PHILIP ROTH

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
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worry about their relative position. I do not think the poor are helped in any way by policies that simply punish the rich for being rich. You cannot eat Gini coefficients.

Fred Ehrman concedes I am right in saying that the vast increase in housing wealth has disproportionately benefited the middle class, thereby improving the distribution of wealth. Yet he dismisses the point with an irrelevant discussion of national saving. He also dismisses my point about standards of living being based on levels of consumption

rather than income. Somehow, he seems to think that how people actually live is meaningless to their well-being.

What seems to matter to him is how they theoretically should be living based on their income. But this is fallacious for several reasons. Many of those in the bottom income quintile have little income but live quite well. This includes the elderly, many of whom live in homes that are completely paid for; those just starting out in life, with no job but bright prospects; and those who have suffered

a temporary income loss and are either borrowing or drawing down savings to maintain their living standards. Such people are not poor in any meaningful sense. But Mr. Ehrman assures us that they are.

Nick Gatsoulis says that saving and investment are irrelevant to productivity. He is entitled to his opinion. But a contrary view will be found in every economics textbook ever published. He further states that the gains from growth do not accrue to everyone. Of course that is true. But it does not follow that we

should be unconcerned about growth. Clearly, it is the essential precondition for betterment of the human condition. The fact that all will not necessarily share in the bounty or to the same degree is a poor reason to deny all the rest an improvement in their living standards. Moreover, where are we going to get the resources to aid the poor through governmental programs if we do not have a high level of growth?

I thank Paul Rothstein for further exposing the illogic of the *New York Times* series on class.

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
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


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
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


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
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
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
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Defending and Advancing Freedom *A Symposium*

To commemorate COMMENTARY's sixtieth anniversary, and in an effort to advance discussion of the present American position in the world, the editors addressed the following statement and questions to a group of leading thinkers:

IN RESPONSE to a radically changed world situation since the Islamist attacks of 9/11, the United States under George W. Bush has adopted a broad new approach to national security. The Bush Doctrine, as this policy has come to be known, emphasizes the need for preemption in order to "confront the worst threats before they emerge." It also stresses the need to transform the cultures that breed hatred and fanaticism by—in a historically stunning move—actively promoting democracy and liberty in the Middle East and beyond. In the President's words, "We live in a time when the defense of freedom requires the advance of freedom."

This sweeping redirection of policy has provoked intense controversy, especially but not only over its practicality, and especially but not only over its application to Iraq. At issue as well are the precise nature of the threats faced by the United States and the West, the specific tactics adopted by the Bush administration in meeting them, American capabilities and staying power, relations with traditional allies, the larger intentions and moral bona fides of U.S. foreign policy, and much else besides. Opinion on these matters is divided not only between the Left and the Right in political and intellectual life but, quite sharply, among American conservatives themselves.

1. Where have you stood, and where do you now stand, in relation to the Bush Doctrine? Do you agree with the President's diagnosis of the threat we face and his prescription for dealing with it?

2. How would you rate the progress of the Bush Doctrine so far in making the U.S. more secure and in working toward a safer world environment? What about the policy's longer-range prospects?

3. Are there particular aspects of American policy, or of the administration's handling or explanation of it, that you would change immediately?

4. Apart from your view of the way the Bush Doctrine has been defined or implemented, do you agree with its expansive vision of America's world role and the moral responsibilities of American power?

The responses, 36 in all, appear below in alphabetical order.

This symposium is sponsored by the EDWIN MORRIS GALE MEMORIAL FUND.

Paul Berman

THE BUSH DOCTRINE contains two strands of analysis that, pushing in opposite directions, have produced gigantic failures in American policy. The doctrine's first strand affirms that the United States and the world are threatened by rogue states and some dangerous non-state actors, whose motivations are, at bottom, self-interested. These enemies ought to be brought to heel by swift military action, keeping the power of command in American hands and relying on the latest gizmos of high-tech weaponry.

The Bush Doctrine's second strand asserts that the United States and the world are threatened by full-scale ideological movements calling for aggressive violence and random slaughter, and resembling in some ways the classic totalitarian ideologies of the past. These movements, being popular, will never be defeated by armies alone. They will be defeated, instead, by countermovements that will engage the totalitarians in argument and that will secure their triumphs only by constructing the kinds of institutions that favor liberal and rationalist ideas. The countermovements will have to build, in short, a new political culture in key regions. Military force might well be required to give the anti-totalitarians a boost—to lift them into power, in certain cases, and to help them stay there. But ultimately the victories will have to be political and ideological.

The champions of the Bush Doctrine, to my knowledge, have never laid out the principles of this second strand of thought in much detail. President Bush has delivered some intelligent speeches about totalitarianism and "ideologies of hate," but when he has spoken off the cuff he has sometimes recast the ideological battle in terms that might seem appropriate to a rustic Christian preacher, all of which suggests a somewhat casual or non-committal attitude.

In any fight against mass movements that are animated by mad ideological beliefs, the first thing to do is to mount a campaign of ideas—a campaign to identify the totalitarian doctrines and expose their flaws. The Bush administration has never managed to mount anything of the sort, at least not on the eye-catching and ambitious scale that our current predicament would seem to require (though I'm aware that, here and there within the government, some people are doing their best). Instead, the administration has launched public-relations programs in the Muslim world, which have been laughable—reinforcing the impression that the Bush Doctrine's second strand has been conceived as an afterthought and is valued mainly for its oratorical opportunities.

The second strand does have military implications, and these are easy to identify, even to a military non-expert like me. The main purpose of military action, from this viewpoint, ought to be to support the political development and popular strength of the anti-totalitarian movements. Toward this end, military action ought to be designed to promote liberal and rationalist goals—and therefore ought to be consistent, as much as possible, with liberal principles. There is an obvious way to go about launching military actions that deploy large numbers of troops and observe liberal principles and encourage a new political culture, and this obvious way is to make use of the elephantine mechanisms of law and multilateral institutions. The first strand of the Bush Doctrine emphasizes the military value of being sleek, agile, and indifferent to world opinion, but the second emphasizes the military value of actions that are plodding, punctilious, and popular.

President Bush has tried to meld these strands together. It can't be done. He has described the enemy every which way, and in so doing has left most of the world, including our own part of it,

fatefully confused. It is shocking to me that, four years after 9/11, the White House has generated no consensus, none at all, about the general nature of the enemies we face. We invaded Iraq on the military basis of the first strand, only to discover our urgent need for the military qualities implied in the second. And disasters have followed.

The first Bush administration, back in 1991, badly underestimated the Baathists and ended up allowing Saddam to achieve a victory, if only by allowing him to remain in power. The administration thereby betrayed the Kurds and Shiites of Iraq, who were slaughtered in droves. The second Bush administration has committed precisely the same error. Thus the United States has for the second time created a situation in which huge masses of Iraqis, our own allies, have been slaughtered by their and our enemies. This is surely one of the worst things the U.S. has ever done in modern times—something disgraceful yet somewhat understandable the first time, and beyond disgraceful the second time.

If I had my druthers, I would love to see President Bush fire every one of his top advisers, and keep on firing them, the way that Lincoln did during the Civil War, until a new Ulysses Grant, or several of them, civilian and military, somehow emerged. I would love to see the President reach out to those people within the European Left, not to mention the American Democrats, who share the values of the second strand. Okay, I'm dreaming. This administration is much too sectarian to do anything of the sort. Besides, the administration radiates an air of "what, me worry?" incompetence, which will inhibit any effort to undo the disasters of the past.

Is there something to be said, at least, for the Bush Doctrine's expansive vision of American responsibility? In my view, it is a mistake to bang too heavily on an American drum. The administration has managed to reduce the gigantic question of resisting the totalitarian and fascist movements of our time to a simple question of American hegemony. We should be emphasizing something else—the need for liberal and democratic societies of many kinds to establish a hegemony of principles of human decency and mutual respect. We ought to rid ourselves of every single aspect of what is called the Bush Doctrine, except for those aspects that could just as well be called the Franklin Roosevelt Doctrine of the Four Freedoms. The United States with its wealth and power and military capabilities should certainly make outsized contributions to the foreign-policy programs of the future, but these programs ought

to be conceived in a light of practical internationalism instead of incoherent nationalism.

PAUL BERMAN, *a writer in residence at New York University, is the author of Terror and Liberalism and, most recently, Power and the Idealists: Or, the Passion of Joschka Fischer and Its Aftermath.*

Max Boot

I APPLAUD THE Bush Doctrine. I think it was the right response—the only possible response—to the horror of 9/11. In light of the very real prospect that millions of Americans may be killed by biological or nuclear weapons, it would be madness to sit back and rely on the law-enforcement approach that failed on 9/11. While President Bush has improved the effectiveness of homeland-security efforts, he has correctly placed the emphasis on a forward defense strategy. This means killing or detaining terrorists even before they attack; denying them sanctuary; and trying to dry up their sources of support by promoting a constructive alternative for the Muslim world—namely, liberal democracy.

This policy has been largely successful. Who would have dreamed in September 2001 that we would soon see the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baathists in Iraq, or the establishment of nascent democracies in their place; the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon; the renunciation by Libya of its WMD program; the breakup of the biggest nuclear-smuggling ring in history, run by Pakistan's A.Q. Khan; the establishment of pro-Western democracies in Ukraine and Georgia; and, perhaps most importantly of all, not a single major terrorist attack on U.S. soil? Not all of these facts can be ascribed solely or even mainly to American action; some might even be due to sheer, temporary luck. But even if we are hit again tomorrow, a four-year respite is pretty good—and more than almost everyone (myself included) expected.

That said, I think there are major problems with the way the Bush Doctrine has been implemented—or, more accurately, not implemented. After 9/11, the President vowed that "you are either with us or against us." Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia appear not to have gotten the message.

In all three of these supposed American allies, the

news media—which remain under the thumb of the state—continue to spew anti-American rhetoric of startling virulence and breathtaking falsity. Pakistan is allowing Islamist extremist groups to use its soil as a base for attacks on U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Egypt has responded to U.S. demands for democracy with sham elections in which Hosni Mubarak won a Saddam-style 88 percent of the vote. And, despite some efforts to curtail terrorist financing, Saudi Arabia continues to bankroll *madrassas* and mosques around the world that remain breeding grounds of fanaticism. What consequences have they suffered? None that I'm aware of.

Admittedly these are hard problems; in all three cases there is reason to fear that any alternative regime might be even worse. But what about Syria? Bashar Assad—the world's sole remaining Baathist dictator—allows jihadist killers to use his country as a transit point into Iraq, where they murder many Americans and even more Iraqis. Syria has been warned for more than two years to shape up or face the consequences. Yet none has been forthcoming. This cannot be for fear of bringing to power a Syrian government even more inimical to U.S. interests than the current one; it is hard to imagine such a regime.

The failure better to police the Iraq-Syria border—which would probably necessitate military action in Syria itself—has been one of the biggest problems with the U.S. liberation of Iraq, but it is far from the only one. The lack of pre-invasion diplomacy, the lack of post-invasion planning, the lack of ground troops, the lack of intelligence, the lack of coordination and oversight, the lack of armor, the lack of electricity—all these errors have been noted ad nauseam. There has been some exaggeration of them by the President's political opponents, along with an implausible attempt to dump the blame on a handful of “neocon” appointees while ignoring the culpability of senior military officers and non-neocon civilians. But in essence most of the charges are true.

There is no question that the war has been bungled in many respects. And yet, that doesn't make the Iraq war very different from any other—including World War II, where many blunders (Anzio, Dieppe, Iwo Jima) killed more Allied troops in a single day than died during the first two years of fighting in Iraq. If we win in Iraq—and, despite everything that has gone wrong, victory is still the most likely outcome—the missteps along the way will be forgotten.

To his credit, President Bush has not made the most serious mistake of all, which would be to lose

his nerve. His steely determination to stay the course, notwithstanding the baying of the press and the Democrats (forgive the redundancy), is giving Iraqis the breathing room they need to build political and security institutions that might be able to survive a drawdown (though not a total pullout) of U.S. forces.

We're finally on the right course in Iraq, though it has taken a while to get there. I am not so sure we're on any course at all in dealing with the looming threat of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear-weapons programs. In both cases, the administration has so far been satisfied with toothless multilateral diplomacy that has merely bought time for atomic assembly lines to ramp up. There are no easy answers here, and military action is not a terribly palatable option. But why hasn't the U.S. done more to try to bring about peaceful regime change? The President has talked eloquently about the “non-negotiable demands of human dignity.” I wish he had done more to promote those demands in the two remaining members of the “axis of evil.”

Lest I end on a sour note, some perspective is in order. No President can achieve everything or please everyone. Even as Bush's poll ratings go south for the winter, it helps to remember how reviled Harry Truman was when he left office in 1953. His reputation revived in subsequent years when it became clear that he had set in place the containment policies that ultimately won the cold war. So, too, I suspect George W. Bush will one day be seen as the President who set us on the long road to winning the war on Islamist terror.

MAX BOOT is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a contributing editor of the Weekly Standard, and a weekly foreign-affairs columnist for the Los Angeles Times.

William F. Buckley, Jr.

I DO NOT count myself a supporter of the Bush Doctrine, though I count myself a supporter of Bush. The President's “diagnosis” of the threat we faced—or were facing—or continue to face—requires more parsing than I think the editors of COMMENTARY would wish from me. The threat he singled out in 2002 focused on the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction by an enemy of freedom. Here was a dictator who had succeeded, in

his own country, in ending freedom, and was putatively determined to succeed beyond his shores, reaching, perhaps, to our own.

I do not think that the President, since the invasion, established retrospectively either the capability of Saddam Hussein to extend his threat or his determination to attempt to do so. I think the President acted on the intelligence at hand. But even if he acted as we'd wished he had, his actions did not bring about the termination of a prior foreign-policy doctrine for the United States or any doctrinal prescription for dealing with such threats in the future.

Bush's success has to be weighed by—there is no other way—the success of the Iraqi venture. Something that very much needed doing, after 9/11, was a demonstration of U.S. resolve and capability. We demonstrated both in Afghanistan. The undertaking was decisive, rapid, and exemplary in other aspects as well. The ensuing campaign, against Iraq, has required for its justification a kind of empirical success we have not yet achieved. We have not defeated the insurgency or united the Iraqi nation. If we do achieve those ends, and if they bring on a step forward in the direction of Iraqi security and constitutional government, the President will rightly be acclaimed for having dared to undertake something that vastly reorders life and hope in a critical part of the world. If the venture fails, he will justly be held accountable for imprudence.

Are there aspects of our policy that I would change? This is a tough question. As the costs increase, so also should the scale of our visionary purpose. It is inappropriate for the President to abbreviate, let alone abandon, a rhetoric that underwrites a great enterprise. If the Iraq venture were merely one more great-power gymnastic exercise, he would find the ongoing costs hard to justify. As these costs mount, the purpose of expending the necessary funds and other resources cannot be undermined. As we have come this far, and done what has been done, I do not see anything of a military character to be done differently from what we are doing, and I cannot see any prospect of a substantial geostrategic modification of the thinking that brought us to where we are.

But, to address the final question, I do not believe that Bush's expanded view of the U.S. role is wise. Our goals, as pronounced once by Woodrow Wilson and now by George Bush, remain organically commendable as free societies are themselves commendable. In the nature of things, however, rescue missions to tormented nations of the world have to be selective—a geostrategic art form.

This is so obviously the case that it is embarrassing to undertake to remake it. "What do you call dictators of countries that have nuclear bombs?" the saw began, decades ago.

Answer: "Sir."

We are not about to extend the President's concern for freedom to an energetic concern for freedom in mainland China. We cannot even rev up the political energy to do anything about the genocide in Sudan. Every now and then the stars arrange themselves to give us an ideological mission we can handle, as in Grenada under Reagan—and before that, on an entirely different scale, the war against Hitler. But accompanying doctrines are to be reserved for political oratory. In days and decades ahead, the U.S. will do good for other countries and for humankind, but not, I think, as a doctrinal exercise traceable to a "Bush Doctrine."

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., *editor-at-large of National Review, is the author most recently of Last Call for Blackford Oakes, a novel (Harcourt).*

Eliot A. Cohen

I HAVE NEVER understood the supposed novelty of the Bush Doctrine. The right to preemption is inherent in the functioning of a more or less anarchical society of states. Were the French to face a probable attack from, say, Tunisia, and if they thought they could do something about it in advance, they would. So would any other state not run by cowards or fools.

Nor is it a matter of great novelty that the path to security from Islamic terror lies in some liberalization of the Middle East—the spread, not so much of democracy in the sense of plebiscites or even regular elections, but of limited government, free press, the rule of law, and a regular rotation of leaders who can be evicted from power by something other than illness, death, or coup. What are the alternatives, really? To wall off the Middle East from all contact with the developed world? To turn the rule of turbulent societies over to reliable thugs? To accept Islamic fanatics in their rise to power, with the hope that its exercise would moderate them? The first is impossible, the second and third have been tried and failed, and even in the most appeasement-prone capitals of Old Europe or Asia, you will not find

anyone who seriously believes in them. Indeed, only a handful of American academics, intoxicated with theories that deny the importance of religion as a force in the life of humanity, believe that we have the option of sitting pat, and waiting for the forces of political realism to work their inexorable and presumably beneficent will.

In the short term, doctrines do not change the world: action does. The much underrated removal of al Qaeda's base in Afghanistan and the killing or arrest of most of its pre-9/11 leadership (and the scattering of the rest) did not remove the fundamental problem, but it did severely weaken an exceptionally dangerous organization. To be sure, the ideology of al Qaeda lives, and numerous cells remain dormant or have sprouted up around the world. But smashing and dispersing the core hierarchy probably prevented more mega-terrorist events; while dealing with loosely networked terrorists is difficult, counteracting a well-organized and coordinated enemy of this kind would be even more difficult.

About the long term we simply do not know. The liberation of Iraq was a good thing in and of itself; the language of freedom that accompanied it has had a salutary effect in Lebanon, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Arab world; and American military prowess, and our demonstrated will to use it, produced good results in Libya. But it is no doubt true that the war increased antipathy to the United States in the Arab world, and in the short run has stimulated the recruitment of terrorists inflamed by the lies of al Jazeera as well as a bitterly anti-American Arab, and in some cases European and Asian, intelligentsia.

Launching a war is like rolling a giant stone down a mountain slope strewn with rocks: we cannot predict where the avalanche will go. Whether Iraq is a success or a failure (and what success and failure mean is open to debate), the consequences will be prodigious, for good or for ill. This is a bold and determined administration; the war was a bold stroke, and boldness has both risks and rewards.

There are three things the administration could do, in ascending order of difficulty and descending order of likelihood, to make its doctrine effective. The first is to speak plainly about the nature of the enemy—Islamic extremism—and to do so in ways that do not misstate its argument, its appeal, or its roots. Administration spokesmen shrink from using the word "Islam," for fear of being accused of bigotry. Anodyne formulations like "a perversion of a great religion" or "a few extremists" do not capture the power of this movement. There is a great need for a sober, detailed, and ed-

ucational rhetoric about whom we are fighting. Happy talk to the Muslim world about what nice people Americans are is not only no substitute—it fools only those who utter it.

Second, the administration wrongly steered away from asking the American people to sacrifice anything in this war. Lowering taxes, it hampered its own ability to raise defense budgets. More importantly, it allowed the spirit of patriotism and resolve that flooded the country after 9/11 to dissipate over time. If you do not ask people to lend their money or their children to a fight, they will not think that they are at war. Nor was the administration willing to accept the political pain of a serious effort to undermine the grip of oil on the economy—a grip that indirectly feeds the infrastructure of terror—by imposing taxes that would reduce consumption and stimulate alternative fuels or thriftier uses of those we have. If this is war—and it is—then it demands sacrifice and an appeal for service.

Finally, the administration has suffered from its insularity, its overwhelming emphasis on loyalty to the exclusion of all other virtues, its suspicion of those with whom it could have made common cause, its refusal to admit missteps or failure, its inability to fire the incompetent (as opposed to the merely disgruntled). Huddled now in its bunker, assaulted not only for a botched war abroad but for a bumbling reaction to natural catastrophe at home, it is unlikely to open itself up; but it would be better if it could.

The expansive vision of the Bush administration seems to me broadly right, and I admire unservedly the courage and determination with which it has pressed the fight. But how I wish that the spine of steel had found its match in an eloquence suitable to the moment; how I would have desired as great a stress on talent as on fidelity; how much better if the commitment to a vision of freedom abroad were matched with an equal and effective commitment to greatness at home; how ironic and sad that competence—the quality upon which this administration prided itself when it came to office—has, for too long, been in such short supply.

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Niall Ferguson

IN MY book *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (2004), I argued that the Bush Doctrine was less radical as a doctrine than was widely thought when it was promulgated.

The administration's key document, the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, argued that because "deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network or murderous dictator . . . constitute as grave a threat as can be imagined," the President should, at his discretion, act preemptively to forestall any such threat, even if the threat was not imminent in the traditional sense of armies massing on borders. Many critics seized upon this as a dangerous new departure. Yet the idea of preemption had been asserted by more than one President during the cold war, and had been assumed by them all. The radical aspect of the Bush Doctrine was not so much the theory as the practice.

Even before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it became clear that the White House intended to use the doctrine of preemption to justify violating the national sovereignty of certain "rogue regimes" and using military means to neutralize perceived future threats, preferably by changing those regimes. In *Empire: The Rise and Fall of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (2003), I had expressed some doubts as to whether the United States had the economic, military, and political capabilities to make a success of what was, in all but name, an imperial undertaking. Unlike many critics of the Bush administration, I did not dismiss the project as morally wrong. On the contrary, I argued that there were a number of regimes around the world that were likely to cease sponsoring terrorism, acquiring nuclear weapons, or murdering their own people only as a result of effective foreign intervention. My qualms have all along related to the ability of the United States successfully to execute such interventions.

I have no doubt that the 2002 *National Security Strategy* was right in its diagnosis of the dangers posed to the United States. Nor do I doubt that a preemptive strike to avert the use of weapons of mass destruction against American targets would be legitimate. But I would add two qualifications.

First, terror networks are a proven threat even when they do not have WMD. Second, it now seems clear that Saddam Hussein did not pose even a distant threat to the United States in 2003, though it was impossible to be sure of that at the time. As I contend in *Colossus*, the claims made by

the American and British governments in connection with Iraq's WMD capability and links to al Qaeda lacked credibility. There were good reasons for overthrowing Saddam, but these were not among them.

Is, then, the United States more secure today than in 2000? From the point of view of U.S. military personnel, it is less secure, in the sense that they are much more likely to be killed or wounded by hostile action than during the 1990's. How far this increased risk is outweighed by the reduced threat from a jailed Saddam is not clear.

On the other hand, we cannot know the degree to which actions taken by the Bush administration in Afghanistan, Iraq, and—perhaps more importantly—in the American homeland have reduced the ability of organizations like al Qaeda to attack the United States. My hunch is that another 9/11-type attack could happen even while this President is still in the White House; there are too many ways for terrorists to enter the country and operate undetected, and too many targets to protect. There is also good reason to think that the disruption of al Qaeda's leadership structures has been compensated for by the formation of new cells and the recruitment of new operatives, notably in Europe. This may turn out to be one of the most important unintended consequences of the invasion of Iraq.

The longer-range prospects of the Bush Doctrine are bleak. The next President will need to come up with a national-security strategy that commands much greater legitimacy abroad. It might make more sense in the future to keep the doctrine of preemption tacit.

Are there particular aspects of American policy that I would change immediately? Secretary of State Rice has already made the single most important change that I would have recommended to the administration last year, namely, to revive the art of diplomacy. The United States came perilously close to less-than-splendid isolation in 2004, not least because the administration came to believe its own rhetoric about the viability of "acting alone" (another component of the *National Security Strategy*). But success in Iraq cannot be achieved with the support of Tony Blair alone. The resources needed to contain the burgeoning civil war in Iraq must come from outside as well as inside the English-speaking world.

As for what the editors call the Bush Doctrine's "expansive vision of America's world role and the moral responsibilities of American power," I revert once more to the wording of the *National Security Strategy*. I am all for "actively work[ing] to bring

the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.” The same goes for promoting “the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.” But a further defect of the *National Security Strategy* was its assumption that doing these things would necessarily enhance American national security. On the contrary: the more the United States represents itself as a messianic force spreading freedom around the world, the more resentment it will arouse; see the history of the British empire, *passim*.

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Aaron L. Friedberg

SINCE 9/11, the “Bush Doctrine” label has been applied to various aspects of administration policy, from the President’s initial “with us or against us” warning to state sponsors of terrorism, to his declared willingness to act preemptively (and, if need be, unilaterally) to head off the danger of covert WMD attack, to his assertion that final victory in the global war on terror depends on the spread of liberty across the Middle East and throughout the Islamic world. I will focus on this final usage, which is likely to prove the most lasting.

Is a campaign aimed at the political transformation of the “broader Middle East” essential to the defeat of terrorism? If so, how can it be carried forward to a successful conclusion at an acceptable cost? The first of these questions is easier to answer than the second.

I believe the administration’s assessment of the Islamist threat is fundamentally correct. In al Qaeda and its affiliates, we confront an enemy who aims to inflict as much pain on us and our allies as possible, thereby dividing the West, forcing a retraction of American power, and clearing the way for the overthrow of local “apostate” regimes and their absorption into a transnational caliphate. Having concocted quasi-theological justifications for their actions, the terrorists put no limit on the numbers they are willing to kill to achieve their

goals; all that stands in their way is, for the moment, an apparent lack of means.

The menace we face may not be “existential,” in the same sense as the cold-war threat from the Soviet Union. Al Qaeda cannot rain down tens of thousands of nuclear warheads on American cities. But, with a few well-placed dirty bombs or vials of anthrax, it could impose terrible human and financial costs and radically alter, perhaps for a generation or more, the character of our open society and the extent of our integration into the global economy. The passage of time since 9/11, and the absence thus far of a follow-on attack on American soil, have caused some observers to lose sight of these dangers and even to argue that they have been grossly exaggerated. I know of no one involved in the conduct of the war on terror who shares this sense of complacency.

The ideology that motivates the jihadists has now metastasized and spread, so that it finds adherents even in free societies. But it sprang to life first in the diverse despotisms of the broader Middle East, and these are the sources from which it still feeds and which continue, either deliberately or indirectly, to sustain it. Even if it were possible to wave a wand and transform these societies overnight into functioning liberal democracies, the jihadist movement would likely live on, at least for a time. But unless and until progress is made in this direction, it seems *certain* to survive, and to thrive. The absence of liberty fuels frustration and extremism by cutting off avenues for more moderate forms of political expression, reinforcing social and economic stagnation, and feeding a sense of collective weakness, shame, and rage.

The other key elements of U.S. strategy—stronger homeland defenses and a relentless global offensive against Islamist terror networks—are necessary to keep the enemy off balance and reduce the risk of future attack; but they will not be sufficient, in themselves, to achieve a lasting peace. Jihadism cannot be defeated on the defensive, or even by cutting back its visible offshoots. It must be pulled up by the roots.

There are alternatives to a strategy that has transformation as its ultimate goal. If pressed, most liberal critics of the Bush Doctrine would say they agree with its ends but differ over means (more “soft” power and less “hard,” more multilateralism and less unilateralism). While the differences are in some respects overstated, there is a serious debate to be had here and a consensus to be hammered out, though controversies over Iraq have made this all but impossible for the moment.

More distinct are the options offered by advocates of what can only be called a policy of appeasement, on the one hand, and the self-described “realists,” on the other. The first group asserts that by leaving Iraq, cutting support for Israel, and perhaps withdrawing altogether from the Middle East, we may be able eventually to deprive the jihadists of their base of support. Despite the evident moral and strategic bankruptcy of these arguments, they have begun to gain ground recently in academic circles, where books “bravely” questioning our ties to Israel and “proving” that suicide terrorists are motivated solely by a desire to free their homes from occupation are currently the rage. Fortunately, such ideas seem unlikely for now to exert much influence on practical policy.

It is the “realists” who most stand to gain if American policy in Iraq comes to be seen as a costly failure. Such an outcome would be taken as proof that the pursuit of liberalization in the broader Middle East is a fool’s errand and that, instead of criticizing “friendly” local regimes and pressuring them to reform, we should be content to make common cause in wiping out the jihadists. What is needed, in this view, is a more effective and if need be a more ruthless version of the policy that existed before 9/11. The fact that this approach has already proved its ineffectiveness may not lessen its appeal, at least for a while.

In the long run, and whatever happens in Iraq, some variant of the Bush Doctrine will remain an essential part of overall U.S. strategy for defeating Islamist terrorism. The questions facing this administration as it enters its final quarter are more practical than theoretical. How to tailor the right mix of pressures and inducements to move “friendly” regimes toward meaningful reforms, and how to deal with openly hostile holdouts? How to minimize the inevitable risks of transition (the “one man, one vote, one time” problem)? How to institutionalize the “forward strategy of freedom” within the U.S. government and the Western alliance? And how to ensure continuing domestic political support for a goal that is both necessary and just?

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Francis Fukuyama

I BELIEVE THAT the Bush Doctrine’s central assumption—that the United States had to transform the politics of the Middle East as a means of solving the post-9/11 terrorist threat—was misguided, and that the problem was greatly compounded by extremely poor policy execution before and after the Iraq war. For the record, I made up my mind that the war was a bad idea by the fall of 2002, i.e., before the war began, when I was asked to lead part of a Pentagon study on strategy in the war on terrorism, and not in response to events as they unfolded after the war.

There is no question that the 9/11 attacks exposed a very new kind of threat, and that the usual tools of the cold war—containment and deterrence—would not work against suicide terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. The Afghan war was a fully justified exercise in prevention, where we dismantled terrorist networks that were clearly of danger to us.

The problem was that the Bush administration merged the terrorist/WMD problem with the problem of Iraq and rogue-state proliferators more generally. The latter was and continues to be a very serious issue, but it was never clear that a rogue state—which (unlike stateless terrorists) has a return address—would go to all the trouble of developing nuclear weapons only to give them to a terrorist organization.

The bigger problem lay with the diagnosis of the root causes of the terrorism, and the prescription for fixing it. Radical Islamism is in no way an assertion of traditional Muslim values or religiosity. Olivier Roy has argued persuasively in *Globalized Islam* that it needs to be seen as an essentially modern phenomenon driven by the deterritorialization of Islam, primarily in Western Europe, and by the forces of globalization and modernization that we otherwise celebrate. In a traditional Muslim society, your identity is fixed by the society into which you are born; only when you live in a non-Muslim environment does it occur to you to ask who you are. The profound alienation that results makes poorly assimilated second- and third-generation Muslims susceptible to a pure, universalistic ideology like that of Osama bin Laden. Mohammed Atta and the other organizers of 9/11, the Madrid and London conspirators, and Mohammed Bouyeri, murderer of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, all fall into this category.

This means that more democracy and more modernization will not solve our near-term terror-

ism problem, but may well exacerbate it. I believe that both democracy and modernization are good things and should be promoted in the Middle East for their own sake. But we will continue to have a serious terrorist problem in democratic Western Europe, regardless of what happens in Egypt or Lebanon.

Even if one accepted the view that the Middle East needed to be "fixed," it was hard to understand what made us think that we were capable of fixing it. So much of what neoconservatives have written over the past decades has concerned the unanticipated consequences of overly ambitious social engineering, and how the effort to get at root causes of social problems is a feckless task. If this has been true of efforts to combat crime or poverty in U.S. cities, why should anyone have believed we could get at the root causes of alienation and terrorism in a part of the world that we didn't understand particularly well, and where our policy instruments were very limited?

The other constraint is very specific to the United States. We have gotten involved in nation-building efforts in many places over the years: Reconstruction of the South after the Civil War, occupation of the Philippines and the various Monroe Doctrine interventions, Japan, Germany, South Korea, and South Vietnam, and finally the humanitarian interventions of the post-cold-war era in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and other places. Of these, only Japan, Germany, and South Korea were clear successes, and these were places where U.S. occupation forces came and basically never left.

Americans have a habit of starting such projects enthusiastically and then losing interest after things go bad, usually at about the five-year mark; this is what happened with Reconstruction, in Nicaragua between 1927 and 1932, in South Vietnam, and in many other places. We sign up local allies, make a stab at giving them modern institutions, and then pull the plug. I was fearful that we would repeat this pattern in Iraq prior to the war, and nothing that has happened since then has alleviated that concern.

We need to win militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is extremely important that we resist pressures to reduce numbers of American forces prematurely. But we also need to conceive of the broader war on terrorism as a classic counterinsurgency campaign fought out on a global scale. In that campaign, winning hearts and minds is as important as neutralizing the hard-core terrorists. I strongly believe in the need for an expansive foreign policy that shapes the insides of states and not just their external behavior. But it is American soft

power, not hard, that will be the primary instrument for promoting democracy and development around the world, and we need thoroughly to rethink the structure and funding of the instruments we have for doing this.

After the first four years of the Bush Doctrine, the United States has created a new terrorist haven in Iraq and a power vacuum that will destabilize regional politics for some time to come. While allies may seek to restore good relations with Washington at an elite level, at a popular level there has been a seismic shift in the way that much of the world perceives the United States. Our image, fairly or not, is no longer the Statue of Liberty but the hooded prisoner at Abu Ghraib. Fixing this problem is a project that will preoccupy us for many years to come.

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Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.

I HEARTILY AGREE with the Bush Doctrine as described by the editors and as outlined in the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*.

We are once again engaged in a global conflict imposed upon us by a dangerous, totalitarian ideology that has properly come to be known as Islamofascism. Its adherents seek to implement their vision of a global caliphate governed by a Taliban-style repressive version of *shari'a* law. They will employ all available means to accomplish that goal.

In a world in which Islamofascists and their state sponsors and allies can reasonably be expected to have access to weapons of mass destruction, a proactive, offensive, and, where necessary, preemptive American strategy is indispensable. Nothing less is at stake than our survival as a free, democratic, and secular nation.

If we are to defeat the Islamofascists, however, we are going to need something more: the help of non-Islamist Muslims, who are as much at risk from this intolerant ideology as are those in the non-Muslim world. We must legitimate and empower our natural allies in this war. The President is right that one means of doing so is to help them

establish governments that are representative, accountable, and conducive to economic growth—in stark contrast to the repression and privation associated with Islamist misrule.

All that said, I am happier with the Bush Doctrine conceptually than with its implementation. In defining the enemy in this war, the administration has largely refused to go beyond euphemisms like “terror” and “an evil ideology.” The unwillingness to declare Islamofascism the force that drives our foes has made problematic the devising—let alone the successful implementation—of strategies for defeating them.

This failure has had negative consequences for the war effort abroad and at home. The President’s bold assertion that “you are either with us or against us” has been undermined by the administration’s practice of certifying as “with us” the nation that is arguably most responsible for the worldwide spread of Islamofascism: Saudi Arabia. Despite the President’s admirable rhetoric about spreading freedom, two other nations demonstrably not “with us”—Iran and North Korea—have moved from being members of the “axis of evil” to being negotiating partners. At the insistence of putative friends like China and Russia and the connivance of sometime allies like France and Germany, these odious regimes are being assured of our willingness to support their continued misrule in exchange for still more fraudulent promises of non-proliferation.

The administration is also confusing elections with the establishment of institutions essential to functioning and enduring democracies. Elections in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza have helped to empower Islamofascists. Even in Turkey, with its well-established secular democracy, an elected Islamist regime is mounting a classic takeover of the institutions of civil society. Ignoring these realities is a formula for still greater setbacks down the road.

Unfortunately, the same disconnect between rhetoric and practice is evident in the administration’s outreach to the Muslim community here at home. While it talks of rooting out domestic support cells, charities, and front organizations that enable terrorists here and abroad, it has repeatedly embraced many who have been leaders of and sympathizers with such efforts. This has afforded Islamists access and influence and added to the incoherence of U.S. war policies, while demoralizing truly non- or anti-Islamist Muslims.

Unless promptly corrected, such practices augur ill for needed security improvements over both the

short and long terms. The most urgent change, apart from clarifying the nature of the enemy, is to put the country on a war footing. Four years after the attacks of 9/11, too many Americans have come to believe that the conflict in which we are engaged is the problem of the U.S. military, the President, our allies, or somebody else. That this sentiment is widely held owes much to the fact that the public has been encouraged to think of its job in this conflict as nothing more than going shopping.

There are many ways in which the American people can be asked to assist the war effort. Here are three of the most important.

First, stopping the underwriting of terror. Unbeknownst to most American investors, significant portions of their public-pension funds, mutual funds, life insurance, and private portfolios include stocks of privately held companies that partner with state sponsors of terror. Were that money to be divested, it could have a profound effect on the ability of terror-sponsoring states to underwrite the war the Islamofascists and their friends are waging against us.

Next, enhancing energy security. The public can help deny financial succor to our enemies by reducing our dependence on foreign oil—much of which is purchased from the same nations that are supporting Islamofascism and its allies. There are various ways this can begin to be accomplished. The least painful near-term approach would be to enable domestically produced alcohol-based fuels and electricity to be used on a greatly expanded basis as means of powering the transportation sector.

Third, securing the homeland. Perhaps the most basic step in protecting against future attacks requires the American people to increase their vigilance in monitoring domestic threats. In addition, the nation needs to involve its citizens much more fully in planning for and preparing against future attacks. As Hurricane Katrina reminds us, such capabilities may prove to be of great value in future emergencies, whether natural or man-made.

As for “America’s world role and the moral responsibilities of American power,” I subscribe to an expansive presidential vision that predated and underpins the Bush Doctrine: namely, President Reagan’s conviction that America is “the last best hope of mankind.” From this flows the belief that we should be engaged in the world, not out of some sense of *noblesse oblige*, but rather because it is essential to our own survival in the face of enemies who wish to destroy us and everything we stand for.

Reagan’s philosophy recognized that international peace is best preserved through American

strength. In practice, this requires a robust presence across the globe—one able to respond to the full spectrum of threats, ideally by nipping them in the bud, but in any event confronting them in whatever way is most efficacious *before* they endanger our lives and freedoms.

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Reuel Marc Gerecht

ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT George W. Bush didn't invade Iraq in order to bring democracy to the Middle East—and neoconservatives, with exceptions, didn't advocate war with that in mind—building democracy now defines U.S. policy in the entire region. If democracy succeeds in Iraq, then America, regardless of who sits in the White House, will certainly become more active in promoting representative government. If democracy fails there, then we will become much more timid in encouraging political reform.

Despite the numerous, serious mistakes of the Bush administration in the occupation of Iraq, democracy's chances there remain decent so long as the Shiite political center behind Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani holds. But failure in Iraq may not necessarily dim the prospects of democracy elsewhere in the Muslim world.

The fall of Saddam Hussein has already accelerated convulsive democratic debates in Arab lands and in their more combative and open expatriate media. The region's dictators and kings may have a difficult time stuffing this discontent and dissent back into the tried-and-true shibboleths—principally anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism—that have consumed the intellectual energy of so many and offered the autocrats a safety valve for popular dissatisfaction with the regimes in place. Arab left-wing intellectuals seem today less domesticated than they were just a few years back, when they eagerly turned most of their venom toward Israel and Ariel Sharon. Muslim fundamentalists, especially in Egypt, still the lodestone among Arab nations, seem much less likely to play along, and are increasingly backing the popular push for more open political systems.

Failure in Iraq would mean a civil war between Sunni and Shiite Arabs that would allow for the

rise of a Shiite strongman in Baghdad. Even so, however, this might not at all be seen by Egyptians as a sufficient reason to keep President Hosni Mubarak's family in power. The rest of the Arab world is, like Egypt, overwhelmingly Sunni. With the exceptions of Syria, tiny Bahrain, and Lebanon, democracy in the Arab world would be an intra-Sunni squabble.

Which brings us to a series of important questions for the Bush administration and its successor. Let us suppose that, regardless of what happens in Iraq, the democratic movement among Arabs pushes forward, but, as is probable, with Muslim fundamentalists in the lead. Will the administration shy away from democracy promotion if and when it becomes clear that Muslim fundamentalists will initially do very well in most Arab lands where free elections are allowed?

I myself would argue that the political and cultural evolution of Sunni fundamentalism is central to the death of bin Ladenism, and that democratic politics are an essential part of that evolution. This means that democracy's advance in the Middle East is likely to be a very anti-American process. (Think Latin American anti-Yanquism on speed.) To my mind, this is a painful but necessary step in the evolution of Islamic activism.

Has the Bush administration thought this through? Has it tried to explain to itself, let alone to the American people, how democracy may unfold in the Muslim Middle East? Has the President, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, or Karen Hughes, the new public-diplomacy czarina, called a conclave to figure out what the administration actually believes? It would not appear so.

As for those in the administration who believe that Muslim liberals, progressives, and moderates are the real key to democracy's future in the region—a view that I find in error, but certainly an estimable aspiration—have they troubled to explain how we are going to locate and support such individuals over the heads of the present dictators and kings? Will we endorse open elections where fundamentalists can compete with liberals and others, or will we advocate banning fundamentalists from the election process even when liberals in these countries tell us that doing so will undermine them and us? Should we treat Muslim fundamentalists as beyond the pale, or even as Nazis, as some have argued? (Given that Iran is full of fallen hard-core fundamentalists who now sincerely advocate democracy, the parallel seems strained.)

Another question is useful in considering this complex of issues: are Muslim democracies that re-

strict women's social rights in practice morally superior to Muslim dictatorships that advance them in theory? I think the answer is an emphatic yes, but the administration has so far shown little desire to argue this possibility, thereby allowing the *New York Times* columnist Maureen Dowd to suggest that Saddam Hussein, who was the first Middle Eastern dictator to institute rape as an official means of mind control, was more pro-woman than the democratically sanctioned constituent assembly that drafted Iraq's proposed constitution. Women's rights are a hot-button issue in the United States. It would be wise for the administration to explain how it intends to handle this issue in the socially conservative Middle East.

George W. Bush is one of our most revolutionary Presidents, but regrettably his administration shows little more intellectual ferment than his father's. That is in part because many inside the critical institutions of foreign policy—the State Department, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Pentagon—don't *really* believe in expanding democracy, at least not in the Muslim Middle East. And even among those who share the President's commitment to expanding representative government, and who understand that democracy is an essential component in the big-picture fight against Islamic extremism, there is enormous nervousness about significant change in the status quo. Truth be told, the Bush administration was not that upset when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stole his reelection.

Four years after 9/11, it is still possible to see the United States wavering in its commitment to democracy more than in its commitment to the rulers of the Middle East. It is not hard to imagine Washington's bureaucracies trying hard, once again, to cast the fight against Islamic extremism as essentially a police and intelligence action, which would mean drawing closer to the dictators and kings who run the Middle East's security and intelligence services. If the President isn't vigilant, we could soon be living again in a pre-9/11 world, in which democracy seemed a premature idea for people more suited to prayer and despotism.

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Victor Davis Hanson

ACCORDING TO opinion polls, most Americans are now critical of the President's foreign policy. They are uncertain not merely over the daily fare of explosions in Iraq. Rather, the sustained public attack on American action abroad, emanating from both the Left and the hard Right, has led to bipartisan and broadly-shared condemnation. Even some who once were adherents of preemption have bailed out, claiming that although they supported the removal of Saddam Hussein, they are appalled by what followed. Or, translated, "In hindsight I remain in favor of my near-perfect military campaign, but not your messy reconstruction"—as if America's past wars were not fraught with tragic lapses and muddled operations.

But for all the media hysteria and the indisputable errors of implementation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, moving ahead. Soon it will bear long-term advantage. Despite our inability to articulate the dangers and stakes of the war against radical Islam and our failure to muster the full military potential of the United States, and despite the fact that our own southern border remains vulnerable to terrorist infiltration, there has been enormous progress in the past four years.

We have removed both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Those efforts have cost us over 2,000 American combat deaths, a hard loss and to be mourned, but still two-thirds of the number of American civilians killed on September 11, 2001, the first day of the war. Thanks to our forward policy of hitting rogue regimes abroad and staying on to help the reconstruction, coupled with increased vigilance at home, the United States has not been struck since then.

Inside Iraq there is a constitutional government grinding ahead, and a series of elections slated for ratification and/or amendment. Much is rightly made of Sunni intransigence, yet this minority population, with no oil and with a disreputable past of support for either Saddam or the Zarqawi terrorists, or both, has been put in an untenable position. Its clerics call for Iraqi Sunnis to vote no on the constitution even as Sunni radicals like Zarqawi threaten to kill any who would vote at all.

There has also been a radical transformation in regional mentalities. The elections in Egypt, though boycotted and rigged, were an unprecedented event, and the irregularities quickly ignited popular demonstrations. Events elsewhere are no less significant, as Libya and Pakistan have renounced their nuclear commerce, Syrians are out

of Lebanon, and rudimentary parliaments are forming in the Gulf. Even on the Palestinian question, the death of Arafat, Israel's building of a protective fence and its withdrawal from Gaza, and the removal of Saddam have strengthened the hand of beleaguered reformers in the West Bank and beyond. The onus for policing their miscreants is gradually shifting to the Palestinians themselves, which is where it belongs.

There are, of course, no Swiss cantons arising in the Middle East. Rather, we see the initial tremors of massive tectonic shifts, as the old plates of Islamic radicalism or secular autocracy give way to something new and more democratic. The United States is the primary catalyst of this dangerous but long-overdue upheaval. It has taken the risk almost alone; the ultimate reward will be a more stable world for all.

Much is made of global anti-Americanism and hatred of George Bush. But under closer examination, the furor is mostly confined to Western Europe, the autocratic Middle East, and our own elites here at home. In Europe, our most vocal critics, Jacques Chirac in France and Gerhard Schroeder in Germany, have lost considerable domestic support, and are under challenge by realists worried about their own unassimilated minorities and appreciative of American consistency in the war against radical Islam. In the meantime, Eastern Europeans, Japanese, Australians, and Indians have never been closer to the United States. Russia and China have little beef with our war on terror.

Here at home, the relative lack of bipartisan support is due partly to the media culture of the Left, partly to the turmoil and resentment of an out-of-power Democratic party, partly to uncertainty as to how it will all turn out. On the far Right, some see only too much money being spent, too much proliferation of government, and too much Israel in the background.

What lies ahead? We must continue to navigate the dangerous narrows between the two unacceptable alternatives of secular dictatorship and rule by Islamic law, even as we prod recipients of American aid or military support like Mubarak, Musharraf, and the Saudi royal family to reform. At home, unless we come up with a viable policy combining increased oil production, conservation, and alternative fuels, our ability to protect ourselves from international blackmail will soon begin to erode. Most forbiddingly, nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran or any other non-democratic Middle Eastern country could destroy much if not all of what has

been accomplished. What would have happened in the late 1930's had America found itself dependent on Romanian oil or German coal, or learned that Hitler, Mussolini, or Franco was close to obtaining atomic weapons?

I continue without reserve to support our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and our pressure for reform in the Middle East at large. Not because the Bush Doctrine follows some predetermined neo-conservative agenda—I thought the January 28, 1998 letter by the Project for the New American Century, urging the removal of Saddam Hussein, was ill-conceived at the time—but rather because, in a post-9/11 age, muscular idealism is the new American realism, the one antidote to Islamic radicalism and its appendages of terror.

Rather than seeking empire or economic advantage, or being recklessly utopian, our present policy promotes democracy abroad even as we downsize in Germany and South Korea and withdraw all our troops from Saudi Arabia. This is striking, and admirable. What are we to make of this tough new doctrine that is neither wide-eyed Wilsonian idealism nor cold-war realpolitik? Call it something like enlightened Jacksonianism—a determination to undertake needed military action and to promote political reform consistent with our democratic values when, and only when, a continuation of the status quo abroad first threatens the security of the United States.

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Owen Harries

THE BUSH DOCTRINE was the product of three interacting conditions: American hegemony, American exceptionalism, and American outrage.

The first encouraged the belief that anything the United States willed was achievable. The second insisted that what should be willed was the remaking of the world in America's own image. The third created an enormously powerful pressure for immediate and drastic action.

Taken together, these three conditions constituted a combustible mixture, one not conducive to calm deliberation, the careful weighing of options,

or alertness to the danger of unintended consequences. A mature and experienced President might have been able to resist, modify, or deflect the pressure. President Bush not only yielded to it but gave it authoritative voice, reducing the complexity of the international situation to simple and dangerous Manichean terms: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." (Can you imagine Churchill ever uttering such words, even in the infinitely more drastic conditions of 1940?)

Thus was the Bush Doctrine born. My basic objection to it has been its utter lack of balance. There is nothing wrong with including the promotion of democracy and its associated values as one goal among many in the foreign policy of the United States, one to be pursued with care and modest expectations when it does not conflict with more demanding goals, and when the conditions for its implementation are favorable. There is everything wrong with pretending (or, even worse, genuinely believing) that it can and should be the overriding purpose of policy, one that must be achieved in quick time and by the application of American force.

Nothing demonstrates the imbalance more clearly than the language used in the President's three-page introduction to the *National Security Strategy* document of September 2002. In this first authoritative statement of the doctrine, the President uses the words "liberty" and "freedom," or some variation of them, 28 times; the word "interest" occurs only twice. This, in a document purporting to set out the nation's security strategy.

The defenders of the doctrine insist that this criticism wrongly assumes a conflict between American interests and American values, that the two are in fact mutually reinforcing, if not identical. Indeed, the President claimed as much in his Second Inaugural: "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one." This being so, no hard choices, no setting of priorities, are deemed necessary.

Samuel Huntington long ago suggested that the "pleasant conjuncture of blessings" in their history inclined Americans to believe in "the unity of goodness: to assume that all good things go together." Unfortunately this is not the case. Desirable goals can, and often do, conflict and collide. Hard choices do have to be made and priorities established. And the most inspirational goals are not always the most important ones.

The Bush Doctrine links the promotion of freedom and democracy to the active use of American military might. The danger of such a linking has often been spelled out by both realists and liberals.

Here is the late Robert Osgood, a much respected realist, on the subject:

[M]ilitary force is not only ineffective as an instrument for achieving transcendent moral ends: it is morally dangerous as well. The use of force with a view to such grandiose ends tends to become an end in itself, no longer subject to either moral or practical restrictions, but merely to the intoxication with abstract ideals.

And for those allergic to realism, here is John Stuart Mill, on the same subject:

To go to war for an idea, if the war is aggressive, not defensive, is as criminal as to go to war for territory or revenue; for it is as little justified to force our ideas on other people as it is to compel them to submit to our will in other respects.

What of the record of the doctrine in action? It has to its credit the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, which is not inconsiderable. As against that, tens of thousands of innocent people, and 2,000 American servicemen, have been killed, and both countries remain in a state of violence and turmoil. While some kind of democratic apparatus has been set up in both countries, the prospect of genuine and viable democracy in either remains remote.

The American military, which three years ago seemed an irresistible force, has had its limitations exposed. While its power to crush and destroy is great, its capacity to control and maintain order, to administer honestly and efficiently, is very limited. Eliot A. Cohen, an expert on the subject and a supporter of the war, believes the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have been strained "to the breaking point" by the first implementation of the doctrine. The international standing and influence of the United States are much lower than they were four years ago. The country itself is more deeply divided than at any time since the early 1970's.

Precedents have been set that will come back to haunt us and our children: among them, a ready resort to preventive and preemptive wars, the setting-aside of the Geneva Convention and habeas corpus, the blatant insistence on the right to double standards, and exceptionally low standards of truth-telling on vital questions of policy.

The application of the doctrine has also served to highlight the contradiction between a conservative domestic policy that seeks to reduce the power of government and a conservative foreign policy that must greatly increase it.

All that said, America has great powers of self-correction, a historically proven capacity to rebound from adversity and error. Indeed, I believe that the first great test of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq is also likely to be its last. Failure there will restore balance and prudence to American foreign policy. With reasonable luck, it will lead to the conclusion that the smartest way of being a hegemon is to be content with appearing to be *primus inter pares* in a concert of powers.

The greater disaster in America's Iraq venture would have been something plausibly resembling a quick and decisive success. What dangerous excesses would that have led us to by now?

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Mark Helprin

THE PRESENT foreign policy of the United States rests heavily upon three fundamental errors, the consequences of which we are likely to escape only via divine intervention.

The first error is that of being in thrall to the most pressing and immediate. Because of their inability to sense the long term, chess players who focus on their pawns rather than their position usually lose, and bulls that are mesmerized by a matador's cape fall victim to his sword. In bulls it may be expected. In a politician it is the result of a dim intellectual horizon that cannot be brightened even in conversations with experts.

As if history had ended with the cold war, we reduced our military power so that the order of battle now stands at approximately a third or less of what it had been, this despite the continuing and remarkable military and technical evolution used by both the Clinton and Bush administrations as a cover for their neglect of other strategic essentials. Perhaps we would not have experienced the boom of the 90's or recovered from its bursting bubble had it not been for the "peace dividend." But, with the grossest negligence, we continued to draw upon the "peace dividend" even after September 11, when, in the full blush of hubris the administration decided, first, that we would from now on

fight mainly terrorism, and would need not prepare for or deter major opponents; and, second, that terrorism can be fought successfully with only lightened forces.

But history, which has yet to end, will not spare the leading—though not dominant—power in the international system a challenge from nations in ascension. China has modeled itself after Meiji Japan, with the specific intent to forge economic growth and the rise in per-capita incomes into effective military power. As it succeeds brilliantly, our answer, rather than confronting it with a gap that it would never be able to close, building the navy to exploit America's natural advantages at sea, and responding to its every move with an appropriate countermove, has been to cede the field, to shrink our military sector as China builds its own, and to convert our armed forces into a steroidal version of the French Foreign Legion.

Thus, we forswear mass, heavy formations, heavy weapons, and heavy lift. We scatter and commit ever diminishing forces and fewer bases worldwide in the terrorist mouse hunt, something that should be the successful activity of the left hand only. And in planning to leave in Europe merely special forces, two brigade combat teams, and no heavy armor, we are gratuitously providing Russia with confirmation that its military revival is not hopeless, an error that may assume grand proportions in the years to come. Terrorism must be defeated, but beyond terrorism are great and persistent dangers that by ignoring we stimulate and court.

The second error is in our choice of objective, in this instance forsaking the purely defensive aim of soliciting or coercing the cooperation of various Arab and Muslim regimes, without regard to their purity, in eradicating terrorists and their infrastructures. Instead, we have embarked upon the messianic task of changing the political culture of 1.2 billion Arabs and Muslims from Morocco to the Philippines, from the Volga to Nigeria.

Learning nothing from the flagrant errors of believing that no resistance would follow the invasion of Iraq, and that the Turks, despite their Islamic tilt and their overwhelming desire to please Europe, would allow a northern front, we continue to misjudge the nature and motives of the insurgency and the Arabs' support for it. Iraq is the march land of the Middle East, once threatened by Persians and Mongols, and now by the Shiites and "Crusaders." Those who see themselves as defending it (that is, most of the Arab world) have a long historical pedigree. That their tactics are bestial and psychotic does not speak

to the depth of their motivation or perseverance.

We have undertaken to transform a deeply rooted absolutist political regime of kings, dictators, and military juntas that is based upon a strong and famously uncompromising culture, that is in turn based upon a proudly absolutist and uncompromising religion, that itself arose amid a tribal nomadic society whose standards have carried forward into a world in which mothers offer their sons as suicide bombers and fathers murder their daughters for even a hint of promiscuity. And other than by military means (which alone are insufficient), to turn all this around in heart and mind, against some of the strongest forces known to history or man, we have deployed . . . Karen Hughes.

The third error is that of scale in military operations. For martial control of the areas in question to be effective either in directly suppressing terrorism or in the stated goal of transforming political cultures, martial control must first be firmly established. And yet, in odd counterbalance to the manic expansiveness of the objective is the nearly inexplicable limitation of the effort.

We have in Iraq 140,000 troops. They stand in roughly the same proportion to the citizenry as do the police in the City of New York. But in Iraq they do not speak the language and are at the end of an 8,000-mile supply line, and they are tasked with controlling a heavily armed population of 26 million people efficiently organized into indelible ethnicities, semi-professional militias, and criminal gangs, and supported from without over borders we cannot seal. And with characteristic impatience, we diverted these troops from combat to nation building even before they had pacified the nation they were supposed to build.

Just as NATO signed its death warrant as a cohesive and effective military alliance when upon the fall of the Soviet Union it reduced its powers in direct proportion to the expansion of its responsibilities, we now beg for failure, by limiting, compressing, and starving the military while assigning to it a grandiose task as rich with intention as it is likely to be bereft of result.

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Daniel Henninger

WE HOLD elections to affirm or reject political ideas, and in 2004 George Bush put the Bush Doctrine and its exercise in Iraq before the American people. In their collective wisdom, the people chose the Bush Doctrine over the Kerry Doctrine, whose messenger over several months gave voice to virtually all available criticisms of the Bush Doctrine. Bush won, and the mandarins of foreign policy need to acknowledge that the Bush Doctrine has earned no small measure of political legitimacy.

The Bush Doctrine describes, more accurately than do its critics, the world as it exists in our time—the political and economic world amenable to diplomacy, and the threat, which requires military capacity. The doctrine's critics err primarily in not addressing the realities of the 21st century's political economy and its most obvious threat, weapons of mass destruction.

Threat first, because it can kill us.

September 11 changed a lot, but what truly “changed everything” was the revelation of A.Q. Khan's production network for nuclear-bomb know-how. The implications of the Khan network haven't been fully internalized; one can read critiques of the Bush Doctrine heavy on “how we're seen by the world” but light on WMD. Backwater nations (Pakistan, North Korea, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela) can—or soon will—produce sufficient cash flow, infrastructure, and technical prowess to build WMD and missile-delivery systems. North Korea, whose income per capita is too small to measure, can reach Japan with ballistic-missile technology.

Mass murder is going mass market. That is the basis for preemption doctrine. Preemption is not directed at suicide bombers with 25 killed or even at planes flown into buildings, ships, and embassies. The trade in WMD technology, flowing through the canals of legitimate commerce, aims at producing civilian death on a massive scale. In the *Wall Street Journal* recently, Fred Iklé described how such an event overnight would transform the world's politics: “The paroxysm after 9/11 would be a hiccup compared with the reaction the morning after one or more nuclear bombs caused massive devastation.”

Against this reality, a doctrine of preemption is justified.

The WMD trade came to life contemporaneously with the reality of radical, resentful Islam. Either you believe the politics and ideologies of the

Middle East are a clear and present danger to our security or you don't. I do. This product, radical Islam, is now a threat because Arab governments *have chosen to export it*.

In reply, the Bush Doctrine, premised in preemption, has chosen to export democracy. The criticism of this idea, crudely stated, is: why do we believe that what works for us, our system broadly imagined, will work for the Arabs or anyone else? The crude reply is: the United States is already exporting every other, nonpolitical aspect of its system to the world; it isn't possible over time to prevent our political values from sweeping into their systems along with the rest of it.

Like it or not, the nations of the 21st century are being absorbed into an American system historically rooted in freedom, broadly defined. The movement of traded goods, of labor, the discovery and exchange of technical and scientific ideas, financial transactions, opinion: the worldwide trend now is to ensure that all this activity is minimally fettered and largely frictionless—free.

Though often slighted in discussions of foreign-policy doctrine, economic growth—annual GDP—is the real oxygen of world affairs. When it declines, stressed nations, as in the past, often seek to compensate with belligerence. Politics is a daily activity, and democracies—even flawed democracies—are more likely to spend their energies on policies affecting mundane matters of commerce than on belligerence. Indonesia and South Korea are examples of the former, Iran and North Korea of the latter.

Some critics of the Bush Doctrine prefer an America in which these “idealistic” impulses are submerged beneath a pragmatic realism appropriate to a hostile, amoral world; one might call it neo-cynicism. They are seeking an America that is not possible. The *world* of politics is centrifugal now; no major nation's policies or values can stay inside its borders; ours haven't, and China's won't. The Bush Doctrine attempts to join America's superpower preeminence to the centrifugal reality of who we unavoidably are and represent. The Bush Doctrine is both morally attractive and pragmatic. Choosing Paul Wolfowitz to run the World Bank was a wise extension of the Bush Doctrine.

It hasn't been easy. The structure of cold-war alliances is dead. After 9/11, there was no time to formalize a new alliance system that would recognize the treacherous decision by France and Germany (misnamed “Europe”) to opt out. Part-time coalitions of the willing are insufficient to the Bush Doctrine's ambitions. The U.S. needs identifiable

allies. Foreign policy cannot be unipolar while economic life is omnipolar. A new alliance of like-minded systems might begin with Britain, Japan, Australia, India, Poland, Israel, and Iraq.

As for China, the presidencies of both Bushes and Bill Clinton have confused us about that country. The Defense Department should measure and publish China's military progress formally, as it did during the cold war in its yearly report, *Soviet Military Power*—until China democratizes.

My primary criticism of the Bush Doctrine is a familiar one: fantastically, it abjures public diplomacy. The Bush team appears to be paranoiac about the media. However justified the feeling, ceding control of the public debate or fact-set, as in Iraq, to the opposition ill serves the voters who legitimized this doctrine and, more, the military fighting and dying on the doctrine's behalf.

It also puts the doctrine at risk. The U.S. and Western European media are together the most potent driver of doctrinaire pacifism since that idea emerged with force in the 20th century. President Bush's resolve is admirable; but what comes after him is likely to be a politician who, having watched the way the Iraq war was represented to the public, concludes that the political upside of any such future engagement is minimal. The principle of preemption may die the day Mr. Bush leaves office.

The future of the President's foreign-policy idea turns of course on the outcome of the test in Iraq. For the Bush Doctrine itself, this test is pass/fail. But a lot more than the Bush Doctrine is riding on the result.

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Stanley Hoffmann

IF BY the Bush Doctrine is meant the primacy of the war against terrorism, the move from deterrence to preventive war, the promotion of democracy across the world, and a willingness to resort to unilateral action in many circumstances, I find myself in profound disagreement with it.

Terrorism is one threat among many and, while it needs to be opposed, prevented, and fought, the struggle against it is not a war but a combination of good intelligence, coordinated police action, infil-

tration, moves to eliminate financial support for terrorist operations, and policies aimed at addressing the diverse causes of hostility and suspicion of the U.S. The term “war” suggests military operations leading to victory, and that is not a formula for success.

As for preventive military action, this is justified only when enemy attacks are imminent. Otherwise, it is illegal under international law, and is a form of aggression. Since our military operations and the struggle against terrorism require broad cooperation from allies and from other threatened countries, unilateral prevention would be counterproductive, and encourage other actors to strike whenever they want. The result would be chaos.

The promotion of democracy is a worthy goal, but it cannot normally be imposed by force (Germany and Japan after 1945 were exceptional cases)—the beneficiaries of our interventions would sooner or later turn against us, or else their compatriots would. Nor is it at all obvious that democratic revolutions would necessarily be moderate, lead to greater stability, or turn out friendly to American values and interests. This is an area in which the primary instruments should be secret public support and open private help for “freedom fighters,” and in which it is in America’s interest to act with other democratic countries.

Has the Bush Doctrine made for “a safer world environment,” as the editors ask? Such an environment requires not only a long-term struggle against terrorism but also:

(a) the recognition that terror—the dreadful weapon of the weak—often results from the denial of the right to self-determination or autonomy in places like Chechnya, Kosovo, or Palestine;

(b) coordinated measures by the U.S. and its allies against nuclear proliferation, as long as they do not deny the right of other states to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. These measures require diplomacy rather than threats, deals rather than diktats;

(c) the acceptance by the U.S. of international criminal jurisdiction and of the principle of universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity;

(d) the acceptance by the U.S. and its allies of an obligation to intervene against acts of genocide;

(e) a much bigger and more sustained effort at promoting economic and social development in order to reduce and gradually eliminate world poverty and to enhance the capabilities of the people in underprivileged countries;

(f) a willingness to work on a concerted policy of state-building, focusing on failed states, aimed at

fighting corruption as well as at establishing viable institutions (including a free judiciary and free media). The UN should play a central role in such an effort;

(g) a responsible environmental policy, in which all states would be asked to participate (i.e., going beyond Kyoto) and in which the greatest damagers of the environment would be asked to revise their policies and might need to be compensated for their sacrifices in certain instances.

Toward these ends, some aspects of current American policy in particular need to be eliminated. They include the hectoring and threatening tone that the leaders of this administration seem to have gotten used to, and that infuriates far more than it intimidates; the tendency, explicit or implicit, to reduce American power to its military dimension, to discount what Joseph Nye calls soft power, and to celebrate our unique status as *the* superpower; and an American cultural policy that often seems little more than a celebration of American achievements and virtues rather than an invitation to cooperation aimed at benefiting others.

In all these matters, the self-celebration is counterproductive as long as the contrast between our boasts, on the one hand, and our actual policies and results at home, on the other hand, remains often so obvious.

Finally, the editors ask about the Bush Doctrine’s “expansive vision of America’s world role and the moral responsibilities of American power.” An expansive vision is certainly necessary, but it should not amount to what I would call a conception of leadership as domination or imposition. The moral responsibilities of any powerful country are often tarnished or undermined by hubris and by an excessive faith in one’s own goodness, or by a mistaken conviction that our good intentions must be visible to all except the propagators of evil. Leadership means not only consulting others and listening to others, but forging ententes or alliances toward commonly defined and accepted goals—leadership as consensus-building.

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Josef Joffe

A DEEP IDEOLOGICAL strain runs through American foreign policy. Making the world safe *through* democracy, it might be called. A German, Immanuel Kant, invented the idea of “democratic peace,” and a Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, embellished it. Both argued that democracies (“republics”) are inherently more pacific than autocracies. Yet it took Americans to turn a noble idea into a national interest. The latest is George W. Bush, but the ancestry reads like a Who’s Who of American history: from Thomas Paine to James Madison, from Woodrow Wilson to Bill Clinton (yes, him in particular).

The dissenting school known as realism has always remained in the minority, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft notwithstanding. If Kantians proclaim that only good states make good foreign policy, realists insist that the best guarantee of peace is a solid balance of power, never mind how our rivals are governed. Let us not confuse politics with pedagogy, they argue, or go to war to make the world safe through or for democracy. Fight only in the name of necessity—to stave off threats to our security and our vital interests.

The Iraq war, a war of choice if ever there was one, delivers an instructive test case. Post-9/11, regime change seemed an exhilarating idea (which I shared, against my nagging better instincts). Make an example of the world’s most evil regime. Replace Saddamism with democracy, and Iraq will be a “light unto the nations,” to misappropriate a phrase. Other despots will quake and reform, or falter and fall. Either way, the threats without—terrorism, expansionism, weapons of mass destruction—will haunt us no more.

What is wrong with this? In ascending order of importance, here are three answers. One is the intractability of present-day Arab culture and politics. It is a safe bet that “one man, one vote” will segue into “one time,” that removing the Abdullahs and Hosnis will bring on a new tyranny under the green flag of the Prophet, and that we will have exchanged “our bastards” for declared enemies of the West.

So we must stay, as in Iraq, to ensure that the good guys win not only the first, but also the next elections. This runs into the second trouble: an open-ended commitment, which democracies do not savor. Listen to the chorus of resentment rising throughout the land: let’s “Iraqize” the war, let no more American boys and girls die for Basra and Baghdad.

To note in response that American troops are

still in Germany, Japan, and South Korea six decades after World War II is to succumb to the wrong analogy. During the cold war, America had bigger fish to fry. Reeducating yesterday’s enemies was only a subsidiary interest; the vital interest was to contain the existential threat that was the Soviet Union. Also, nobody ever died in Germany and Japan, nor in Korea once the fighting there was over. American troops are still welcome in all three places as an insurance against Russia and China.

Third, and worst, the democratic impulse has led America to pounce on the wrong enemy. Evil as Saddam was, a threat to the United States he was not, as the case of the vanishing WMD’s shows. For once, Madeleine Albright was right when she insisted that “we have him in a box.” Saddam was a menace to his own people, but only a nuisance to the U.S.

So who was the real foe? From a coldly realist perspective, it was and is Iran. Twenty years ago, the Reaganites had it right: they let strategic interest get the better of democratic ideology by secretly supporting Saddam against Tehran, the more populous and more potent would-be regional hegemon. Driven by a messianic ideology, the Iranians sponsored all kinds of terrorism, from Hizballah to Hamas, from Beirut to Berlin. Even then, they were quietly assembling the many components of nuclear weaponry while developing ever longer-range missiles and sharing the stuff with unsavory regimes around the world. Today, they are within reach of nuclear weapons.

Whence this calamity? Because, after the Reaganite blip, the democratic imperative targeted the lesser evil. When the U.S. marched into Baghdad in 2003, we might have heard the Iranian equivalent of champagne corks popping. “Thank you, America,” the chant might have gone, “for taking out our worst rival.” And then: “Thank you, Allah, for tying down the Great Satan in an insurgency war we can manipulate at will.” Finally: “God is great, for the infidel is now handing to our Shiite brethren the power so long denied them by the Sunni minority.”

As an unintended consequence of America’s regime-changing war, Iran now finds itself in its best strategic position ever. This summer Tehran told the Europeans it would not stop its enrichment of uranium, not for any bribe in the coffers of the EU. And what was the United States going to do about it? Tehran knows full well that Washington will not unleash a second war while the first one is not exactly proceeding as planned. In the meantime, with America stymied in Iraq, its credi-

bility battered, China and Russia will not vote for sanctions in the Security Council. Is it wild-eyed alarmism to suggest that Iran will get the bomb and set off an arms race in the greater Middle East that will damage American interests more than post-Kuwait Saddam ever could?

Against the Bush Doctrine, realists argue: do not go to war unless the noble ideals of this Republic are encased in hard strategic interests that justify the price and legitimize the burden. Though America, spending almost as much on its military as the rest of the world combined, can win battles effortlessly, be forewarned that “network-centric warfare” does better against armies than against those who believe that death will take them to heaven. Make the ends you treasure fit the means you are willing to invest. Husband your strength and credibility so that you can intimidate without having to kill. Cheer democracy’s forward march, but measure threats correctly and target the right enemies—those who can truly hurt you.

The irony of it all is that the Bushies had it right at the very beginning, when they categorically refused any “nation-building.”

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Paul Johnson

ALTHOUGH WE use the decorative name the “Bush Doctrine,” the guiding principle of American policy today is essentially an updated reassertion of national sovereignty, including the right to take preemptive action in self-defense.

We live in a contracting world, one that has shrunk to the point where national frontiers, vital though they are to preserve national identities, cultures, and valuable systems of politics and law, are of rapidly declining use in defense. Moreover, there are no air or sea frontiers. The United States was born and came to maturity in a world where two vast oceans protected it from external attack, and its approach to global problems was shaped accordingly. That position began to change in the 1940’s, with the development of nuclear weapons and long-range rockets.

The result was a fundamental extension of the American response to danger. NATO was created, with a trip-wire running through Germany, and it succeeded in preserving the U.S. and its allies from the threat of a single great-power enemy. But when that enemy collapsed, and America became the sole superpower, a new threat emerged: terrorist attacks, not capable of annihilating America but able to inflict horrific casualties. The U.S. responded by again reformulating its sovereign and unconditional right of self-defense. This time, it asserted its determination to take measures against any terrorist organization that threatened it, and any sovereign states that supported such an organization.

These measures will inevitably be further extended and strengthened if and when terrorist-supporting states seek to acquire or actually possess nuclear, thermonuclear, or other weapons capable of inflicting grave harm on the American people. The overwhelming need for speed in dealing with such threats, and the calamitous consequences of failure to respond in time, means that the U.S. must act the instant the threat is perceived—if necessary without warning, without consulting its allies, and to the limit of its military power, using only the good judgment of the President and the respect for humanitarian principles built into the system as limits on its freedom of action.

This is not so much a doctrine as an expression of common sense, dictated by the changing logic of events and the contraction of the globe into a single theater of action. It places an enormous burden of decision and responsibility on the President’s shoulders, and confers on America unprecedented global powers and rights. The U.S. is becoming in fact what Thomas Hobbes wrote about in theory: the great Leviathan, “to keep them all in awe.” But it is becoming so not by wish or choice but from unsought necessity.

The fact is that collective security has broken down, as it did when the League of Nations failed in the 1930’s. The United Nations has failed repeatedly to deter or punish aggression or reverse its consequences. NATO, which succeeded in its day, is now in many respects out of date. As the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait showed in the early 1990’s, ad-hoc coalitions have to be slowly and painfully created to deal with aggressive acts of a conventional kind. In dealing with terrorism and terrorist-supporting states, the American Leviathan has acted, and often will act, alone, though naturally it will always carry with it as many active and trustworthy allies as it can.

But there is one transforming and vital moral

fact about this unilateralism. America acts for itself, but also for the world. All civilized states under the rule of law, indeed all peoples who long for a world of peace and order, benefit from American unilateralism. The evil organizations that threaten the United States, and the regions that support them, also threaten the entire world, its men, women, and children.

We live in a dangerous and violent time. America is driven, in extremis, to drastic action. But we must ask ourselves this question: how much more fearful and violent would our world be if America did not exist? The truth is, we must thank God that there is a nation strong enough and determined enough to accept the role of Leviathan, and to protect us from the evil forces that roam the world seeking to destroy.

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Robert Kagan

IS THERE a Bush Doctrine? It may be too soon to know. There is nothing radically new about preemptive action and the promotion of democracy. The former has long been a part of American strategy, as diverse historians have pointed out, and Americans from the founders onward have calculated that their democratic nation was safer when the world was more liberal and democratic.

In the past century, American leaders have often judged that the undemocratic nature of an enemy was the source of its aggression, whether the adversary was Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union, and that keeping the peace required transforming the enemy regime. The United States has tried to implant democracy in nations it has invaded, from Japan and Germany to Nicaragua, Panama, and the Philippines. Such efforts have produced mixed results, as that list suggests, but the current administration's efforts hardly constitute a "stunning" departure from the past.

The question is whether the Bush administration's policies will stand out as defining a new chapter in American foreign policy, characterized by a particular coherent and systematic approach to

the world, or whether they will seem in retrospect to have been only a brief, spasmodic reaction to the attack on 9/11. Is there consistency and coherence to the Bush approach?

Compare the Bush and the Reagan administrations. Reagan, too, declared a policy of promoting democracy around the world. But his approach seems to have been a good deal more extensive and comprehensive and, despite the disorder and confusion that often reigned in that administration, more consistently and systematically implemented.

The Reagan administration provided support to anti-Communist political and guerrilla movements in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, and Nicaragua, as well as to Solidarity in Poland, leading in each case to an eventual change of regime. It abandoned right-wing forces and leaders in Latin America and turned toward supporting centrist and even Left-leaning democratically-elected leaders—against the advice of some conservative and neoconservative commentators at the time. It promoted the transition from dictatorship to democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala, toppled dictators in Haiti and Chile, and began the process of removing another dictator in Panama. In Asia, it engineered the downfall of Marcos in the Philippines and the military dictatorship of South Korea. Most of this took place in the roughly five years following Reagan's speech to Parliament in 1982, when he first enunciated his pro-democracy approach.

The Reagan administration also made substantial financial investments in its policies, including a historic military build-up and large expenditures for economic assistance and democracy promotion. And despite bureaucratic infighting, the leadership of the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA were all deeply committed to the President's policies.

The Bush administration, by contrast, has not applied its "doctrine" very broadly or systematically. The circumstances are different, of course, and Bush has had to fight two wars that absorb the bulk of the administration's energy and resources. But if one surveys the globe, it is not clear that a "Bush Doctrine" is really even the organizing principle of American foreign policy.

No such doctrine has been applied, for instance, to North Korea and Iran, although both were once part of the now never-mentioned "axis of evil." At the moment, the Bush policy toward North Korea does not seem dramatically different from the Clinton policy. In the case of Iran, applying the Bush Doctrine would seem to call for dramatically

increased efforts to promote democratization and internal pressures for reform. But this hasn't happened, either. The current approaches to both countries may be perfectly reasonable, especially in the absence of obvious alternatives. But they hardly reflect a new doctrine, at least not yet.

The administration can take some credit for the triumph of democracy in Ukraine, and it supported the opposition in Lebanon following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. But elsewhere in the Middle East? In Egypt, after setting forth a list of demands for Mubarak in the recent presidential elections, the administration did not even object very strongly when he ignored them. It has no known strategy for promoting democracy in Saudi Arabia or Syria, or even in Jordan. One suspects many in the administration fear that the product of democratic elections in some of these countries will be a victory of radical Islamic groups. Perhaps they are right to be worried. But if so, what is new?

Meanwhile, the administration has almost entirely ignored the quashing of what little democracy remains in Russia, and it no longer makes more than the barest pretense of caring about the lack of democratic reform in China. Again, these may or may not be reasonable positions. But they do not fit what has been called the Bush Doctrine.

Then there are Iraq and Afghanistan, where President Bush is clearly committed to a democratic outcome. This, if achieved, could be the signal achievement of a Bush Doctrine. But is everyone else in the administration equally committed to such an outcome?

There is no longer much argument that insufficient numbers of troops were deployed in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, or that forces have been inadequate ever since. The endless stream of statements from Pentagon officials indicating a desire to leave Iraq whether or not the insurgency has been defeated raises questions about their commitment to the Bush Doctrine. The wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan have also raised questions about the nation's military posture. Has the Pentagon really adjusted its strategy and force structure to enable it to implement a Bush Doctrine, or has it continued roughly along the path it was taking before the President embarked on this course?

It is premature to make any final judgments about policies that are still unfolding. No one in 1984 could have been sure what the Reagan Doctrine would produce. The evolution of the Truman Doctrine was anything but smooth and coherent. It may be that we are still in the early stages in the evolu-

tion of this latest, pro-democratic doctrine as well.

The editors ask whether I support the Bush Doctrine and an expansive vision of America's role in the world. I do. The question remains whether there is a Bush Doctrine to support. The answer is still unknown.

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William Kristol

IT SOMETIMES seems, when I'm tired, that I've been debating the Bush Doctrine forever. In fact, it's been only a decade. I spent the late 1990's, along with a few allies, advocating something more or less like the Bush Doctrine *avant la lettre*. And I've spent the last four years more or less defending the actual Bush Doctrine.

During this period, two vaguely remembered passages have occasionally drifted into my consciousness. I'd read them years before. They were written by men I very much admire, and they have continued to strike a nerve.

The first is the conclusion of Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind*:

This is the American moment in world history, the one for which we shall forever be judged. . . . [I]n politics the responsibility for the fate of freedom in the world has devolved upon our regime. . . . The gravity of our given task is great, and it is very much in doubt how the future will judge our stewardship.

Bloom's statement struck me as true when he wrote it, in 1987. It remained true in the 1990's, when history had allegedly ended. And it is true today. Liberal democracy has always had, and probably will always have, illiberal enemies. For the foreseeable future, resisting and overcoming those enemies depends on American leadership, and American strength.

From this perspective, the Bush Doctrine is more than defensible. It's necessary and right. It's the Bush *administration* that can be a problem. But what administration isn't? Real world administrations never fully live up to their doctrines. Sometimes administrations don't execute policies well, or

they lose their way in a certain area, or they fail to rise to a particular challenge.

Much that the Bush administration has done is admirable. At other times there have been startling failures of execution and surprising losses of nerve.

The Bush Doctrine promises that we will confront terrorist groups and the regimes that support them. Removing the Taliban and Saddam were impressive achievements. Tolerating Syrian and Iranian sponsorship of terror is less so.

The Bush Doctrine takes a tough line on the intersection of terror, tyranny, and weapons of mass destruction. Iraq and Libya were dealt with accordingly. But Iran and North Korea are moving ahead with their nuclear programs with minimal military or political interference from us.

The Bush Doctrine argues that regime change toward liberal democracy is the real solution (insofar as the world allows "solutions") to the dangers confronting us from dictators. Dictators, after all, are tempted to acts of aggression, may seek weapons of mass destruction, and directly or indirectly tend to foster extremism. But despite real and impressive change in parts of the Middle East, we seem to be doing little to promote successful regime change in many places that need it—ranging from Saudi Arabia to China.

September 11, according to the Bush administration, changed everything. But the administration still apparently sees no need to increase the size of our military forces, no case for really overhauling the institutional capabilities of our government, and no urgency in insisting on a serious and coherent policy process. Above all, we are fighting a war in Iraq upon which everything else depends—and the President seems unwilling to overrule the strategic decisions or indecisions of his Secretary of Defense, who treats the war as an odd combination of an annoying distraction from his other work and business as usual.

Still, I trust the future will judge the Bush administration's stewardship favorably. I would be even more confident if I thought its leaders had been sufficiently attentive to the second passage that has come intermittently to my mind in recent years. It's the final paragraph of an essay by Leo Strauss on Machiavelli:

Toward the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle speaks of what one may call the political philosophy of the Sophists. His chief point is that the Sophists identified or almost identified politics with rhetoric. In other words, the Sophists believed or tended to believe in the

omnipotence of speech. Machiavelli surely cannot be accused of that error. . . . But Xenophon, who was a pupil of Socrates, proved to be a most successful commander. . . . Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, was under no delusion about the sternness and harshness of politics, about that ingredient of politics which transcends speech. In this important respect Machiavelli and Socrates make a common front against the Sophists.

Our political debates today are full of sophistic arguments. They come in many varieties—sophistic liberal multilateralism, sophistic foreign-policy "realism," sophistic old-Right conservatism. There are even (a few!) instances of sophistic neoconservatism. What these arguments have in common is that they are not serious about prescribing policies for the real, existing United States of America that would address the real threats confronting us.

The Bush Doctrine is superior to all the varieties of sophism on offer. But sound doctrine is not enough. Politics is the realm of action as well as speech. I would not counsel the U.S. government to act in the spirit of Machiavelli. But perhaps in the spirit of the high-minded but also hard-headed Xenophon?

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Robert J. Lieber

THE BUSH DOCTRINE set a tough-minded and visionary grand strategy for the United States. More than four years after 9/11, the logic and purpose of that doctrine continue to merit support. Though much mischaracterized abroad and at home, it provides an informed diagnosis of the threat to America and prescribes very broad guidelines—preemption, military primacy, a new multilateralism (where possible), the spread of democracy—for confronting that threat. The execution of policy has inevitably been flawed, at times seriously, but the overall strategy rests on a fundamental grasp of contemporary realities that often eludes the administration's critics.

My own assessment rests on three premises. First, we face an unprecedented threat from the combination of militant Islamist terrorism and

weapons of mass destruction. Doctrines of containment and deterrence that served in the cold war do not fit the threat. As a result, we must be prepared to use preemptive and even preventive force when needed. Second, the UN is almost always incapable of acting effectively on the most urgent and deadly problems. Third, because of America's unique power, others will inevitably look to it for leadership. The U.S. can and should seek to collaborate with others, but if we do not lead, no one else is likely to. In coming to grips with the threat of terrorism and WMD, and when values like human rights, the rule of law, and even the prevention of genocide cannot be guaranteed by others, American involvement and even intervention are not something about which to be apologetic.

Although progress has been mixed, American policy has caused or contributed to major accomplishments: the denial of state support and sanctuary to al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq, the removal of Saddam's tyrannical regime and with it a serious strategic and regional threat, the disruption and destruction of at least part of the al-Qaeda network, the thwarting of Islamist ambitions to overthrow existing governments and take control of any Middle Eastern state, the abandonment by Libya of its WMD programs, the exposure and dismantling of the A.Q. Khan nuclear network in Pakistan, the first stirrings of a political "Arab spring," and the avoidance (so far) of a major post-9/11 terror attack within the United States.

To be sure, these achievements must be weighed against the continuing military campaign in eastern Afghanistan, a bitter and costly insurgency in Iraq that has become a focal point for radical opposition to the United States, the proliferation peril from hardline regimes in North Korea and Iran, long-term risks to the stability of a nuclear Pakistan, the continuing threat from radical Islamists, and the long and difficult road to political liberalization and democratization. In addition, there is a climate of anti-Americanism in much of Europe and the Middle East. Finally, there remains uncertainty on whether the absence of terrorist attack against the U.S. since 9/11 may be only temporary.

This balance sheet provides a portent for the longer term. The global war against Islamist terrorism could well prove to be as protracted as the cold war and involve a struggle waged at least as much with political, economic, ideological, and covert means as through conventional battle.

Not surprisingly, some policy changes or adaptations are needed, as was the case in World War II

and the cold war. One of the great strengths of the United States has been the ability to make timely course corrections. Although it is easier to point to past shortcomings than to set out specific recommendations, a short list of problems would include the following: the failure to prepare effectively for a post-Saddam Iraq and seriously flawed policies in the immediate aftermath of the war; the inability (going back to the Clinton administration) to mount an effective public-diplomacy effort; the tendency (recently pointed up by the Katrina disaster at home) to appoint to key positions people better known for political or personal ties than for competence; the failure to make a sustained case for the war in speaking to the American public, or to call for sacrifices like reducing America's dangerous dependence on imported oil and insuring that fiscal policy sustains a strong economic base for both domestic prosperity and the war on terror.

The administration's expansive view of America's world role and moral responsibilities rests on a justifiable assumption: that the U.S. is likely to remain the world's leading power for a considerable time to come and that, in Bush's words, "Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe." Unlike the British Empire a century ago, we are not a "weary Titan." But the ability to use our power to achieve desired outcomes remains a messy and imperfect business. Our best bet is (in Charles Krauthammer's apt phrase) to intervene where it matters most—namely, the Middle East.

Is the Bush doctrine sustainable? Ultimately this is not a question of money or manpower, but of political will. A key concern is whether the public, focused on the painful loss of American lives (though the numbers remain below those killed in previous conflicts), will weary of a long, ongoing struggle with no definitive end in sight. Another problem is the disproportionate and heavily one-sided views that pass for conventional wisdom, not just among the Chomskys, Michael Moores, and Buchanans but among more serious authors, journalists, and academics. Much of the impetus for the unfavorable verdicts on the Bush Doctrine stems from a deep political and cultural antipathy to the Bush presidency itself.

This aversion would not necessarily matter did it not characterize so many of the policy elites in and around the Democratic party. Sooner or later, the political pendulum will return the Democrats to national office. Although there are Democratic figures and office holders who are not so obsessed

with political pique or wishful thinking as to lose sight of the stakes and perils of the post-9/11 world, right now they are a distinct minority, and the energy and activism of the party lie elsewhere.

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Richard Lowry

BUSH GRASPED the nettle after 9/11: Islamic terrorism emanates from the Middle East because the region's politics and religion have been poisoned by radicalism. Only by changing the region can we drain Islamic terrorism of its ideological supports and defeat it at its source.

For me, the Iraq war always made the most sense as a way to advance this ambitious project, and it may well serve that purpose. Already we have seen glimmers, most notably in Lebanon's "cedar revolution." But our difficulties in Iraq show how reality does not entirely accord with that signature piece of Bush rhetoric: "Freedom is the desire of every human heart."

As a speechwriter's poetic exaggeration this passes muster, but not as a guide to human motivation. If most do not want the boot of tyranny on their neck, the human heart is still a many-faceted, twisted thing. It can desire power more than freedom. It can desire fealty to religious faith more than freedom. It can desire honor, interpreted as resistance to a foreign occupying army, more than freedom. It can desire sexual purity and ethnic pride more than freedom.

These obvious points have sometimes been lost on the administration. When calamitous looting took hold after the fall of Baghdad, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld excused the disorder as the natural exuberance of a newly liberated people. Since the war was conceived as a liberation rather than an occupation, no one thought seriously enough about the need to constrain (and overawe) the Iraqi people rather than simply setting them free.

In a key respect, the theory of the war was flawed. We thought we could cut off the top of the Iraqi regime and there would be a functioning government underneath. There was no such thing. In

addition, the civil society had been devastated by Saddam, who built up the tribes and the Islamists as crutches for his regime. The sophisticated Iraqi society that we told ourselves about prior to the war was mostly chimerical.

This does not mean all is lost in Iraq, the linchpin of Bush's Middle East and democracy strategy. It does mean that we have had to lower expectations. Creating a somewhat stable, roughly representative government that can keep a persistent insurgency from growing out of control would once have seemed setting the bar too low; now it looks like an achievement to be fervently hoped for.

This scaled-down ambition and the Bush administration's increasingly open acknowledgment of it have prompted murmurs of betrayal from some hawks. But not from unhyphenated conservatives like me. We exist in the space between paleo-conservative pessimists who maintain against all evidence that countries and cultures never change and neoconservative idealists who believe most of the world consists of closeted Western liberals. We realize that forging a new Iraq in keeping even with downward-adjusted expectations would be a victory, a step on the long path—alas, longer than it takes to hold one inspiring election—toward reform in the Middle East.

Sometimes it has seemed the last true realists in America are the military commanders in Iraq, at least the best of them. There is no endeavor quite like counterinsurgency to strip away ideological grandiosity. It requires a keen appreciation of local conditions, a willingness to compromise, and a sense of the limits of military power. Successful counterinsurgencies usually involve giving the political process primacy over, or equal footing with, the military fight, and undertaking negotiations with the enemy.

The irony of the Iraq war, born of an overwhelming sense of American power, is that it has demonstrated our limits. I believe in a robust American role in the world. But we now know—if we didn't already—how hard it is to attempt to build nations anew. We should undertake interventions like Iraq only when there is a strong national interest at stake, and never as willy-nilly do-goodism. The American public would never support such an indiscriminate international role in any case. The price the public is willing to pay for any endeavor that it isn't convinced is directly connected to our security is low—a constant disappointment to Wilsonians, but a fact.

Most of the shifts in Bush policy that I would have favored have taken place, coinciding with

Condoleezza Rice's rise to Secretary of State. In Lebanon the administration helped the Lebanese chase out the occupying Syrian military by using those tools—moral suasion and international pressure—that it seemed to underappreciate in the first term. Such bottom-up regime change, when possible, is much preferable to the Iraq-war variety. Administration officials have also finally said to themselves, “We have these things called ‘embassies.’ How can we use them?”

These differences in emphasis have almost all been in the service of a broader reorientation of American foreign policy to which Bush has been surprisingly true. I was one of those who asked, after Bush's second inaugural address, “What is he going to do? Move out of our Uzbek bases? Push Egypt to have elections?” Well, yes.

But it is Iraq that is the proving ground of the Bush Doctrine. In the war on terror, we are fighting a global insurgency of Islamic militants. Insurgencies are rarely won by killing all the enemy fighters but rather by undermining their support so that they quit or so that potential recruits don't take up arms. For this to happen, Islamism must be discredited, and it is the Muslims who have to do the discrediting.

In Iraq, we see the struggle over the nature of Islam starkly in the competition for the country's future between Ayatollah Sistani, who believes his religion is compatible with democracy, and Abu Zarqawi, who believes it is synonymous with violence. It is imperative that Sistani's vision prevail, but it never would have had a chance if Saddam were still in power. Nor would we have had the January 30 elections, with their stirring glimpse of a better Middle Eastern future. Nor would we see King Abdullah of Jordan—whose father famously kowtowed to Saddam—promoting a reformed Islam.

The Bush Doctrine stands or falls with the Iraq war, as does his presidency. Success or failure will be the difference between being remembered as a Jimmy Carter, a well-meaning bungler who presided over catastrophe, or a Ronald Reagan, a visionary whose leadership transformed the world.

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Edward N. Luttwak

THE IDEA of actively spreading democracy among the Arabs and beyond is very tempting—I was once tempted myself. With a co-author of Arab Shiite origin, a talented woman who went on to better things, I set out to write a policy paper advocating the vigorous promotion of democracy by the United States in the Middle East, even at the expense of stability. As we started, it seemed it would not be too difficult to argue persuasively that interim turmoil, and even electoral victories by Islamists in the democratic aftermath, were preferable in the long run to persisting in the colossal anomaly of protecting the grotesque Saudi family, lesser Arabian wastrels, and assorted authoritarian potentates like Mubarak and Hussein of Jordan. That was a year or so before September 11, 2001.

What changed my mind was not, I fear, more concentrated thought but rather the distraction of a visit to Sicily with my brothers to revisit the scene of our childhood in Palermo and its environs.

Despite an abundance of world-class attractions, there are scarcely any good hotels—all development in Sicily is strangled by poor public services and infrastructures, traceable most immediately to hugely costly and stupendously inefficient local and regional bureaucracies. With 6 million inhabitants, Sicily is more populous than many UN member states, but its governance is so haphazard that traffic in Palermo is a nightmare of unpoliced congestion—many traffic cops on the payroll, but few on duty—while in western Sicily many towns, including Agrigento of the famous Greek temples, do not have drinking water in the summer, let alone swimming pools, crippling tourist development.

Nor is there any disagreement as to the ultimate causes of this spectacular misgovernment, perpetuated decade after decade ever since the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was overthrown by Garibaldi in 1860. The essentially political phenomena known collectively as the mafia subvert and preempt government and directly attack free enterprise by imposing unofficial taxes and protecting local monopolies.

This is not the Hollywood mafia of violent common criminals with or without socio-cultural pretensions. It is the actually existing mafia of medical doctors, lawyers, and engineers—indeed mainly doctors, for the simple reason that health care delivered by Italy's version of a national health service is by far the largest item in the regional budget, providing billions of euros that can be diverted (as opposed to the mere millions that local drug-deal-

ing can earn). As for the second largest budget item, it is in the domain of engineers: the public works usually left somehow incomplete to justify further contracts, even unto the bridge that stops in mid-span.

As hundreds of trials have shown, the professional criminals of Sicily's local mafias, i.e., those who live off petty extortion and the like, operate under the patronage of the lawyers, doctors, and engineers of the mafia superstructure who pay for their legal defense and maintain their families while they are in prison in order to keep local control and faithful troops. As a result, the accountants, auditors, government employees, or journalists who might be tempted to denounce fraudulent billings or crooked contracts remain silent, and investigations by national police forces usually fail because of the lack of willing witnesses.

That is the situation in Sicily some 145 years after the overthrow of the Bourbons and after countless free elections. Because the Sicilians did not liberate themselves but were instead liberated by northerners, while they themselves remained passive or hostile, their sense of identity is still today defined by opposition to everything that the liberal kingdom of Italy tried to impose on them, starting with legality itself.

It is the same in Iraq today, except much worse. At least the Piedmontese and Sicilians were nominally of the same nationality and religion, and the invasion of Sicily was preceded by decades of propaganda for a united Italy that had reached Sicily as well. In Iraq, by contrast, it is widely assumed that the un-Islamic liberators/invasers are there primarily to subvert Islam—for example by propagating women's rights—while Iraqi Arabs who may or may not believe this do believe that the primary purpose of the invasion was to destroy the power of the strongest Arab state. Almost all Iraqis—Kurds included—also agree that control of the oil fields was another prime motive. (Because they themselves would never dream of invading another country except for loot, they exclude the possibility that Americans and British are expending blood and treasure to establish a democratic and prosperous Iraq.)

Further embittering the Iraqis has been the increasing mayhem. Many Shiites now assert that the Americans are secretly organizing the attacks against them, in order to weaken both the Arabs and Islam by provoking a Sunni-Shiite civil war; for their part, many Arab Sunnis claim that U.S.-Iran tensions are a sham and that the two want to capture and divide Iraq and the Arabian peninsula.

And these are only the simplest explanations on offer; more complete conspiracy theories usually include an Israeli and Jewish angle, which is why *fatwas* have been issued forbidding the sale of land to Jews.

The overall result parallels the Sicilian syndrome: having been liberated instead of liberating themselves, Iraqis now construct their sense of identity by rejecting all that the liberators stand for and embracing radicalized versions of their own cultures, with the leaders that go with them. These include the hopelessly ignorant and xenophobic clerics whom the Shiites now obey more blindly than ever and who favor elections only because they will assure Shiite rule; the clan and tribal leaders of the Arab Sunnis; the Baath holdouts; and the Islamist killers.

Left to its own devices, Iraq might have evolved over time in a natural and organic fashion toward better forms of governance than Saddam Hussein's. As things stand, it will first have to overcome the effects of its liberation, adding generations if not centuries to the process.

It is the same in all the other places of the Arab world and beyond that are so different from Germany and Japan in 1945, where aborted prewar democracies only had to be rehabilitated, where there was no Islam standing in the way, and where years of bloody warfare had extirpated the enemies of democratic advancement and utterly discredited their ideologies.

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Joshua Muravchik

I AIM to address the editors' questions but not in the order presented, arguing instead from the general to the specific.

The perpetual overarching issue of U.S. foreign policy is the choice between an expansive and a constrictive approach, between the legacy of Woodrow Wilson and the legacy of George Washington. For reasons both moral and pragmatic, Wilson was right.

The "Washingtonian" view holds that moral considerations should carry less weight in the calculus of states than in that of individuals. But the

actions of a democracy reduce to the choices of its citizens. Are we released from moral obligation when we act as a collectivity?

As for pragmatic considerations, the fact is that every war America fought in the 20th century was a war we had earlier decided to avoid. We resisted entry into both world wars. The Korean war followed official declarations that Korea lay outside our "defense perimeter." The Vietnam war came to us a decade after we had rebuffed the appeals of the French to rescue them there. In the first Gulf war we drove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, but earlier our ambassador had suggested we would not intervene. One might add that the cold war began only after the death of our illusions about an enduring partnership with Stalin, and that the present war against terror was preceded by a long period of denial.

The implication? America is so central to the political and economic life of the planet that deadly problems will always find us if we do not find them first. There is no option to remain above the fray, only the options of entering it early on our own terms or late on the terms of our enemies. Our best hope for remaining at peace is to shape a more peaceful world.

Therefore, I applaud President Bush's reaction to 9/11, and specifically his declaration of a war against terrorism. The terrorists had long since declared war on us. Over decades, they had murdered Americans by the ones, tens, or hundreds. On 9/11 they killed thousands, hoping next to try for more. It was high time to fight back against them and their sponsors.

I am also enthusiastic about Bush's grand strategy, namely, to transform the political psychology of the Middle East in order to eliminate the environment that breeds so many young men imbued with the ambition to kill themselves along with as many of us as they can. They are so numerous not because of "poverty," as the cliché has it, but because such murderous acts are widely approved in their societies, which celebrate terrorists as freedom-fighters and "martyrs."

We hope that the rise of democratic norms will make terrorism cease to seem heroic to Middle Easterners, that it will come to appear as despicable to them as it does to us. Admittedly, this theory is untested, drawing its force principally from an extrapolation. We know that democracy makes societies less warlike; we hope it will make them less conducive to terrorism.

As for Iraq, I supported and support the war there, albeit without knowing if it was the right

move. It was not self-evident that Iraq was the next front once the Taliban had been overthrown. A case could have been made for tackling, say, Iran or Syria. But undoubtedly the war on terror required military measures as well as non-military ones. Since I was in no position to judge where it would be best to fight, or when, I supported the choices made by our commanders. The real issue was not where to fight but whether. I do not know of any opponents of the war in Iraq who contend that we should have fought elsewhere instead—apart from the argument, of dubious ingenuousness, that we should have left lots more troops chasing Osama bin Laden around Afghanistan.

How can we judge the progress "so far" in making the U.S. more secure? We are in the midst of a war. If we win, we will be more secure. If we lose, we will be less.

True, we have provoked rage among Muslims. Will that create more terrorists, or harm us in other ways? Perhaps. But was there any way to vanquish the terrorists without compounding the Muslim world's sense of humiliation? Opinion surveys in Muslim-majority countries before the war in Iraq revealed overwhelming hostility to the U.S., fanned by the war in Afghanistan. The pronouncements of bin Laden and company suggest that what inspires them is less their hatred of us, bottomless though it is, than the conviction that they will defeat us. The key psychological variable determining the level of our insecurity, therefore, is not their anger but their optimism.

This makes the outcome in Iraq all-important, but I am not able to judge how we are faring there. I am better equipped to assess our democratization project, which is advancing surprisingly well. Although the administration has stressed that this project will require a generation-long commitment, we have already stirred unprecedented democratic ferment in the region. Democracy has largely been restored in Lebanon. Meaningful elections have been held in Iraq and among the Palestinians. Elections in Egypt were less honest, but still the conviction is widespread there that a five-year transition to democracy, culminating in presidential and legislative elections scheduled for 2010 and 2011, has begun. Liberalization proceeds in Morocco and Jordan. Long-term dictatorships in Syria and Libya are visibly weakening. There are even stirrings in the Gulf monarchies. The one discouraging note comes from London. The subway bombers were mostly native Britons, casting a certain doubt on the theory that democratic societies do not give rise to terrorists.

What to change? There is a crying need to

renew American public diplomacy. This will not cure our unpopularity but can make a dent in it. Traditional diplomacy connects us to foreign governments, and augmented broadcasting aims at Middle Eastern masses. What is missing is any sustained engagement with the shapers of public opinion: journalists, scholars, intellectuals, businessmen, students, even clerics. This is not hard to do. But we are not doing much of it at all.

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John O'Sullivan

PREEMPTION AND the democracy project are both better than they sound. That is partly because both have been described and justified in overly ambitious, unqualified, and extravagant terms.

Preemption, for instance, is the unspoken policy of every great power. Great powers typically face several potential threats at any one time. If one of those threats is judged to be mortal, a state will take steps to counter it, in the last resort by waging war.

A prudent state, however, will not usually declare this as a principle. After all, the original threat may fade away. The declaration may push the preemptor into some imprudent action, lest he seem to back down. Either a declaration or a preemptive action may alarm neighboring states and recruit a coalition against oneself. Above all, there is the risk of miscalculation. Germany began the 1914-18 war to defeat a rising but still weaker Russia. It ruined itself, Russia, and Europe as a result.

What is feared and resented by other powers when advanced as a principle may nonetheless be accepted as a legitimate response to a *particular* threat. The U.S. war in Afghanistan was accepted as a proportionate response to the threat that the Taliban's terrorist state might spawn future 9/11 attacks. The invasion of Iraq was not—in part because the Bush administration, believing it would be justified in retrospect by the discovery of weapons of mass destruction, made plain its determination to invade irrespective of the opposition of other powers. In the aftermath of Iraq, if the U.S. were to emphasize the limited, prudent, and last-

resort character of preemption, international opposition to it might soften. And why not? It is, after all, a last resort.

The democracy project presents a slightly different problem. A world of liberal democratic states would no doubt be both more stable and more friendly to U.S. policies. As in our own history, however, the progress of democracy in the Middle East is likely to be gradual, fitful, imperfect, reflective of religious custom, and mainly the work of locals. America's role is to be around for perhaps many years to encourage them to keep the democratic rules while accepting that the rules must be of their own devising.

Yet our ambitions outrun our willingness to commit resources. We constantly talk about leaving Iraq soon, while demanding that passionately religious societies install secularist constitutions no army could enforce. Fortunately, the Iraqis at least have had the common sense to reject this secular fundamentalism—though their acceptance of the post-democratic nonsense of sexual quotas for parliamentary representation may yet derail the constitution.

Has the Bush Doctrine made us safer? Well, the capitulation of Libya, the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon, and the success of the administration's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) have all advanced our security in modest but real ways. The PSI is especially significant. It is both a quiet form of preemption and an example of practical multilateralism. It has none of the trappings thought essential by UN bodies—headquarters, international conferences, staffs of lawyers—but it works because governments voluntarily devote real resources to it. It is the acceptable face of preemption internationally. If the Bush Doctrine is to succeed ultimately, this should be its model.

Of course, we cannot say for certain whether the Bush Doctrine has made us safer overall until we know the final outcome in Iraq. A victory for the insurgency, a collapse into civil war, the spread of chaos à la Lebanon in the 1970's would all signify that the Iraq invasion has been an unmitigated disaster. They would create an Afghan-style national base for Islamist terrorism and make us distinctly less safe. By contrast, the establishment of a united democratic Iraq would both deprive terrorists of an occasional sponsor, greatly encourage democratic forces in the Arab and Islamic worlds to imitate Lebanon's return to genuine democracy, and thereby increase our security twice over.

Realists like James Kurth persuasively suggest that the best available outcome in Iraq would be an elected Shiite-Kurdish condominium that behind a

democratic façade ruthlessly crushes the Sunnis. This would be a moral disappointment but a strategic success. In the first place, it would be a bitter defeat for the terrorists and would weaken them worldwide. It would also leave behind an Iraqi government that, because of its isolation in the Arab world, would have no choice but to be a U.S. ally (though one with an Iranian party at court).

True, any such outcome would reinforce the cynical Arab and European view that the democracy project is a hypocritical mask for cold Yankee interests. But the very isolation of Iraq would give Washington the leverage to push the Shiite-Kurdish government into gradually extending real democratic rights to the entire community. After an interval, that would revive disappointed Arab democrats in neighboring states—and thus again underpin our security.

Whatever form it takes, the process is likely to be a messy one. The President may come to regret the overly dismissive way in which he has condemned his predecessors for not advancing liberty abroad in a more principled and consistent manner. But this brings us to considerations neglected in the current debate.

The U.S. today produces about 25 percent of world GDP. It is likely to be doing so in 50 years—by which time, however, China, India, and the European Union are forecast to be producing 25, 25, and 10 percent respectively. Chinese and Indian political attitudes will therefore carry greater international weight than those of Europe. And since China and India are more attached to national sovereignty than are the Europeans, their emergence as great powers will weaken European transnationalism and strengthen U.S.-style practical multilateralism in dealing with terrorism and international politics generally.

Washington has already responded to these future realities by forging a closer relationship with India. It now needs a more imaginative European policy both to forestall an EU-China axis and to ensure that Europe's wealth and weight will remain committed to a united West. Otherwise, America's current superpower status will inevitably decline to one of "first among equals."

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Martin Peretz

A HALF-CENTURY has passed since the appearance of *Oriental Despotism*, a majestic study by Karl A. Wittfogel written in the then still common genre of global history. The book is about how pre-industrial societies responded politically to the workings of the heavens and the seas and their caprices. Wittfogel aimed to show that in regions where governments managed irrigation and flood control well, their rule was secure. By contrast, the lack of control of hydraulics put authority in peril.

Our own federal government's interaction with Hurricane Katrina was, as the President himself conceded, nothing less than catastrophic. There was no consolation for him in knowing that a certain dumb and corrupt inanity also characterized the response of the municipal and state authorities. Nor could it be much comfort that the *New York Times*, self-assured guardian of public good, had several times over the years editorialized against spending money on bolstering the deteriorating bulkheads and embankments that were the only plausible buffers between the people of the delta and the wild tides.

In any case, it wasn't science or technology that failed us. It was the nature of our public policy and public administration. A government that fails to perform its elemental tasks at home—because of ideological rigidity and a certain spoiled self-indulgence—will be hard put to mobilize its people and its friends for more arduous and intricate ventures.

In one domain, then, that of domestic policy, the Bush administration has lost its mandate of heaven. What of its other mandate of heaven—its claim to advance the career of freedom in critical places around the world? Will it, too, now falter? After all, how many Americans would know what to do if there were a biochemical attack on our cities? Would agencies of the city, state, and country behave any more competently and comprehensively in such a situation than they did in New Orleans?

At the moment, the President does not have deep reservoirs of support either for the war in Iraq, which I endorse—and endorse more urgently now than ever, given the unquestionable fact that the Sunni insurgency has become nothing but a helter-skelter rampage of murder against Kurds and remarkably forbearing Shiites—or for his more generally assertive foreign policy, which I also endorse, focusing as it does on the intrinsic democratic illegitimacy of the United Nations, the weight of whose authority is in the hands of tyrants and cynics. I believe Bush is thin in domestic back-

ing because, as Lawrence F. Kaplan has argued in the *New Republic* ("American Idle," September 12), he never appealed, even after 9/11, to the people's desire and perhaps concrete need to participate in some common national purpose and common national sacrifice.

It is true that the administration did not argue its best case for the war with candor. It is also true that the war's critics were equally dishonest or ignorant in insisting that more multilateral negotiation under UN sponsorship would have persuaded the tyrant to give up his catastrophic weapons. (Remember, the President's adversaries also believed Saddam had them.) If those adversaries had their way, and we and our allies had not invaded Iraq, Saddam would still be in power, ruling a terror state that was truly a gulag (not the imaginary gulags of Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib), and Kofi Annan's global UN bureaucracy, national allies, personal cronies, and son would still be draining the oil-for-food exchequer big time.

I cannot estimate whether the world is more secure or America a safer place than it was. Operationally, Katrina magnifies doubt; politically, Afghanistan magnifies hope. Even Iraq has its moral certainties. A robust federalism is the only way to govern a country where ethnicity and sect, across a range of populations, are what define and self-define people. The spoilers, that is to say the killers, are the Sunnis (who themselves, if they were living in the oil-rich areas, would long ago have seceded).

This is the case not only in Iraq. Almost everywhere terror stalks a polity, it is Sunni militants who are the stalkers. Admittedly there are exceptions. Bashar Assad's small minority of Syrian Alawites, apostates from Shiism, also provide volunteers and passage to the suicide bombings in Iraq. Iran's Shiite tyranny forgets its grievance against the Sunnis when it helps Palestinian Sunnis kill Jews. (There are always priorities to consider.) And in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, fanatical Sunnis kill Sunnis.

What the Bush Doctrine has not dealt with is the issue that has been forced, albeit very reluctantly, upon Europe. It is not only a matter of sleeper cells. There is the more basic question that faces all Western democracies, some more (France and the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands, Spain, maybe Germany), some less (us, if we are lucky): what are the standards for citizenship in a national community?

This is not an idle question. "Admission and exclusion," writes Michael Walzer in *Spheres of Justice*

(1983), "are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be . . . historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life." Such considerations do not dispose of the matter, but they are central to the survival of democratic norms. Does mass immigration of one group or another endanger the rules and the motifs of democratic politics? Does it imperil the habits, so painfully attained over the generations, of social tolerance, sexual equality, achievement through study and work? Does it burden society with the fires of the old country's hatreds?

These questions were raised, some only inferentially, on Dream 2 TV, an Arabic channel, by Khaled Abu al-Fadhl of UCLA law school. He didn't evade the central issue: "Is the Muslim who is an American citizen . . . really an American citizen who loves America, or does he belong to a fifth column, with loyalties that lie elsewhere?" I do not know the answer to this question, and there are many impediments to seeking it, including the legitimate desire to keep xenophobia out of the discussion. But I am glad the issue has been put into the public arena.

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Richard Perle

DESPITE A history of terrorist attacks on our ships and embassies and despite evidence that al Qaeda was recruiting, training, and organizing for even more murderous attacks on Americans around the world, the United States, under Clinton and then under Bush, did nothing. While we could have dealt a devastating blow to al Qaeda's terrorist base in Afghanistan, we chose instead to help sustain, with substantial "humanitarian" assistance, the Taliban regime that sheltered it. We left Osama bin Laden unmolested; and we waited. On September 11, we knew we had waited too long.

We had waited too long not only to deal with a visible threat but to revise our complacent notion, influenced by Clinton-era faith in international laws and institutions, of what it was appropriate to do, at home and abroad, to protect ourselves from

Islamist fanatics who had long since declared war on the United States.

So the ancient wisdom of acting first in self-defense, discarded by leaders who had gravely underestimated our vulnerability to—and, even more, the consequences of—an attack on the scale of 9/11, was recognized anew by President Bush on the very day the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon were destroyed.

Bush was right to insist that we would no longer wait until we were attacked. And he was right to give notice to governments supporting and sheltering terrorists that we would no longer distinguish between them and the terrorists who operated from their territory. Finally, he was right to reject the failed policy he had inherited, according to which terrorists were to be dealt with only by the instruments of law enforcement, and the governments backing them by diplomacy alone.

Notwithstanding the caricature of the Bush Doctrine, portrayed by its critics as a menacing unilateralism serving a crusade to impose democracy by force, Bush has correctly understood that the dictatorships and autocracies of the Middle East are the soil in which lethal extremism and the passion for holy war have taken root and spread. He is under no illusion that democratic reform will come quickly or easily, or that it can be imposed from outside by military means. In pressing for reform, he has stood up against the counsel of inaction, self-designated as sophistication, from foreign offices around the world—including those of our European and “moderate” Arab allies—and rather too often even from our own diplomatic establishment. Such counsel would leave the dictators in place for as long as they can cling to power or, worse still, have us collaborate with them and their secret services, or negotiate for their voluntary restraint, in the vain and by now discredited hope that we can thereby purchase safety for our citizens.

It is early days for the Bush Doctrine, but for those who can see beyond the last suicide bombing in Baghdad, there is progress. Millions in Afghanistan and Iraq risked death to vote, bravely affirming the democratic opportunity given them by the destruction of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes. Millions in Lebanon have been emboldened to demand their country back from Syrian domination. Qaddafi has thrown in the towel. Four years after 9/11, al Qaeda has been unable to mount an attack in the United States that could satisfy its political requirement for ever more spectacular acts of destruction. And in coffeehouses and at backgammon tables throughout the Middle East, there

is open discussion of the once-dreaded “D” word.

That’s the good news. Of course, there’s bad news, too. Not everything has gone well. There have been serious mistakes, both tactical (in Iraq) and strategic (policy toward Iran and Syria). In Iraq, the vindictive State Department/CIA disparagement of Saddam Hussein’s opponents—especially the Iraqi National Congress and its talented and effective leader Ahmad Chalabi—made it impossible to launch Iraqi self-governance immediately after Baghdad fell. Instead, we allowed the liberation to subside into a politically inept occupation that was neither necessary nor wise.

The attempt to govern Iraq from Foggy Bottom and the Baghdad “green zone” by thousands of American civil servants who knew nothing of Iraq’s history, language, culture, or politics was a catastrophic mistake. This foolish occupation allowed the deposed Baathists from Saddam’s regime to regroup, import jihadists from abroad, and mount the insurgency from which we, and even more the Iraqis, continue to suffer. With rare exceptions, the intelligence and advice (and often the policy instructions) flowing between Washington and Baghdad continue to be an amalgam of the incompetence of the CIA and the clapped-out conventional wisdom of the State Department.

Administration strategy with respect to Iran and Syria is simple: there is none. While Tehran and Damascus work hard to undermine the fledgling Iraqi democracy and American influence in the region, the administration dithers. The President’s shrewd intuitive grasp of the way forward with these two main enemies of success in Iraq has been sidetracked again and again into the cul-de-sac of bad intelligence and even worse policy advice.

While the President can define issues, adopt bold strategies, and lay out broad visions, he cannot practically manage the thousands of policy matters that arise every day and whose consistency and integration profoundly affect the success of his strategy. Nor can he free himself from dependence on the bureaucratic institutions that are responsible for informing and executing his policies. Partly because the Bush Doctrine has encountered massive resistance from the government departments charged with implementing it, desperately needed change has often been slow and halting: two steps forward, one step back.

Soliciting cooperation from duplicitous Iraqi Baathists, making deals with Kim Jong Il, indecision on Iran, seemingly limitless patience with Syria’s support for the insurgency in Iraq, pretending the Saudis are our friends (they may not be out

to destroy us but they are quite content to let others try)—these are products of your tax dollars at work. A cast of thousands of bureaucrats has been blunting or deflecting the President's best instincts and encouraging him to return to the policies he once expressed the vision to change. The launch of the Bush Doctrine required a new understanding of the threat of Islamist terror, and, even more, the courage to confront it. Sustaining the Bush Doctrine will require more of the same.

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Daniel Pipes

AS THE editors note, the Bush Doctrine consists of two parts, preemption and democracy, both of them far-reaching in their implications. Yet their scope is different. Preemption specifically concerns the most aggressive tyrannies and radical groups. Democracy primarily concerns one region, the Middle East. The two require separate consideration.

The United States and other democratic governments have historically relied not on preemption but on deterrence to stave off enemies. Deterrence signals, "Don't harm us, or you will pay dearly." It has many successes to its credit, notably in the cold war. But deterrence also has significant drawbacks; it is slow, passive, and expensive. Worst, if it fails, war follows. That happens when a tyrant is not intimidated (Hitler) or when the deterrent threat is not clearly enough articulated (Kim Il Sung, Saddam Hussein).

Several recent changes render deterrence less adequate than in the past. For one thing, the demise of the Soviet Union means that no preeminent enemy power exists to restrain the hotheads, for example in North Korea. For another, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction raises the stakes; a U.S. President cannot afford to wait for American cities to be destroyed. And for a third, the spread of Islamist terror networks renders deterrence ineffectual, there being no way to retaliate against al Qaeda.

Responding to these changes, President Bush in June 2002 added a second policy option, that of preemption. Americans, he announced, are not prepared to wait for deterrence to fail and war to start. "We

must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge." U.S. security, Bush said, requires Americans "to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives."

Preemption is to be deployed in unusual cases, against enemies of a particularly vicious and ephemeral sort. According to a draft Pentagon document, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations," the military is preparing guidelines for commanders to receive presidential approval to use nuclear weapons to preempt a WMD attack or to destroy enemy stockpiles of WMD.

To date, preemption has been used only once: in the March 2003 war against Saddam Hussein. It most likely would be brought into service a second time against Iran or North Korea.

I have endorsed preemption, both in the abstract and as applied to the Iraqi dictator. But in doing so, I am aware of its special difficulties: error is likely, and uncertainty is inescapable. That three Arab states tightened a noose around Israel in 1967 did not prove they intended to attack it. That Saddam Hussein had a WMD infrastructure still left his plans ambiguous.

These difficulties place special responsibility on a government that preempts. It must act in as transparent a manner as possible, without guile. It must first establish the validity of its actions to its own citizenry. Second, because Americans heed so much what others think, the opinion of the targeted country's population also matters, as does the opinion of other key countries.

In this regard, the Bush administration has fared poorly, convincing only half of Americans and far fewer among most other peoples, including Iraqis and Britons. Should preemption be invoked against Iran or North Korea, public diplomacy would need to be a far higher priority.

When it comes to spreading democracy, the Bush administration breaks no conceptual ground. Since its own war of independence, the United States has inspired others by its example, and its government has consciously promoted democracy since World War I. What is novel today is the interventionist quality of this policy and its application to the Middle East.

Concerning the latter, it is notable that in November 2003, the President referred to what had been an enduring, consensual, bipartisan policy as "sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East." In fact, that emphasis on stability resulted from a recognition of Middle East exceptionalism—that, unlike elsewhere in the world, popular attitudes in this region were deeply

anti-American, and distinctly more so than the attitudes of the region's emirs, kings, and presidents. Such a situation naturally led Washington to conclude it had best work with dictators, lest democracy bring radicalized governments to power.

This fear was entirely reasonable, as the 1978 revolution in Iran established and as the Algerian elections of 1991 confirmed. But, setting aside such apprehensions, Bush now insisted that Middle Easterners would, no less than other peoples, benefit from democracy and mature through it. He drew direct comparisons with American success in sponsoring democracy in Europe and Asia.

I cheered this change in direction when it was announced, and still do. But here, too, I find the implementation flawed. The administration is trying to build democracy much too quickly. A mere 22 months, for example, passed between the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and elections for the prime minister of Iraq; in my view, the interval should have been closer to 22 years.

Haste ignores the historical record. Democracy has everywhere taken time, and especially so when it builds on a foundation of totalitarian tyranny, as in Iraq. As I wrote in April 2003:

Democracy is a learned habit, not instinct. The infrastructure of a civil society—such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, the rule of law, minority rights, and an independent judiciary—needs to be established before holding elections. Deep attitudinal changes must take place as well: a culture of restraint, a commonality of values, a respect for differences of view and a sense of civic responsibility.

As for the editors' final question, although Americans have no moral *obligation* to sponsor freedom and prosperity in the rest of the world, it does make for an excellent foreign-policy goal. The more the world enjoys democracy, the safer are Americans; as other free peoples prosper, so do we. The bold aim of showing the way, however, requires a cautious, slow, and tempered policy. The Bush administration has a visionary boldness but not the requisite operational caution.

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Richard Pipes

I DO NOT recall a period in modern history when United States foreign policy has been under such relentless attack both from abroad and at home as in the administration of George W. Bush. In the case of foreign opinion, the primary motive seems to be envy of U.S. power and America's ability to act unilaterally on a global scale. At home, the criticism is mainly inspired by Democratic frustration over Republican electoral triumphs and the feeling that the Republicans' aggressive foreign policy is what makes them vulnerable. But it encompasses much of the intellectual community, regardless of party affiliation.

To cite but one example: the September-October 2005 issue of *Foreign Affairs* has four essays on this subject, all written by American academics, each critical of U.S. foreign policy. One blames the Bush administration for its misplaced faith in democracy as a means of stopping terrorism. A second wants Washington to realize that economic liberalization does not necessarily undermine repressive regimes. A third accuses the U.S. of lacking a coherent strategy in Iraq. And the fourth charges Bush with using power in an "arrogant" fashion. One can only wonder: can we do nothing right?

The "Bush Doctrine" that provokes so much dissent is, to say the least, revolutionary, because it shifts the thrust of U.S. foreign policy from its original isolationism and subsequent defensive interventionism to a pugnacious strategy of prevention. It calls for aggressive actions intended to deter rather than punish assaults on U.S. lives and interests. As such, it provokes uneasiness among large numbers of Americans who find it difficult to perceive threats unless they are as direct as Pearl Harbor or 9/11, and who have little patience for protracted military operations on foreign soil.

Yet, in my judgment, this policy, prudently implemented, makes a great deal of sense.

A century ago, world order was maintained by a half-dozen great powers. To be sure, their domination was undemocratic, but, while it lasted, it did ensure a considerable degree of peace and legality. This order broke down as a consequence of two world wars and the emergence in Russia of a regime committed to overthrowing the global status quo.

Today, the collapse of empires and decolonization have produced scores of new countries that, for all their appearance of traditional statehood, are in many cases unable effectively to govern their territories. Vast regions of nominally sovereign regimes are today controlled by armed dissidents

with their own agendas. Furthermore, we have rogue states, like Iran, North Korea, or Venezuela, that have international ambitions vastly exceeding their capabilities and are able to gain credibility only by virtue of nuclear blackmail or the threat of revolution. All of which makes for great instability.

The United States is the only country in the world capable of confronting these unprecedented problems. And not only because it has the military power to do so. It alone has a global perspective developed during the years of the cold war when Western Europe, Japan, and the rest of the non-Communist world lived under its protection. The U.S. thinks globally and perceives threats far from its shores—which is not the case with its allies, who tend to reason regionally. Whether the U.S. wishes it or not, circumstances have made it into the world's gendarme.

I have no problem with America's assuming the right to decide when and where it faces danger, and acting to avert it. A country's security is not the subject of discussion by others. The United Nations has no inherent right to decide whether the U.S. is threatened and how it is to react to the threat. Sovereignty implies both the right and the duty to protect one's citizens.

As for President Bush's notion that the country's security is best protected by the spread of democracy, that strikes me as both right and wrong. It is right in the sense that it encourages the inhabitants of despotic regimes to take the law into their own hands. We have seen the positive results of this idea in Georgia and Ukraine, where illegitimate rulers have been peacefully removed. In Central Asia, inhabitants have for the first time challenged their post-Soviet dictators. In Lebanon, the Syrians have been compelled by popular outrage to end their occupation. President Mubarak of Egypt has had to hold elections. These and similar events—most notably, of course, the unprecedented elections in Afghanistan and Iraq—have occurred under the direct pressure of the ideological influence of the United States. They surely are a force for the good.

At the same time, I doubt whether it is realistic to expect third-world countries to produce genuine democracies. Democracy is an individualistic doctrine, which assumes that the citizen stands in direct and immediate relationship to his government. But many if not most third-world countries are organized along tribal lines, under which the tribe and its leaders protect the members. In such societies, the individual is part of a group that exercises effective political authority over him.

It is difficult to see how democracy can triumph

where there exist such intermediate political bodies. The best, therefore, that one can expect from a policy promoting democracy is the removal of dictators and some sort of compromise under which tribal chieftains reach a *modus vivendi* ensuring a modicum of order and self-government.

As these remarks convey, by and large I am satisfied with President Bush's conduct of foreign policy. I approve of its principles, and I admire his determination in pursuing it in the face of unprecedented criticism: this is what true leadership is all about.

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Norman Podhoretz

IN THE beginning I was an enthusiastic supporter of the Bush Doctrine, and I still am. Let me, then, recount the ways.

On 9/11 Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda succeeded in doing what neither Hitler's Germany nor Tojo's Japan nor Stalin's Soviet Union ever managed to accomplish: an attack on the continental United States. The most novel element of George W. Bush's response to this aggression was a strategy designed to "drain the swamps" of religio-political despotism throughout the Middle East in which, he asserted, the new enemy was bred and nurtured.

The first testing ground of Bush's strategy was naturally Afghanistan, whose Islamofascist Taliban rulers were harboring the al-Qaeda terrorists who had attacked us. Militarily, the campaign to topple the Taliban was brilliantly successful, and so were the subsequent political developments in Afghanistan. Within three short years, the first free election in its history was held, and Hamid Karzai, who has rightly been described as civilized, modern, and pro-American, was sworn in as president.

It was natural, too, that the next target would be Iraq. For if the Taliban best represented the religious or "Islam-" face of the new two-headed totalitarian monster ranged against us, Iraq under Saddam Hussein was the leading avatar of its secular or "fascist" component.

The military campaign against Saddam also turned out to be a brilliant success. And so has the political aftermath, notwithstanding an "insurgency" whose

terrorist tactics have been maddeningly hard to counter. But three things need to be noticed:

First, in operating through an alliance between Islamist “holy warriors” and diehard Baathist fascists, the “insurgency” demonstrated that our enemy was—just as the Bush diagnosis posited—a monster with two heads, one religious and one secular.

Second, in its declared aim of preventing Iraq from moving toward democratization, the Islamofascist alliance also demonstrated its agreement with Bush that democratization was indeed the right prescription for killing off the two forces it embodied and represented.

Finally, in the Islamofascist coalition’s failure to prevent the stunning political progress the Iraqis were making even while it was murdering so many of them, it demonstrated that Bush was right in contending that “the peoples of the Islamic nations want . . . the same freedoms . . . as people in every nation.”

Thus, as if out of nowhere, some 8 million Iraqis turned up to vote in a free election; then, and again in defiance of the two-headed monster, a constitution was hammered out that will, sooner rather than later, transform Iraq into a federal republic where Islamic principles will formally serve as “a main source of legislation” but where “No law that constricts democratic principles shall be issued.”

To these achievements of the Bush Doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq we can add the spillover effect it has had throughout the region, including the suspension by Libya of its WMD program, the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, and (probably most consequential of all) the emergence of increasingly bold reformist voices within Islam.

Now, I cannot for the life of me understand how anyone could deny that all this—purchased at an astonishingly low cost in American blood when measured by the standards of every other war we have ever fought—is “making the U.S. more secure.”

But beyond security, what the United States has been doing in the Middle East is so charged with greatness and so redolent of nobility that I have lost all patience with its outright opponents. I find the haters of America among them to be morally contemptible and intellectually cretinous; and as for their more moderate fellow opponents, all they have to offer is either a long-since discredited isolationism or the risible insistence that we be guided by the political wisdom of France and the moral authority of the UN.

Yet I must confess that my patience has worn thin even with those supporters of the Bush Doctrine who spend most of their time complaining that (in the columnist Mark Steyn’s inimitable

paraphrase) “we shouldda done this, and we shouldda done that,” as though it were self-evident that “this” and “that” would have worked out better than the close calls which, under prevailing circumstances, were reasonably made.

Blessed with so much confident criticism from so many *besserwissers*, the Bush administration hardly needs any more from me. Nevertheless, because I am convinced that if we are eventually beaten back, it will not be by the terrorist insurgency over there but by the political insurgency here at home, I believe it has become vitally necessary to re-concentrate the American mind on (so to speak) the threat of hanging that we face. I also believe that the best way for the administration to do this is to start openly identifying the enemy as Islamofascism and the struggle against it as World War IV.

I think I understand the administration’s reluctance to go this rhetorical route, but too big a price in the coin of clarity and focus is now being paid for its resort to euphemism and indirection. More specifically, the failure to call the enemy and the struggle by their proper names has allowed the opposition to rip Iraq out of its proper context as only one front in a much broader conflict, and to portray our campaign there as a self-contained war with no connection to 9/11.

Thanks largely to this loss of clarity and focus, there has been a dangerous decline in popular support for the President’s policy; and this, more than any other factor, threatens its “longer-range prospects” and its magnificently “expansive vision of America’s world role.” To put a brake on and perhaps even reverse the decline, the President will have to begin and then keep on reminding the American people that what we are fighting is indeed a world war against another totalitarian aggressor, and that the stakes are at least as great as they were in World War II and in World War III (otherwise known as the cold war).

God knows that we as a nation need just such a reminder, and God help us if it should come in the form of another attack on American soil, only this time with weapons infinitely more devastating than a few hijacked airplanes.

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David Pryce-Jones

PLENTY OF men in public life in Muslim countries regularly and openly call on their audiences to mobilize for war against the West in general and the United States in particular. Here is a sheikh of Cairo's al-Azhar mosque, supposedly a great center of Islamic learning, who writes: "Christians are like a malignant and contagious disease. Muslims should be unjust to them, they should despise them, treat them roughly, and boycott them to force them to convert to Islam." A Hamas spokesman predicts a decisive battle that will end only when "Americans have returned to their roots, as the Qur'an promised us, that is to humiliation and poverty." Tehran mounts demonstrations in which the crowds shout "Death to the Great Satan."

The leaders and the led are unfortunate people, of course, to be pitied because fantasy is agitating them, and the root cause of this is intellectual poverty. But their words, their fantasies, led to 9/11, and bombings in London, Madrid, and a score of other cities as well—so that pity goes only so far. Intellectual poverty is a plight from which all can escape by their own efforts. And if that proves beyond the wish or the capacity of these men, then others will have to help them.

The Bush Doctrine is fundamentally a reality check. Surely, few Christians see themselves as suffering from a disease whose cure is forcible conversion to Islam. The Qur'an, written down a thousand years before the United States had a name, does not promise to return Americans to roots of humiliation and poverty. The United States protected Iranian independence throughout the cold war, and has taken in innumerable Iranian immigrants. Americans defending themselves in Afghanistan and Iraq are establishing that an example on the ground has priority over fantasy. Preemption is a tactic of surprise, and one to which all manner of powers, great or small, have resorted in the past. It also sounds an alarm to any country that has not declared war but nonetheless permits terrorists to operate with impunity within its borders.

Preemption is, furthermore, a timely response to the post-cold-war stampede for power by local and regional warlords suddenly released from Great Power bondage. The likes of Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, Arafat, and Khomeini calculated that violence was now a paying proposition, and they could safely indulge in it. Typical of the flux and hesitation of that period, the Dayton accords and the Oslo peace process were tentative attempts by

the West to apply democratic procedures to situations in which such procedures were inapplicable and therefore stood no chance of success.

To bring democracy to people who have known nothing but tribalism, absolutism, and a religious identity that admits no compromise is certainly a tall order. But President Bush is surely right to assert that everyone is able to recognize freedom. To suppose that those trapped by intellectual poverty are actually incapable of democracy smacks of racism pure and simple. What is happening in Afghanistan and Iraq is necessarily experimental. The local populations are invited to create a polity that allows them to take responsibility for themselves.

There is indeed a sense in which Westerners have no business to be participating in any such thing, but they are doing so only because in the fraught historical evolution of their relationship with the West, Muslims have fallen behind woefully, and the knowledge of this is humiliating and fuels a corresponding rage. But the liberation of long frustrated creative energies is also happening, as witnessed by the political ferment in so many Muslim countries. When someone like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi boasts that "We have declared a fierce war on this evil principle of democracy and those who follow this evil ideology," he is conceding the dynamism of the principle. Should the Bush Doctrine fail, and Afghanistan and Iraq lapse into their old ways, a historic marker will nonetheless have been put down for the Muslim future.

The country most evidently and persistently working to wreck the Bush Doctrine is Iran. Iranian agents are doing what they can to sabotage a constitutional Iraq and a constitutional Afghanistan. In tandem with North Korea—another founding member of the axis of evil—Iran is progressing toward possession of nuclear weapons on the basis of a strategy of deception and prevarication.

During the cold war, the balance of terror—apart from a blip over Cuba—was rational, therefore predictable. It may be that the ayatollahs will also prove rational, but to date they have shown every sign of acquiring this weaponry with a view to its utility in the fulfillment of their fantasy. Instead of clarifying all the possibilities for preventing Iranian nuclear ambitions, the Bush administration appears to be waiting, eyes shut, for something to turn up and deflect what will be a great danger.

The foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany have been trying for some time to devise some sort of bribe that might induce Tehran to interrupt its nuclear program. This Chamberlainesque exhibition of weakness has served only to buy

time for Iran. Nothing more pertinent is to be expected from the Europeans in their present configuration. The political class and the intelligentsia in just about every country of the continent indulge in an anti-Americanism without precedent. Virtually nobody states the case that the United States has every right to defend itself from attack, or that the Bush Doctrine stands a fair chance of bringing Muslims into the modern world on equal terms with everyone else.

European critics of President Bush and his decisions exhibit their own variety of intellectual poverty, a compound of humbug and obtuseness. They are free to enjoy the civilized values of the West only because the United States makes the world safe for them. Kipling once excoriated the ingratitude that critics in his day nurtured toward those with the means and the moral responsibility to keep the peace, and his unforgettable irony about the swift reversal of attitudes in a crisis needs only a little updating: "Oh it's thank you, Uncle Sam, when the guns begin to shoot."

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Arch Puddington

IN 1972, Freedom House began publishing an annual survey to assess the state of global freedom. The results, back then, made for grim reading: only 44 countries earned the designation of "free." At the time, freedom was restricted to Western Europe, North America, and a few scattered outposts like Israel, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.

To compound a bad situation, the direction of global politics seemed to be moving decisively against free societies. Within a few years, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would fall to Communist insurgencies. Later in the 70's, Communist or Marxist dictatorships were established in Afghanistan and Grenada, and civil war between the Left and Right ignited throughout Central America. Meanwhile, right-wing or military dictatorships gained supremacy or consolidate their authority in practically every country of South America. In Angola, Mozambique, and other former Portuguese colonies, civil war broke out between

forces of the Marxist Left and non-Communist forces supported by the United States and South Africa's apartheid regime. Throughout most of Asia, rule of the military strongman prevailed. At the United Nations and other international venues, the very suggestion that Western-style freedoms might make the world a more prosperous and humane place was treated with scorn by a powerful coalition of Communist-bloc states and the non-aligned.

It is worth reminding ourselves of this gloomy condition in light of the changes that have subsequently taken place. Today, 89 countries are rated as free on the Freedom House index, and the number of outright dictatorships and totalitarian regimes has shrunk considerably. Free societies predominate in Latin America and the former Communist countries of Central Europe. Freedom has made significant inroads in Asia, and a number of important countries of sub-Saharan Africa have made progress toward democratic rule as well.

The forces that drove this unprecedented wave of political freedom are many and varied. But clearly American actions, attitudes, and policies played a crucial role. It is thus neither naïve nor utopian to propose that the promotion of freedom should occupy a central place in American foreign policy. In fact, even during times when our policies were shaped by the principles of realism, the U.S. was involved in projects to sustain democratic dissidents, undermine the legitimacy of dictatorships, and communicate with people trapped in unfree societies. During the crucial decade of the 1980's, a unique and typically American combination of formal diplomacy, public diplomacy, and private initiative proved a potent instrument, and can play the same role again given the support of America's political leadership.

It is true that countries of the Middle East pose a set of issues far more complex than those America faced during the cold war. The Middle East is the only region to have resisted the contemporary freedom revolution, showing very little progress over the past three decades.

But the administration is right to reject the proposition that the very concept of freedom is alien to these societies, and that therefore American policy should always seek stability over the disruptions that democratic change will inevitably bring. Similar arguments were advanced at various intervals in the past about the Slavic world, Catholic societies, and Asian culture. Even as the Soviet Union was in the process of collapse, important voices warned that catastrophe lay ahead

should the Baltic states or Ukraine declare their independence.

The critics were wrong on all counts. The democratic revolution that swept the world over the past quarter-century transformed the political systems of societies as different as Ukraine, Taiwan, and Brazil. Although democracy remains fragile in a number of Latin American nations and in a number of countries from the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, the overall gains exceed the predictions of optimists. The disintegration of the Soviet empire has enhanced global security, especially in Europe, and the spread of democracy elsewhere has been accompanied by a significant reduction in war and civil strife. The threats to peace today emanate from those locales that have rejected democratic change: North Korea, Iran, Sudan, the Arab Middle East. From this standpoint alone, freedom is very much in the national interest.

The dictators who rule over the Middle East and the extreme Islamists who commit acts of terror are locked in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Repression creates the climate in which extremism thrives, and extremism provides a justification for continued repression. Extreme Islam, as the only significant totalitarian movement of the day, stands as the greatest single threat to peace and the most serious obstacle to the spread of freedom. Just as the defeat of Communism opened the door to new democratic possibilities throughout much of the world, so the defeat of violent Islamists would create opportunities for new political options in those regions that have been most resistant to change.

The success of the administration's ambitious agenda will depend to a large extent on American steadfastness. The specter of the Soviet nuclear arsenal played a key role in ensuring that the United States stayed the course during the cold war. But the spirit of bipartisanship that sustained U.S. policy declined considerably in the post-Vietnam period and is, if anything, in more tattered condition today, despite 9/11. The Bush administration's effort to broaden the base of support for its Middle East policies has not been impressive. Likewise, the perspective of large segments of the Democratic party remains stuck in the experiences of Vietnam and Central America.

There is no question that the administration has made serious mistakes in the implementation of its strategy. But a bit of perspective is warranted here, too. The history of the cold war is replete with American blunders, missteps, and errors. Nonetheless, the United States prevailed because its leaders remained focused on the central objectives of curb-

ing Soviet influence and, where opportunities presented themselves, expanding freedom's reach. The history of the past half-century suggests that when the forces of freedom are locked in sustained struggle with freedom's adversaries, freedom will eventually win out.

If the United States demonstrates the patience and determination that brought victory in the past, it should succeed again, even in so challenging an environment as the Middle East.

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Natan Sharansky

IF THE Bush Doctrine means linking the foreign policy of the United States to the degree of freedom enjoyed by citizens of other countries—as called for by President Bush in his second inaugural address when he declared that America would “encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require the decent treatment of their own people”—then I have been a supporter of the Bush Doctrine for over three decades. It is the policy long championed by Andrei Sakharov, first practiced in the United States by Senator Henry M. Jackson, and used with devastating effect by Ronald Reagan to bring down the Soviet empire, free hundreds of millions of people, and help secure Western civilization.

The Bush Doctrine has been under assault primarily because of the current situation in Iraq. It is hard to recall that only eight months ago, a headline in a paper not known for its sympathies with the American President or with the doctrine that bears his name asked, incredulously, “Was Bush Right?”

That week, Iraqi voters had shocked the world when 60 percent of them turned out to participate in democratic elections. Confronted by millions of purpled fingers, fierce critics of the President and his Iraq policy, and particularly of its stress on promoting democracy in the Middle East, fell largely silent. To many, the elections offered clear evidence that, just like Italians, Germans, Japanese, East Europeans, Russians, Latin Americans, and others before them, Iraqis, too, truly wanted to be free. As

for those who had all along argued the merits of helping Iraqis build a free society, they were gripped by a kind of collective euphoria.

The euphoria was understandable enough: these were people whose ideas had been dismissed by critics on both the Left and the Right as nothing but a utopian fiction. Nevertheless, it was misplaced. The Iraqi elections showed that a democratic Iraq was possible, not that it was inevitable.

Still, the President's critics, now more certain in their skepticism than ever, would be wise to remember those purpled fingers. For if supporters of the Bush Doctrine were wrong to assume eight months ago that the difficult days were behind them, today's critics are even more wrong to assume that the project to build a democratic Iraq is bound to fail.

Not that the path ahead will be easy. A democratic Iraq is possible because Iraqis want to be free, and because the President of the United States rightly understands, as few leaders of the last century have understood, that his own nation's security depends on the advance of freedom around the world. An Iraqi people who want to be free and a world leader determined that they will be free make for a powerful combination. Thanks to it, the Iraqi democratic experiment has overcome many a barrier over the last two years, from the horrific carnage in the streets of Baghdad to antiwar sentiment in America. But it is another question whether, given the array of its enemies, the combination will prevail.

Let us be under no illusions. Not a single non-democratic regime in the Middle East, or anywhere else for that matter, wants Iraqis to be free. The regimes that deny freedom to Iranians, Syrians, Saudi Arabians, Egyptians, and so many others know that success in Iraq will help put an end to their own repressive rule. They also know that the vast majority of their nominally loyal subjects, long trained in the arts of doublethink, will lift their eyes toward a free Iraq and ask themselves a simple question: why not here?

To the formidable opposition provided by non-democratic regimes, one must add the determination of Islamist terrorist groups to wreak havoc in Iraq, correctly appreciating as they do that a free Iraq will represent, for them, a monumental defeat in the war they have been waging on the democratic world for more than a quarter-century. Imagine an occupied post-World War II Japan, surrounded by regimes and terror groups willing to do everything possible to undermine the emergence of Japanese democracy, and one

can sense the scale of the challenge in Iraq today.

The Bush administration can be faulted for not recognizing the difficulties involved in helping to democratize the Middle East, but certainly not for lacking the wisdom or the courage to try. If anything, the problem has lain in not applying the Bush Doctrine consistently enough. For example, this past June, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave a truly remarkable speech in Cairo about the importance of democratic reform in the Middle East. By the end of the summer, however, the administration was doing everything to help keep Hosni Mubarak's regime in power in Egypt, while extending little help to the democratic opposition in Iran. It also enthusiastically supported an Israeli disengagement plan from Gaza that utterly rejected the centrality of Palestinian democratic reform to the peace process.

Equally unfortunate is the scant attention paid to the need to turn the Bush Doctrine into a bipartisan policy. No doubt, in a politically polarized climate, this is no simple matter. But if the Bush Doctrine is to succeed in transforming the region and the world, it will have to remain American policy beyond January 20, 2009.

Yet any criticism I may have of the Bush Doctrine's implementation is tempered by my deep appreciation of the fact that its merits are being discussed at all. For too long, American foreign policy was shaped by the idea that supporting friendly dictators was critical to peace and stability. This illusion collapsed on 9/11, and President Bush was bold enough to chart a different course. For this he deserves nothing but praise and gratitude.

Among the first who owe him gratitude are the millions of Afghans and Iraqis who no longer live under tyranny, the millions of Lebanese who have begun to build a free Lebanon, and the countless democrats now raising their voices throughout a region once characterized only by fear and repression. These are the true beneficiaries of the Bush Doctrine, and I have no doubt that both America and the world are much safer for the bounty that has befallen them.

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Amir Taheri

I HAVE SUPPORTED the Bush Doctrine from the start as an example of enlightened self-interest. As a democracy, the United States has always been threatened by despotic regimes of different colorings. In two world wars, that threat was translated into classical military conflicts. During the cold war, it consisted of a mix of political, diplomatic, and cultural campaigns against the U.S.—supplemented, at times, by low-intensity war waged through surrogates. In the past few decades, the threat has come in the form of terrorism—starting with the seizure of American hostages in Tehran in 1979, passing through the killing of 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983, and culminating in the 9/11 attacks.

In an ideal world, it would be up to an international body to “confront the worst threats before they emerge.” But we do not live in such a world, and the United Nations is in no position to assume the task. Thus, Bush is right both in his diagnosis and in his prescription. Over the past century or so, the United States has almost always been a force for good. It has helped defend freedom in Europe and Asia, and has invested blood and treasure to defeat fascism around the globe and to see off the Soviet “evil empire.” Fighting to defend and advance freedom is a natural goal for a self-respecting democracy.

The picture, moreover, is encouraging. The U.S. has achieved historic victories by destroying two of the worst despotic regimes in history—the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baath in Iraq—and liberating more than 50 million people. In Afghanistan and Iraq, democratization is proceeding at a faster pace than I imagined. If the same cannot be said about the process of pacification and stabilization, that is largely because the U.S. and its allies have not committed the necessary forces and because the task of building the new Afghan and Iraqi armies has been hampered by squabbles within NATO, by bureaucratic rivalries in Washington, and by weak leadership in Kabul and Baghdad.

I have no doubt that the removal of the Taliban and the Baath has made the U.S. more secure. Four days before he fled, the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar told the BBC that his regime had a single aim: no less than the destruction of America. Indeed, Afghanistan had become a haven for terrorists from more than 40 countries, all sharing a hatred of the United States. Iraq under the Baath was no better. Baghdad housed the head-

quarters of 23 terrorist organizations, while Saddam Hussein was biding his time until the United Nations sanctions would be lifted and he could put his war machine into full gear again.

The Bush Doctrine has produced other positive results. The obnoxious Colonel Quaddafi in Libya has ended more than 25 years as a sponsor of international terrorism and dismantled his programs for weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear warheads. The Sudanese Islamist-militarist regime has signed a U.S.-sponsored peace deal with the southern Christian rebels, accepted a power-sharing scheme, and promised multiparty elections. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak has submitted to the “ignominy” of a multi-candidate presidential election after 24 years of one-man rule. Saudi Arabia, which had always rejected the popular vote as a “Western disease,” has held its first, albeit limited, municipal elections. Kuwait has granted women the right to vote and to be elected. The Lebanese, encouraged by U.S. support, have risen against the Syrian occupation and forced the occupier to leave after more than a quarter-century. Afghanistan and Iraq have held their first free elections, and have adopted constitutions that are the most democratic in the Muslim world.

As for the Bush Doctrine’s longer-range prospects, we have to keep our fingers crossed. My fear is that once Bush has left office, his successor will relapse into the reactive torpor that, with brief but significant intervals, has marked American foreign policy since Vietnam.

The chief weakness of present American policy is the administration’s failure to develop a coherent approach to the problem of Iran. This has encouraged Tehran to challenge the Bush scenario for reform in the Middle East. In a speech in Tehran last June, Iran’s “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei put it starkly: “The Americans have their plan [for the region]. We also have a plan. We will not let the Americans impose theirs.”

The absence of a clear American policy toward Iran is a cause of concern throughout the region, including in Iraq and Afghanistan where politicians wonder what will happen if the next U.S. administration decides to cut and run, leaving Iran, which by then could have nuclear weapons, as the major local power. Similar concerns are aired from Rabat to Riyadh. This is what Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahamdinejad told Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad in Tehran in late August: “One day the Americans will leave. But we will always be there!”

Today Iran plays the role that the USSR once played, albeit on a smaller scale. When the USSR

collapsed, the global structure of the totalitarian Left fell along with it. Similarly, when the Islamic Republic collapses, the global edifice of Islamofascism is likely to collapse.

There are three options concerning Iran: *détente*, based on a demarcation of areas of influence; a mini-cold war, which would include hot episodes fought through proxies all over the Middle East and beyond; and regime change through a mixture of political and military pressure. Doing nothing is not an option, if only because Iran is determined to move onto the offensive.

The editors' final question has two aspects. First, does the U.S. have a world role? Let me quote the British author John Buchan, writing in 1929:

I hate cruelty. I hate using human beings as pawns in games of egotism. I hate all the rotten [totalitarian] creeds. I believe in liberty, though it may be out of fashion, and because America, in her queer way, is on the same side, I'm for America!

The second aspect of the question is whether or not Bush can unite his people behind his doctrine. Again let me quote Buchan:

No power or alliance of powers can defeat America. But suppose she is compelled to quarrel with a group of [rogue states] and that, with her genius for misrepresenting herself, she appears to have a bad cause. Has she many friends on the globe except Britain? Most countries will flatter her. But they hate her like hell. Trust them not to help matters by interpreting her cause sympathetically. Inside her borders she has a dozen [warring factions] which, in a situation like that, when she was forced to act and yet didn't want to or didn't know how to, might, if properly manipulated, split her from top to bottom.

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Ruth Wedgwood

TWO PROJECTS are commonly associated with the Bush Doctrine, both of them arising from the major transformations in strategy called for by the post-9/11 world. The first, taking alarm at the new limits of effective deterrence, asks whether at times we may need to take concerted action to keep weapons of mass destruction out of dangerous hands. The second supposes that encouraging steps toward democracy may dampen the fires of nihilist radicalism in the Islamic world, and set Arab societies on a sounder course.

The 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington made plain a new security landscape with catastrophic possibilities. We lost both our oceanic buffer and the assurance of stability provided by nuclear or conventional deterrence. Non-state actors have little to lose when they target civilians, and in the absence of a return address, retaliatory threats against them can sound idle. The threat of "catastrophic consequences" kept Saddam Hussein from using chemical or biological weapons in the first Gulf war; such reticence is lost in a campaign of jihad by terrorists who seek to mimic the destructive capability of states.

International law has taught that any state, even under a bellicose regime, has the right to acquire any weapon it pleases, bounded only by treaty commitments and the political decisions of the UN Security Council. But the danger posed by transfers of WMD to non-state actors, or of indiscriminate sales to a high bidder, does not permit such indifference to the nature of a regime. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proved at times to be an attractive nuisance, permitting states to hide behind its parchment and claim the right to develop "peaceful" uses of nuclear energy, no matter how evident their ultimate ambition to build a bomb. One may have a defiant leader like Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who shows no inclination to allow international checks on his fuel cycle. Or the unpredictability of North Korea, whose programs, even after the new joint statement in the six-party talks, will be exceedingly hard to monitor and whose offshore sale of components and designs will remain exceedingly dangerous.

A chastened appreciation of the new dangers is not confined to Republicans, or indeed to Americans. In 2004, the UN Secretary General commissioned a "High-Level Panel" to address new threats in the international system; the ensuing encyclical was remarkable, especially in the UN setting. Although predictably deferring to the author-

ity of the UN Security Council, it stated clearly that any group seeking to attack civilians is guilty of terrorism; that the right of self-defense includes thwarting an imminent attack, without waiting for the actual dire event (a state of war announced by *fatwa* presumably portends such an imminent attack); and that reckless regimes should not be entitled to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

To all this one may add Kofi Annan's warning to the General Assembly in September 1999, reviewing the UN's failure to act in Kosovo and Rwanda. When the Security Council refuses to meet a threat, said Annan, should we be surprised when nation-states act in their stead?

Thus, admitting in principle that there are situations where the acquisition of WMD capability by irresponsible regimes may need to be addressed through national power is not quite the "branding" event some would suppose. Whatever one calls it, the doctrine that states sponsoring terror groups should not be permitted to develop weapons of mass destruction is inherent in the current security environment; it will survive the difficulties of the Iraq war, and is fundamental to containing the threat posed by Iran and by a commercial proliferator like North Korea. Acknowledging this does not lead to any automatic policy prescription; but it is the first step in devising a more effective *cordon sanitaire* against non-state actors.

Along with the death of deterrence, there is the competition of culture. The integrated world economy was supposed to enlist new recruits to champion growth in poor societies. *Homo economicus* was slated to lead modernization, in a world of trade without barriers. Atavism was supposed to give way to consumerism. But this future, inevitable as it may still seem to some, has been scorched by Islam's ferocious civil war. The cultists of al Qaeda seek globalization of another sort, celebrating the martyrdom of Salafist violence. Playing upon the past failures of Arab nationalism and corrupt economies, they argue an imaginary account of Islam and purity that seeks the reconquest of Europe.

In the midst of this group hypnosis, you can't beat something with nothing. Democratic change is overdue in Islamic societies. It has electrified other societies, giving a young population something to plan for, buoying a sense of personal engagement. The possibility of changing the government by means other than violence may channel the energy of the "street" into structured methods of choice, and bring voters to consider the sober choices of actual governance rather than the frenzied choices of the imagination.

Undoubtedly, the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds will have to endure the violence of the Salafist vision for some time to come. But the gamble of the Bush administration in seeking democratic change is that a young man who can cast a vote and have it counted in an honest tally has less reason to imperil his family and his future in a tirade of violence. It also says to the world that America's proudest possession—its democracy—is not an advantage that America wishes to enjoy in isolation.

Again, one takes a lesson from Iraq. The angers and jealousies that dwell below the surface may be unknown to us, and post-colonial states may have been held together with barbed wire and repression rather than any feeling of commonality. The speed of change is not likely to be in our control, and pushing too hard may, as with the Shah of Iran in the late 1970's, simply create an opening for radical takeover. But the ideal should remain the same—for the principle of reason was permitted by the prophet Muhammad and recognized in Islamic tradition. Democracy is a process of reasoning together, and of thereby constructing a *res publica*. The social nature of Islam, and its commitment to live by an ethic of charity in a public and visible way, is not so far from this ideal.

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George Weigel

THE BUSH DOCTRINE clarified the issues at stake in a moment of new peril for American democracy, and indeed for the democratic project. Despite tremendous difficulties (obtuse Europeans, sclerotic and corrupt international organizations, partisan sniping at home, media carping around the globe), and notwithstanding the hard slog under way in Iraq, the bold application of the Bush Doctrine in Kabul and Baghdad has changed the dynamics of world politics for the better. Vicious dictators deposed; nascent democracies being nurtured; Libya defanged; the Syrian grip on Lebanon loosened and Assad the younger put on notice: these are no mean achievements.

But there is more, and if ideas really do have

consequences, it is no small “more.” For the Bush Doctrine has also posed a sharp challenge to the hegemony of an unexamined, and dangerous, “realism” in the U.S. foreign-policy debate.

In the form asserted by Reinhold Niebuhr in the 1930’s, realism was a necessary antidote to the kind of crackpot idealism that had produced confections like the 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact “outlawing” war—an idealism blind to, or psychologically incapable of coping with, the rise of the fascist threat. Niebuhrian realism will always have a place in any serious thinking about world politics, with its understanding of the inevitable irony, pathos, and tragedy of history; its distinction between the moral reasoning appropriate to domestic politics and the moral reasoning required in world politics; its robust skepticism about all schemes of human perfection; and its critical affirmation of democracy, which stops far short of a worship of democracy.

But this was not the realism on tap in U.S. foreign-policy circles in the immediate aftermath of the cold war. There was always something intellectually strange about this neo-realism, from which virtually all of the Niebuhrian subtleties had disappeared. The neo-realists’ insistence that world politics was a realm of immorality, or at least amorality, was not only implausible at a basic philosophical level—as if moral reasoning, a quintessential characteristic of human beings, could somehow be factored out of politics, a quintessential human activity. Just as urgently, it tended to blind policy-makers to the religious and cultural passions that were shaping the post-cold-war world.

Neo-realism seemed to assume that the determination of the national interest was an exercise in casuistry, in which policy-makers would fix on the best way to achieve something already well known and perfectly understood. That simply isn’t the case. The determination of the national interest is an exercise in the virtue of prudence, a calculus of political judgment *and* moral judgment in which resources and capabilities, imperatives and commitments, aspirations and traditions are all in play.

The Bush Doctrine has reminded the country and the world that there are options beyond an idealism untethered by reality or a crackpot realism susceptible of premature closure in its thinking about what is possible. Call this (as I once did) “idealism without illusions”—a form of moral reasoning and a method of policy calculus that takes the hard facts of the human condition seriously, but that always remembers what Niebuhr called “the important residual creative factor in human rationality.” In deeds as well as in words, the Bush Doc-

trine has reminded the country and the world that things can be made to change for the better—and that, sometimes, the only prudent option is to make the effort to make them change.

September 11 made clear that post-cold-war realists had misread the realities. A new reading was required, informed by a larger sense of possibilities. These included the possibility that the first use of military force could be morally justified, because it prevented rogue regimes from wreaking havoc, because it advanced the possibility of a more rational politics in the Middle East, or both. Iraq was and remains a crucial test here; one hopes the doomsayers understand that, and understand that the pre-March 2003 status quo is one to which no realist, in any sense of the term, should want to return.

The administration’s postwar planning was, obviously, not up to the standard of its war planning. Trial-and-error learning seems to be the American way in these situations; Americans ought to remember that the Marshall Plan and NATO weren’t ready for implementation the week after V-E Day. And the situation of post-Saddam Iraq is arguably a tougher problem to solve than post-Hitler Germany, for any number of reasons. Still, even those inclined to give the administration the benefit of the doubt in the implementation of the Bush Doctrine have, I think, a legitimate complaint in the failure of the administration’s public diplomacy.

By “public diplomacy,” I mean at home as well as abroad. In the long-haul war against terrorism, the maintenance of national focus and morale is no easy thing. A monthly, prime-time presidential report to the nation, even if only fifteen minutes in length, would have been a useful tool in maintaining focus—and in challenging, if only indirectly, the unremittingly negative reporting of the mainstream media.

The administration has not, in other words, done a very good job of determining the public narrative in America about the war against terrorism. But it never even got started in Europe, where the initial burst of pro-American sentiment after 9/11 was palpably eroding by late October 2001. U.S. embassies in both “old” and “new” Europe became bunkers when they should have been launching pads from which to carry the argument into Europe’s media, universities, and think tanks. Leading American commentators with European credibility ought to have been deployed throughout the continent, in person and through the electronic media, to challenge the regnant cartoon of American cowboys running riot in the world.

No doubt, the current crisis of civilizational

morale that besets Western Europe would have made things difficult in any event; but they didn't have to be as difficult as they've been. Besides, it is a simple matter of self-respect to get into the argument and fight. If the Bush Doctrine is to have staying power, those responsible for implementing it must figure out how to regain control of the storyline, at home and around the world.

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James Q. Wilson

PRESIDENT BUSH, in his September 2002 preface to *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, said that this country will act against emerging terrorist threats "before they are fully formed," not because we seek unilateral advantage but because we wish "to create a balance of power that favors human freedom."

I believe that these arguments are correct. To defeat possible Soviet aggression, we built up our military in order to counter an attack. To defeat radical terrorism, we must detect and intercept such plots before they are carried out; acting without armies or national governments, terrorists supply no advance warnings to their victims. This forward policy does not require us to become the world's policeman. It requires only that we serve the interests of this country by means of good intelligence and counterterrorist acts.

Although the President's policy clearly favors liberty and democracy, read literally it does not require us to change every unfree nation into a free one. Instead, it declares that we wish to create a "balance of power" that favors freedom. Our goal is to achieve, in the words of the *National Strategy* document, "the union of our values and our national interests."

That union was threatened by Afghanistan and Iraq. In the former country, al Qaeda, active in and protected by the Taliban regime, had attacked us. As for Iraq, it did not attack us and may or may not have supported terrorist groups, but its behavior deeply threatened the balance of power in the Mid-

dle East. That threat was revealed by its invasions of Iran and Kuwait, by its bloody attacks on its own citizens, and by the financial support it gave to the families of terrorists. If it had been successful in Iran and Kuwait, Iraq would have been able to invade Saudi Arabia and create a monumental threat to democratic Israel.

Much of the debate about our invasion of Iraq involves rival claims about its possession of weapons of mass destruction. That argument is misplaced. The intelligence service of just about every Western nation believed that Iraq had such weapons, and Iraq's deceitful response to Security Council resolutions suggested that it was trying to conceal them. There is evidence, little reported in the mainstream media, that an effort had been made to create the machinery for producing such weapons.

But even if we had known that Iraq had no WMD's, it would have made little difference. At issue were the public behavior and manifest intentions of Saddam's regime: brutality, invasions, the ambition to dominate all of the Middle East, and the death of up to a million Iraqis at the hands of the country's army and intelligence services.

Maintaining a balance of power abroad has long been the goal of American and British foreign policy. It was at the root of England's resistance to Napoleon and of America's Monroe Doctrine; it led Britain to resist Russia during the Crimean war and Germany during both world wars; it helped make America a British ally even though Germany never attacked American territory in either 1914 or 1941. The English-speaking countries, though protected by channels and oceans from European struggles, have long understood that their interests would suffer if some aggressive power dominated Europe. Today, many of them (not only Britain and America but Australia as well) understand that their interests will suffer if some aggressive power dominates the Middle East.

President Bush, like Prime Ministers Tony Blair in England and John Howard in Australia, understands that no nation will aggressively dominate a region if its citizens can control its foreign policy through free and democratic elections. In general, democracies do not make war on one another.

It takes a long time to convert a nation accustomed to authoritarian rule into one that embraces democratic rule. A majority of the Democrats in the Senate opposed our effort to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to replace Saddam with a new government. Opinion polls suggest that Americans who support the Democratic party do not believe our 2003 invasion of Iraq was justified. Many influen-

tial leaders are unwilling to support the long, difficult effort to bring some modicum of freedom and democracy to other nations. "It was completely predictable," according to John Deutch, a former director of Central Intelligence, "that a rapid transition to a stable and secure coalition government [in Iraq] would not occur."

As for me, I think it "completely predictable" that critics of the war would imagine a "rapid transition" is *ever* possible. It has never been possible, or expected. It took many years to create a democratic regime in Germany and Japan, even though we had many more troops on the ground there than in Iraq. Deutch observes, rightly, that there was no credible alternative government or regime in exile waiting to take power in Iraq. But one did not exist in Germany or Japan, either. Under the Deutch doctrine, we should have abandoned Germany and Japan in 1945, just as he wishes us to abandon Iraq right now.

Reasonable criticisms can be made of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the latter, we disbanded the entire military instead of drawing on the better elements to support domestic security. The Coalition Provisional Authority had no clear plan, in part because the United States, despite having been involved in many nation-building efforts in the past, has retained no organizational basis for learning from and improving on our earlier efforts. By contrast, the British had a Colonial Office that managed to recruit and train a cadre of specialists in nation-building who managed to leave a country like India with a legacy of laws that helped it become, over time, the world's largest democracy.

We are at war in Iraq, and Americans, I think, want us to win that struggle, not to desert it as John Deutch and Ted Kennedy prefer. The gains from our bloody and long struggle are clear: in Lebanon, Libya, among the Kurds and Shiites (and probably most of the Sunnis) in Iraq, and in Pakistan (which no longer supports the Taliban) and Syria (which has learned that overreaching is a bad idea). And about WMD's: whether or not Iraq ever had them, we know that it does not have them now.

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R. James Woolsey

DEMOCRACY AND the rule of law have gained decisively in the 60 years since World War II. In 1945 there were 20 democracies; today, according to Freedom House, there are 89 operating under the rule of law and another nearly 30 with regular and generally fair elections. Although sometimes democracies backslide into dictatorship (e.g. Venezuela), today over 60 percent of the world's people and states choose their leaders by democratic processes.

These democracies don't fight each other. Of the 29 major international wars since 1945, none has been between democracies. And in a number of additional states moving toward democracy, Natan Sharansky's central question—can there be free debate in the public square?—can be answered in the affirmative.

During these six decades, democracy skeptics have tried several tactics to bolster their losing case. Some define democracy solely in terms of balloting, and then argue that when a dictatorship like Belarus holds a plebiscite but doesn't become a democracy, democracy has failed. Amartya Sen has effectively destroyed this weak reed—obviously, democracy involves much more than balloting and is not solely a Western idea. There are many versions of what Sen calls "public reason" in different cultures (e.g., the Loya Jirga in Afghanistan)—traditions in which democracy, with balloting in time, can be rooted.

Another tactic of the skeptics has been to ignore Mongolia, Mali, and many other poor democracies and to assert that democracy can come only in the wake of wealth. Morton Halperin and his co-authors have effectively destroyed this line of argument in their superb book, *The Democracy Advantage* (2004).

The skeptics' last redoubt has been cultural determinism. Their predecessors lost the argument that Germans, Japanese, Catholics, or Asians could never operate democracies. Today, with over half of the world's Muslims—in Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Turkey—living in electoral democracies, it is difficult to contend that Islam in general is inconsistent with democracy. So the skeptics have retreated into angry pessimism about Arab democracy. Ignoring the millions of purple index fingers proudly demonstrated by Iraqi voters last January and the remarkable subsequent events in Lebanon, they chide the U.S. for "imposing" democracy on Arabs—the unarticulated premise being that Arabs would prefer to be ruled by tyrants.

It must be admitted, however, as the UN-sponsored Arab Human Development Reports have stressed, that a number of factors do indeed hinder the development of democracy and the rule of law in the Arab world. In my view, most of the cited influences—treatment of women, intellectual isolation—derive from a principal underlying barrier: the heavy influence, driven by oil wealth, of the Wahhabi sect of Saudi Arabia, particularly on the issue of education. Wahhabism's fanatical views—anti-Shiite, anti-Sufi, anti-Jewish, anti-Christian, anti-female, anti-democratic—are essentially the same, except on one point, as those of the Salafist jihadists like al Qaeda. As with Stalinists and Trotskyites, true believers in an earlier totalitarian faith, there is a major schism between the Wahhabis and the Salafi jihadists over whether one owes primary allegiance to a single state (the USSR then, Saudi Arabia now) in order to effect world-wide totalitarian rule.

Although no one should doubt the enmity of the opposing camps—the Wahhabi-friendly Saudi interior minister, Prince Nayef, works hard to defeat al Qaeda's attacks against Saudi Arabia—none of this means that the Wahhabis have given up their own aggressive hostility to democracy, and especially to Arab democracy. Leading Wahhabi clerics urge young Saudis to go to Iraq as suicide bombers in support of the Baathists' attempt to return to power, and many respond; the majority of Iraq's suicide bombers are Saudi. So, in another echo of the 1930's, totalitarian movements that stem from very different intellectual roots—theocratic (Wahhabi-Salafist) and secular (Baathist)—have teamed up in a modern version of the Hitler-Stalin pact.

By supporting autocrats over the years, while putting a reliable supply of oil as our principal objective, we have essentially said to the people of the Arab world: "Your job is to be polite filling-station attendants. Pump the oil for our SUV's when we ask you to and shut up. Don't bother us with complaints about your governments." The Wahhabi-Salafist dream of a world-wide caliphate, like the

dream of a Thousand Year Reich or of World Communism, can be attractive to disaffected young men. We cannot compete with it by offering a quarter-billion Arabs, with their memory of ancient accomplishments and culture, nothing more than the task of serving as polite filling-station attendants.

George W. Bush is the first President to have offered the Arab world democracy and the rule of law instead. For this he deserves much credit. But regarding Iraq, implementation of the Bush Doctrine has been scarred by four very poor decisions: (1) not calling on the American people for sacrifice, especially by moving sharply away from our reliance on oil, one of our greatest vulnerabilities and the financial lifeblood of the Arab world's totalitarians and terrorists; (2) not training Iraqi freedom fighters in protected northern Iraq before March 2003, with the result that we had no Iraqi force in the coalition against Saddam; (3) not providing a substantial share of Iraqi oil revenues immediately to U.S. military commanders to let them employ Iraqi civilians quickly on appropriate reconstruction efforts; and (4) not following a strategy of protecting the people in some regions of Iraq and expanding those regions over time rather than launching search-and-destroy missions. Only the last of these decisions could still be reversed in such a way as to affect the outcome in Iraq over the next year or so.

The Arab world could never have begun to become free without removing Saddam Hussein, as the Clinton administration and, overwhelmingly, Congress recognized in 1998 with the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act. But now much more than the Bush administration's reputation hangs on Iraq's progress toward democracy. Success will demoralize the Arab world's totalitarians and provide a positive model for its youth. Failure will embolden the totalitarians and terrorists to a degree that perilously endangers freedom for all of us.

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Sailing to Ithaca

Hillel Halkin

I FIRST SET foot on the island of Ithaca by swimming ashore. This was not how it was done by Odysseus, who was carried from a ship in early dawn by the sailors conveying him on the final leg of his long journey home. "Then they stepped forth on the land," Homer tells us, "and first they lifted Odysseus out of the hollow ship . . . and laid him down on the sand, still overpowered by sleep."* He would have had to be sleeping quite soundly not to awake, for we have just been told that, in beaching, the ship "ran full half her length on the shore in her swift course, at such pace was she driven by the arms of the rowers." That must have given her a powerful jolt.

One cannot beach a modern yacht, which has a keel to give it stability in the water. Ancient Greek ships lacked true keels and so—at least to judge from Homer—they often capsized in rough seas. Nor did ancient Greek harbors have docks or piers. The Greek coast is rugged and its mountains continue down to plunge beneath the water line, making the drop-off too steep to allow for the sinking of pilings in Homer's time. And while one could always moor or anchor offshore, this made loading and unloading cumbersome. The best harbor was a protected spot with enough sand or gravel for oarsmen to put a ship on.

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Our yacht, chartered this summer on the nearby island of Levkos, had cast anchor in a little cove. It was morning and the turquoise transparency of the water, through which the anchor seemed to ripple on the bottom, was still unruffled by the day's breezes. The first to dive into it, I swam to land.

The beach was small and pebbly, boxed in by the headlands of the cove. At its rear, where it ran for a few more yards before starting up the mountain-side, grew an olive tree and some mastic and burnet bushes, typical scrub of the eastern Mediterranean. I could have been anywhere on the Greek or Turkish coast. But I wasn't. I was dripping wet on Ithaca, as excited as on the day when, a twenty-one-year-old student of English literature from New York City, I stepped off the *Queen Elizabeth* onto English soil.

What does a twenty-one-year-old student of English literature do upon disembarking at Southampton on a summer day in 1960? He takes a train to London and another to Cambridge, where he is going to study; stows his luggage with the trunk that has arrived in advance; returns to London with a backpack in which is a copy of *The Canterbury Tales*, and walks, like Chaucer's pilgrims, 50 miles to the cathedral in Canterbury, arriving with blisters on his feet and a sour stomach

* This and all subsequent quotations from *The Odyssey* are from A.T. Murray's 1919 prose translation in the Loeb Classical Library.

from too many unripe apples picked and eaten along the way.

In fact, English literature didn't have to wait that long. On the London underground, on my way to King's Cross Station and thence to Cambridge, I had struck up a conversation with a young man from the Caribbean. Hearing that these were my first minutes in London, he asked, quite improbably, "If there was one place in this city you would like me to take you to, what would it be?"

"You wouldn't have heard of it," I told him.

"Try me."

"Keats's cottage."

"In Hampstead? Let's go!"

And so, lugging my suitcase, I got off at the next station and followed him to the home of John Keats. O England, blessed land, in which even the immigrants on your underground are versed in the lives of your great poets!

I HAVE ALWAYS been a book-driven traveler. When I was eighteen, two weeks after obtaining my driver's license, I talked a friend into buying an old Dodge and setting out with me for Mexico on the sole strength of having read D.H. Lawrence's *The Plumed Serpent*. *The Plumed Serpent* had as much to do with the real Mexico as the *Bagavad-Gita* has to do with the real India, but I was quite sure that it and a Spanish grammar were the only guidebooks we needed. More precisely, I thought of Mexico as a guide to *The Plumed Serpent*. To my mind, countries existed as illustrations for books.

This was why, when one of my two partners in the 24-foot sailboat we own asked if I would join a group planning to cruise in the Ionian islands off the west coast of Greece, I agreed despite not caring much for yacht trips. After a day or two of them, I'm starved for solitude. Although you might think there would be plenty of that out on the water, a yacht is basically a small, floating apartment shared with several other tenants—the difference being that if you quarrel with one of them, or weary of their small talk, you can't go out for a walk. It takes a nature more gregarious than mine to look forward to that.

But the Ionian islands meant Ithaca, and Ithaca meant *The Odyssey*, and *The Odyssey* is a book I have cherished. Several years ago I made a list of the things I most wanted to do before I died. One of them was learning Greek to read *The Odyssey* in the language Homer wrote it in. Poetry, not just as language heightened, but as language transformed, its particles fused into rare new elements, begins with

Homer. The winedark sea! The rosyfingered dawn! No book has lovelier phrasing. How could I have been so foolish in college as to major in English, which I needed no instruction to read, when I could have been studying Greek? How not sail to Ithaca now?

WHEN ODYSSEUS awakes on shore, the sailors are gone and he does not know at first where he is. He has been away for twenty years—ten fighting before the walls of Troy and ten striving to return to the island he once ruled and left a wife and infant son on, detained by the sea-god Poseidon whose wrath he has incurred. "Therefore," Homer says, "all things seemed strange. . . . He sprang up and stood and looked upon his native land . . . and said, 'Woe is me, to the land of what mortals am I now come?'"

Could the beach I was on be the very spot he was carried ashore at? That one also had "two protecting headlands sheer to seaward" and "a long-leaved olive tree," plus a "pleasant, shadowy cave sacred to the nymphs that are called Naiads." But it wasn't likely. Although Ithaca is a small island barely twelve miles long, its two halves joined by a narrow isthmus, we had already passed, sailing up its eastern coast from Levkos, several coves with beaches like this one. And from where I sat, there wasn't a cave in sight.

Indeed, there isn't a cave corresponding to the Naiads' within easy walking distance of any of Ithaca's beaches. Nor, apart from Mount Neritos, the island's dominant peak, is it possible to identify a single place from Homer's descriptions, some of which are manifestly wrong. Take the nearby and much larger island of Cephalonia, itself of literary fame since the publication of Louis de Bernières' best-selling 1994 novel *Corelli's Mandolin*, subsequently made into a star-studded movie. So close a neighbor is Cephalonia that its higher mountains literally cast their evening shadows over Ithaca. Yet whereas Ithaca is due east of Cephalonia, lying between it and the Greek mainland, Homer, after observing correctly that Ithaca "lies low in the sea by comparison," positions it "further toward the dark" and away from "the dawn and the sun"—that is, to Cephalonia's west.

Two schools of thought have arisen to account for such errors. One holds that Homer knew whereof he wrote but that names have shifted in the course of history. That is, the Ithaca of Homer's age, generally assumed to have been the 8th century B.C.E., is not the Ithaca of today, and should be identified with some other island in the vicinity.

The latest such theory, proposed in a new book by a team of British investigators, places the true Ithaca on the peninsula of Paliki, at the western tip of Cephalonia.*

The second school holds that present-day Ithaca, whose demotic name of Thiaki shows every sign of having been handed down from antiquity, is indeed the Ithaca of Homer—who, however, was never there and had only a hazy idea of its geography. He set much of his epic poem on an island he hadn't been to because tradition held that his hero came from there, and he researched his work by asking travelers for information. One need only suppose that some of this was inaccurate, or misremembered or garbled by him, to account for his mistakes.

The second explanation is more parsimonious, it being simpler to assume that Homer was never on Ithaca than that Ithaca was never on Ithaca. Not that, if Odysseus had lived on Cephalonia or Levkos, one's impressions of his physical environment would differ greatly. While Ithaca's size seems better suited to the intimate, one-town island described by Homer, its "quivering-leaved" mountains, so much greener than those of the Aegean, and its "rock-girt" coast, banded above sea level with a belt of bare limestone as if to keep it from sliding into the water, are just as typical of its neighbors—"not one of which of those that slope abruptly to the sea," as Odysseus' son Telemachus remarks of their terrain, "is fit for driving horses, or rich in meadows, and Ithaca least of all."

WHY CARE, then, if one is on the real Ithaca? And yet one does. It would make as much sense to tell someone searching for a grave in a cemetery that its exact location doesn't matter, since most tombstones look alike. The search is not for a different-looking grave, but for the right one.

Deep down, rationality aside, the dead live mysteriously on for us; this is the oldest layer of human religion and perhaps its sole ineradicable one. But like Odysseus' mother—who, when encountered by him in the underworld, proves ignorant of his wanderings while knowing all about recent events on Ithaca—the dead cannot visit new places, and return as ghosts only to where their memories can take them. This is why houses aren't haunted by those who haven't lived in them; why it mattered to think I was on Homer's Ithaca.

APART FROM the episode in Hades, the dead are not prominent in *The Odyssey*. Although many of Odysseus' comrades and shipmates have perished, whether at Troy or on the journey home, the steady focus of the story is on him, his wife Penelope, and his son Telemachus—now a young man of twenty who sets out, even as his long-missing father nears Ithaca's shores, in search of some trace of him.

And yet *The Odyssey* is about loss, and as death is the ultimate loss, all other loss is its symbol. A man is gone from his home for twenty years. No known person has seen him for the last ten of these. The island's bachelors lounge insolently in his palace, drinking his wine and feasting on his flocks while wooing his wife, each determined to wed her and be king in his place. Only she and her son, born on the eve of her husband's departure, still believe he may be alive, but as Homer's story begins, they too are on the verge of giving up hope. Surely, his return is as unlikely as a dead man's.

Every culture has its myth of the acceptance of death's finality. Ancient Greece had the story of Orpheus, who travels to the dark underworld to retrieve his wife Eurydice, killed by a snakebite. His love for her is so great that he is given permission to return with her to the land of the living, on the condition that he not look back as she follows him. Yet at the last moment, as he is about to step into the sunlight, he turns to make sure she is there and at once she vanishes. Who of us has not been Orpheus in our dream-lives, reunited in sleep with the dead we have loved only to lose them again to the light of day?

The Odyssey, by comparison, is a fully awake book. Despite its man-eating Cyclops, its fatal Sirens, and its other mythological figures, it takes place in a Mediterranean sunlight so strong that even the gods who are ostensibly the puppet masters of its plot fade—or so many of its readers have always felt—into insubstantiality. Homer's gods are dramatic characters whose sometimes comic, sometimes petulant speeches he grants himself full poetic license to invent; often they appear to be no more than the externalized embodiments of human moods or thoughts. It's hard to say whether he believed in them. Perhaps it would be better to call *The Odyssey* an almost fully awake book, written in that state after waking when one's dream images, though understood to be false, still exert a powerful impression.

Odysseus, in any case, is perfectly human. He

* Robert Bittlestone, James Diggle, and John Underhill, *Odysseus Unbound* (Cambridge University Press, 618 pp., \$40.00).

has been away for twenty years, and he is desperate to get home, and he is worried that when he gets there he will find his wife remarried or no longer in love with him, and his son a stranger. How will he appear to them? How will they appear to him? In every age men returning from long absence have had the same fears.

Twenty lost years, though not without their adventures. And this too is a reason to worry, because of adventures in those same years Penelope has had none. She has spent them in her chamber, weaving at her loom, listening to the carousing of the suitors in the great hall of the palace. What can she still feel for the man who has been away for so long? What can they still have in common?

WHEN ONE speaks of loss, one speaks of things from the most trivial to the most terrible. The first thing I can remember losing in my life was a children's book that I loved. One day it disappeared. Nothing was more important than finding it. For years, long past the time when I would have deigned to read it, I dreamed of its reappearance. These were joyous dreams, and I awoke from them like Orpheus, clutching a ghost. Yet although I could easily have obtained another copy, that never occurred to me. Life had taken my book and, if it wished to prove its good intentions, life would return it unprompted.

There is a phenomenology of loss that goes far beyond the value of what is lost. Everyone has had the experience of misplacing everyday items—a cheap watch, a favorite pen, an old pocketknife—only to be stricken by a feeling of true grief. Presumably this is what we mean by ascribing to such things a “sentimental value,” although we rarely reflect on the nature of the sentiment.

It is the same should we happen to come across one of them. Suddenly, long after we have given up the search, there it is, in the one drawer we neglected to look in, the pocket of the winter coat we stuck it in on the last cold day of the year. Naturally we are glad. But whence the disproportionate flood of gratitude that overwhelms us, as if we had found something of inestimable worth?

Loss has its hierarchies. These may start with a children's book. Then a family heirloom. Next, a disappointment in love or at work. Higher still, a home abandoned, a ruined marriage, a child estranged from its parents. And at the top, always, death itself. But because step leads to step, the lowest prefigures the highest. The lost book is the child's first premonition that there is nothing life

cannot take from him; the dream of finding it his first hope that there is nothing it cannot restore.

I don't know what makes a particular child grow up with this hope so much a part of him. The real loss must have been of something that he himself, having had a very ordinary childhood, knew only the symbols of. When he put aside children's books for real ones, however, he found that those that spoke to him most deeply were, or seemed to be in one way or another, about the restoration of loss.

And of these none more than *The Odyssey*, in which an exile strives to return; a woman unreasonably believes in him; a boy who never knew him trusts he will appear. And so he does appear, arriving in Ithaca to slay the insolent suitors and regain the wife he loves. Twenty years have not come between them. His son fights by his side and proves as worthy of him as he proves worthy of the boy.

Time and age are vanquished. Nothing has dulled Penelope's beauty or Odysseus' youthful looks and strength. They meet again as if parted for a month. “And when the two,” Homer relates, “had had their fill of the joy of love, they took delight in tales, speaking each to the other. She, the fair lady, told of all that she had endured in the halls. . . . But Zeus-born Odysseus recounted all the woes that he had brought on men, and all the toil that in his sorrow he had himself endured, and she was glad to listen, nor did sweet sleep fall upon her eyelids, till he had told all the tale.”

TODAY, LOOKING BACK, I am embarrassed to admit how a book like *The Odyssey* shaped me. By this I do not mean merely that I have been for most of my life, though hardly of a serene cast of mind, an optimist. Although that is true, it is not saying much. Optimists believe in happy endings, not in the restoration of loss.

What is the difference? If the child were to get a new book, one he loved more than the first, this would be a happy ending. But it would not be the restoration of loss.

If Odysseus were to return to Ithaca and find Penelope, now the mother of many children, happily wed to a man whom Telemachus adores as his father, he would be desolate. He might rage, sink into a depression, even decide to resume his wanderings. Yet suppose that, just as he was about to set despairingly out again, he met a charming young widow, fell in love, and remarried. That would be a happy ending, but not the restoration of loss.

When I was in my twenties, I had a long, tortur-

ously romantic affair with a young woman that lasted, on and off, for seven years. It should have ended long before that. We were only making each other more and more unhappy. But so much had passed between us—so much love, anguish, perseverance, guilt, anger, reconciliation, remorse—that it seemed inconceivable to have to cut our losses. Like a desperate gambler, the greater these grew, the more I doubled my bets. The wager was less on the two of us than on life itself. I would not let life be a thief. I would make it honor its debts to me.

LARGELY DESTROYED, like much of the Ionian islands, in the great earthquake of 1953, Vathi, Ithaca's main town, consists of several streets running back from its port, which was deserted in mid-afternoon. The ports of the Greek islands fill up toward sunset, the yachts flocking to them like starlings to a roost. At night the crews crowd their restaurants, all with similar candlelit tables spread around similar waterfronts and offering similar menus. By mid-morning the next day, the roosts are empty again.

The archeologists have found no signs of a Trojan-war-period palace in Vathi, which—a naturally fortified spot at the sandy head of a bay entered by a narrow channel easily blocked from a small island in its middle—seems the logical place for a town to have stood in Odysseus' day. Possible royal ruins from the Homeric age have been unearthed near Stavros, in the island's interior, but this does not jibe with Homer's account. Besides, the taxi driver who took me to Stavros on a winding road along mountains that sloped abruptly to the sea, lifting his hands from the steering wheel between one hairpin turn and the next to snap his fingers to the Greek music on the radio, explained, after pointing out a modern bust of Odysseus in the town square, that the ruins were on a distant hilltop that it would take hours to reach on foot. I would have to forgo them.

This bust was the only awareness of *The Odyssey* that I saw on the island. There was mercifully no Odyssey Café, no Calypso's Tavern, no "Ithaca: Home of Homer" baseball caps or T-shirts on sale. Ithaca was not like Toledo, its souvenir stores stocked with endless figurines of Don Quixote, or Stratford with its Shakespeariana, all those tacky evocations of the past that frighten its ghosts away. The yacht crews came in the evening and left in the morning. They sought quiet beaches, good winds, and a cold beer with their moussaka or fried calamari at the

end of the day. They sat in the cockpits of their yachts after dinner, conversing in low voices, as in a summer bungalow colony in which, porch after porch, men and women talk far into the night to avoid the hot, sticky bedrooms that await them.

"CORELLI'S ICE CREAM," said a sign in Poros, our first stop in Cephalonia, clear evidence that Nicolas Cage and Penelope Cruz can do more for an island than all the classics courses in the world. Yet *Corelli's Mandolin*, which I had taken to read on our cruise, is a marvelous book. It gazes down at *The Odyssey* as Cephalonia gazes down at Ithaca. I finished it in Poros, reading its last chapters on deck, where I preferred to sleep, by the dawn light.

The plot is simple. An Italian captain, a talented mandolinist named Antonio Corelli, is billeted during World War II in the home of a village doctor on—as the latter puts it in a local history he is writing—"the half-forgotten island of Cephalonia," then under Italian military occupation. Corelli and the doctor's young daughter, Pelagia, fall shyly and tenderly in love. When the German army brutally takes over the island after the anti-fascist uprising that overthrows Mussolini, the captain, saved from a close brush with death, is smuggled out of it. Before he leaves, he swears to Pelagia that he will return.

And return he does at the book's end—forty years later. He is by now an old, white-bearded man of seventy, and for years he has sent Pelagia mysterious, unsigned postcards from his wanderings all over the world. She, too, is bent and weary after a hard life. While she has a married daughter, a war foundling raised by her, she herself has never married or even had a lover. Her memories of Corelli have usurped all else. Now, forty years later, she is furious. Her first words to him are Italian curses: "*Sporcaccione! Figlio d'un culo! Pezzo di merda!* All my life waiting, all my life mourning, all my life thinking you were dead. *Cazzo d'un cane!* And you alive, and me a fool. How dare you break such promises? Betrayer!"

It is a tragic-comic moment. And to add to it, Corelli has actually been back to Cephalonia long before this. He has come as soon as the war ended, keeping his promise, only to catch sight of Pelagia, as he rounds the bend of the road to her house, holding an infant in her arms; wrongly assuming that she has married in his absence and had a child, he departs brokenheartedly. Throughout the years, he has never

stopped loving her. Although they are together again, they have been robbed by a ridiculous twist of fate of the life they might have had.

An ending more bitter than sweet, this was, it struck me, a scathing commentary on *The Odyssey*. Homer, *Corelli's Mandolin* proclaims, is the liar that Plato long ago, for reasons of his own (Plato thought all poets lied), accused him of being. The warrior who comes home to his wife after twenty years, his comrades-in-arms dead, his crew drowned or slain, his ships repeatedly wrecked, cannot possibly be the man described in *The Odyssey* as going off to bed with Penelope "in form like unto the immortals." Or rather, he must be exactly like the man described in *The Odyssey*—who, when he awakes on the shores of Ithaca, is informed by his patron goddess Athena that she will disguise him and "shrivel the fair skin on thy supple limbs, destroy the flaxen hair from off thy head, and dim thy two eyes that were before so beautiful, that thou mayest appear mean in the sight of all the wooers, and of thy wife." It is not Athena who has done this to Odysseus but twenty years of war and wandering. The gods of *The Odyssey*, we have said, are often projections of human states.

And Penelope? She too could not have been "like unto Artemis or golden Aphrodite," as Homer calls her, but old and gray herself, embittered by the wasted years of her womanhood. What happiness can she now have with this bald old man who has come back too late, puckered by sea brine and wrinkled by the sun, to erase even her dearest memories of the handsome young husband who went off to war? What "fill of the joy of love"? The truest words spoken at *The Odyssey's* end are hers when, responding to her husband's crestfallen anger at her initial failure to recognize him in his "disguise," she says: "Be not vexed with me, Odysseus, for . . . it is the gods that gave us sorrow, the gods who begrudged that we two should remain with each other and enjoy our youth."

The Odyssey is a fairytale, the most wonderful ever written, because it is untrue to life precisely in its most seemingly realistic moments. What distinguishes a true fairytale, after all, is not its fairies, much less the good luck of getting something for nothing, but, on the contrary, the principle of something for something: of love, faith, and steadfastness always having their commensurate reward. *Lefum tsa'ara agra*, the ancient rabbis said: "As is the suffering, so is the recompense." But the rabbis were thinking of the World to Come. In *The Odyssey*, there is only this world.

IN THE well-known opening chapter of Erich Auerbach's masterwork of modern literary criticism *Mimesis*, there is a comparison of an intricate passage from *The Odyssey* with the brief narration of the sacrifice of Isaac in the book of Genesis. Writing in the early 1940's, Auerbach made the claim—astonishing for a time when biblical prose was still considered too crude to merit the attention of literary critics—that the terse minimalism of the Bible was more sophisticated in its representation of human reality than all the sumptuous detail of Homer. He wrote:

Each of the great figures of the Old Testament, from Adam to the Prophets [is chosen and formed by God] to the end of embodying His essence and will—yet choice and formation do not coincide, for the latter proceeds gradually, historically, during the earthly life of him upon whom the choice has fallen. How the process is accomplished, what terrible trials such a formation inflicts, can be seen from our story of Abraham's sacrifice. Here lies the reason why the great figures of the Old Testament are so much more fully developed, so much more fraught with their own biographical past, so much more distinct as individuals, than are the Homeric heroes. Achilles and Odysseus are splendidly described in many well-ordered words . . . but they have no development. . . . Odysseus on his return is exactly the same as he was when he left Ithaca two decades earlier. But what a road, what a fate, lie between the Jacob who cheated his father out of his blessing and the old man whose favorite son has been torn to pieces by a wild beast!—between David the harp player, persecuted by his lord's jealousy, and the old king surrounded by violent intrigues. . . .

Or between, one might add, the Abraham and Isaac who set out for Mount Moriah and the Abraham and Isaac who return several days later. True, the Bible says nothing about their having changed; but then, as Auerbach observes, speech in the Bible "does not serve, as does speech in Homer, to manifest, to externalize thoughts—on the contrary, it serves to indicate thoughts which remain unexpressed." Their expression is left to us.

Abraham has, at the last minute, been given back his son: the boy's life, which God commanded him to take, has been spared. While dreadful loss has not taken place in this story, but only been anticipated, in all of literature there is no more dramatic case of its restoration. Not even Odysseus' return to Ithaca can vie with it.

But what, or who, has been restored? The terrified boy who lay bound while the father he loved prepared to slaughter him is no longer the same person. Never again will he look at Abraham without a shudder; never again will he laugh or smile as he did before. He has been restored only for Abraham to lose him more profoundly. It is no accident that the "God of Abraham" is also called, in a startling verse in Genesis, "the Fear of Isaac," or that Sarah, Abraham's wife and Isaac's mother, dies immediately after this incident; no accident that Isaac, upon marrying and having sons himself, favors the down-to-earth Esau over Jacob, who follows his grandfather's God. This God, for Isaac, is the memory of a knife blade on his throat.

Jacob, the God-destined son loved by his mother Rebecca, favors Joseph, the God-destined son of Rachel, the wife Jacob loves most. Joseph's brothers revile him for being his father's favorite as Esau reviles Jacob for stealing his birthright. Because of this, they sell him into slavery in Egypt. Because he grows wealthy and powerful there, they descend to Egypt in time of famine themselves. Because they do, their progeny is enslaved, too. . . .

In the Bible, as opposed to *The Odyssey*, there is nothing, as Auerbach observes, without its consequences. There is no returning to what was. Even when you think you have gotten back what was taken, you have gotten back something else.

LIKE JUST about everywhere, the offshore winds in the Ionian islands begin to blow in late morning and reach their height in mid-afternoon. Turning into the narrow strait between Ithaca and Cephalonia on our way back to Levkos, we caught a brisk northwest breeze. The sails stiffened and the boat heeled sharply as it headed up, close-hauled, into it.

These are the best moments of sailing. Everything is taut, aquiver. You feel the force of the sea on the tiller or wheel and resist with a will of your own. Because you are facing into the wind, its speed is increased by your speed, making it seem stronger and your boat faster than they are. There is the thrill of slight danger. If the wind gusts, forcing you over further on your side, so that the bottom of your jib dips to meet the waves sloshing over the deck, you have to decide quickly whether to trust your keel to right you or to slacken the mainsheet and lose momentum in order to relieve the pressure on the sails. The boat takes the waves as if galloping beneath you. Homer had it just right when he said, describing Odysseus' homeward journey, "And as on a plain four yoked stallions spring forward all together beneath the

strokes of the lash, and leaping on high swiftly accomplish their way, even so the stern of that ship leapt on high, and in her wake the dark wave of the loud-sounding sea"—"*polyphleuisboio thalasses*," the loveliness of it!—"foamed mightily, and she sped safely and surely on her way."

Every decision has its consequences. By the time one is, not in one's twenties, but in one's sixties, the consequences of what one has done—or not done, it's all the same—leave a wake stretching to the horizon.

What's lost is lost.

Yet the wake continues to lengthen. Because Israel multiplies in Egypt, Pharaoh orders its male sons killed. Hence, the newborn Moses is hidden in the bulrushes. Hence, he is found by an Egyptian princess and raised in the royal house. Hence, he cannot tolerate his people's enslavement when he reaches manhood. Hence, Israel is redeemed by him. . . .

The redemption of loss—the idea that, although nothing can be restored, everything that has happened can be changed by adding to it, so that the past is always with us and is continually still taking place—is a biblical concept. You won't find it in *The Odyssey*.

This, too, is different from a belief in happy endings. The life of the real Abraham and Sarah is as unlikely to have ended happily as is that of the real Odysseus and Penelope. The consequences of a man's trying to kill his own son are too great. But there is an interconnectedness of things that extends beyond Homer's ken. Because a knife was laid on Isaac's throat at Mount Moriah, Israel receives the Torah at Mount Sinai.

QUITE A few years ago, a close friend of my wife's and mine, a woman who lived in the United States, died of cancer. A frequent visitor to Israel, she loved our home, and having decided to be cremated, she asked us to bury her ashes beneath an olive tree on our property. Not far from the tree was a stone wall with a gateway, beyond which a footpath led into town, and in one of our last conversations with her she said, "I don't know how long it will take, but one day you'll pass through that wall and I'll be there."

More than once, on my way into town, I have half-expected to see her in the sunlight. It hasn't happened yet. Nor did I encounter any ghosts on Ithaca. It was just a small, pleasantly undeveloped Greek island, and while something in me was fulfilled by being there, I did not learn much about *The Odyssey* that I couldn't as well have learned

from books. But then again, I had only read, or re-read, the books that I did because I went to Ithaca.

It was fitting, then, that the only ghost that did appear was a book's. It was the ghost of the same book I had lost when I was little. For years, this was a blank in my memory. Apart from having lost it, I couldn't remember a thing about it. And then, as I was writing this essay, a small part of it came back to me.

It was a Donald Duck book. That is, Donald Duck was its main character; I can't recall even now who else of his comic-book entourage was with him. But I know he was on a sea voyage and crossed the Equator, because the book had a chapter—I presume it was my favorite, since it alone has surfaced in my memory—in which he had to go through the traditional equatorial ceremony of being judged by King Neptune and sen-

tenced to a symbolic dunking. There was, I'm quite sure of it, a colorful illustration of the captain gotten up as Neptune with a trident, prodding a reluctant Donald in full dinner dress off the diving board of the ship's swimming pool.

Now the odd thing, which must be what stirred this memory from its depths, is that Neptune, the Roman god of the seas, is the Greek Poseidon, Odysseus' nemesis. Poseidon thwarts Odysseus' return to Ithaca because Odysseus has blinded his son, the one-eyed Cyclops, who prays to him for vengeance. Consequently, as Homer has Zeus say, "From that time forth Poseidon, the earth-shaker, does not indeed slay Odysseus, but beats him off from his native land."

So I had to go to Ithaca, it would seem, to find a fragment of a children's book lost sixty years before. Things turn up where you least expect them to.

God, Man, the Devil—and Thomas Mann

Thomas L. Jeffers

AT ONE point in the 20th century, everyone who read serious books knew that Thomas Mann was the most important German writer of the age and one of the most important writers, period. And what an age it was: prominent among the other modernists who mattered were Marcel Proust, James Joyce, W.B. Yeats, D.H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, T.S. Eliot, and F. Scott Fitzgerald.

But the accepted canon of great 20th-century writers changed significantly from, say, the 1930's to the 1970's. By the latter date, with politics, sex, and religion tending to trump literary judgment as such, Proust had begun to be celebrated less for his aestheticism than for his inverted sexuality, Eliot to go behind a cloud because he was an orthodox Christian and possibly an anti-Semite, Lawrence to come under suspicion as a male supremacist, and Woolf to be exalted as the reverse. As for Mann, the author of such once-familiar novels as *Buddenbrooks* and *The Magic Mountain* and of stories like "Tonio Kröger" and "Death in Venice," he either ceased to be read at all because he was supposed to be too Teutonically difficult, or was read selectively because of a homosexual sensibility in his writing that was perceived to be at least as marked as Henry James's.

It is true that Mann can be difficult; but, like any

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great writer, he helps us to overcome whatever may be difficult in his thought as we go along. It is not true that he can be thought of as a spokesman for homosexuality—which, like James in fact, he tends to see as a stage in human development that most young people grow out of. But misapprehensions like these are, among other things, what make the publication of John E. Woods's new and extraordinarily bright translation of *Joseph and His Brothers** so welcome an occasion—an occasion for re-appreciating Mann not just for his powerful novelistic imagination or his attitudes toward sexuality but for his broader concerns with the human condition in the modern world.

THE AUTHOR of this huge tetralogy based on the second half of the book of Genesis was born in Lübeck, by the Baltic Sea, in 1875. By the astonishingly young age of twenty-six, Mann, the son of a well-to-do merchant, had already justified his pursuit of a literary rather than a commercial vocation with the publication of *Buddenbrooks* (1901), a naturalistic saga about his own family. It became a huge favorite with the reading public, and in 1929 would be expressly cited by the committee that gave Mann the Nobel prize for literature.

By that time, he had advanced beyond straightforward naturalism. In "Death in Venice" (1912), which is about an artist who falls in love with a

* Everyman, 1,536 pp., \$42.00.

beautiful adolescent boy and then dies, he combined a study of the psychologically peculiar with an affirmation of the mythically universal. In *The Magic Mountain* (1924), a young man's seven-year stay at a tuberculosis sanatorium before World War I prompts 700 pages of enthralling discussion about everything from religion to medicine to politics; in the end, as Europe begins the dance of death that will last four years, the young man leaves the sanatorium to answer the call of the German army, resolving at the same time to strike a balance between the two human goods of instinctual impulse and rational control—a balance that Mann, who cherished both, proposed as the humanistic ideal.

There were strong motives for clinging to that ideal during the Weimar Republic of the 20's, which Mann, correcting his wartime tilt toward German "instincts" as against French "ideas," defended with zeal. Those motives grew only stronger in the 30's as the Nazis promoted instincts of the ugliest variety. In essays, in speeches—and in the *Joseph* novels that engaged him intermittently from 1926 to 1942—Mann became the most eloquent literary opponent of the New Order. This was not just a matter of lining up with the good Germany against the bad. It was a complicated business of German self-examination, setting the Germany of "Brother Hitler" (as Mann pointedly called him), the propagandist Joseph Goebbels, and the race-theorist Alfred Rosenberg side by side with the Germany of Goethe, Schiller, and Beethoven. Like the cells within a body, they were all somehow related.

Mann was in self-exile from Germany starting with Hitler's accession to power in 1933. He spent the war years in southern California, aiding the Allies with his pen and all but worshipping Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whom he saw as saving the world with the same cunning and strength the biblical Joseph had shown in saving Egypt, Israel, and all of the ancient Near East. In 1947, he followed the *Joseph* novels with *Doctor Faustus*, arguably his greatest work. Relating the life of a musical composer who, in order to make a creative breakthrough, strikes a Faustian bargain with the Devil, *Doctor Faustus* was a parable for the fate of Mann's native land from the late 19th century through World War II.

After the war, Mann nurtured friendly feelings for Joseph Stalin. He was not exactly a Communist, but he was certainly an anti-anti-Communist. In 1952, considering himself too un-American for a country hypnotized by Joseph McCarthy, he returned to Europe. He died in Zurich in 1955, with

his last novel, *The Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man* (1954), still in progress.

THE FOUR novels that comprise the *Joseph* tetralogy—*The Stories of Jacob* (1933), *Young Joseph* (1934), *Joseph in Egypt* (1936), and *Joseph the Provider* (1943)—came out in the worst of times. Not only had Mann left Germany, but Nazi persecution limited distribution of the first two volumes and relegated the publication of the last two to presses in Vienna and Stockholm. Readership in Germany was minimal, and after the war, as Woods remarks in introducing his translation, *Joseph* stood no chance: many Christians thought it heretical, German Jewry had been largely eradicated, Communists in East Germany looked askance at a Left-leaning author's flirtation with theism, while Anglo-American audiences mostly shrugged. Mann may have regarded *Joseph* as the "pyramid" of his career, but the winds of history had covered it with sand.

To be fair, he had managed to blow more than a little sand of his own onto the reader's path. Turning these pages, I occasionally felt guilty for having spent too little time in the Egyptian wing of the Metropolitan Museum, or for never clinching the differences among Ra (or Rê), Amun, Amun-Ra, Atum, Ra-Atum, and so forth. At other moments, I worried about readers who expect a novel to tell a story from the first page.

Similarly worried, Woods sensibly suggests that they begin with the action-filled "Story of Dinah" in part three of the first volume, then go back to part one, "At the Well," for Jacob's meeting with Rachel, after which the drama of courtship, sex, tricksterism, and rivalry among brothers and generations will carry them along nicely. Then, at their leisure, they can return to the actual beginning, "Prelude: Descent into Hell." Its theology is at least recognizably Judeo-Christian, and as for the Egyptian and other mythologies, Mann soon turns us into conversant amateurs.

In any case, more than history and Mann's alleged difficulty have stood in the way of English readers of his work. A good part of the fault has surely lain with the standard translations done by Helen Tracy Lowe-Porter (1877-1963). The publisher Alfred Knopf had favored her back in the 1920's, when she rendered *Buddenbrooks* and *The Magic Mountain* into English, and she remained Mann's official translator thereafter. While publicly complimenting her, he complained privately about her word-for-word inaccuracies and general infelicities of tone. The heaviness, the obscurity, the

“impression of Olympian arrogance” (Mann’s phrase), the lack of humor—these, in English, are most often Lowe-Porter’s own.

Ever since 1993, however, John Woods has been offering us a livelier, funnier, earthier, more transparent Mann. His *Buddenbrooks*, *The Magic Mountain*, and *Doctor Faustus* have been triumphs, and now, with *Joseph*, he has achieved a stunningly happy blend of crispness and sublimity. To those of us whose German is imperfect, he has given a *Joseph* that is as close as we are likely to get to the one Mann wrote. By a coincidence of cultural history, this is also a Mann of whom we ourselves may just now be most in need.

EVEN AS a schoolboy, Mann had been enchanted by ancient Egypt. In middle age, he recalled how the young Goethe had dictated the story of Joseph to a friend, but without getting past the bare outline in Genesis; “it seems too short,” the great poet later wrote, “and one is tempted to carry it out in all its details.” In his own carrying-out, Mann begins in the beginning with Joseph’s great-grandfather Abraham, who “discovers God” and is rewarded by God’s choice of him and his seed. Then Mann quickly moves to Abraham’s grandson Jacob, who tricks his father Isaac into giving him “the blessing” in place of his elder brother Esau, flees east of Canaan to sojourn with his uncle Laban, dreams on his way of a ladder stretching between earth and heaven, and hears reaffirmed God’s covenant with Abraham’s seed.

Coming “into the land of the people of the east,” the biblical Jacob falls in love with his cousin Rachel, but is deceived by her father Laban into marrying Leah, the older sister, first. Although he succeeds in marrying Rachel, too, for many years only Leah and two concubines bear him any children—ten sons and a daughter named Dinah. Rachel finally gives birth to Joseph, the “true son,” then dies in bearing Benjamin, the twelfth son. That she dies by the roadside, perhaps needlessly, is the result of the family’s retreat from Shechem, a town the ten brothers have destroyed on the pretext of Dinah’s having been dishonored—an episode Mann treats at length.

Mann’s second volume, *Young Joseph*, treats of Joseph’s youth and the structural enmity between him and his half-brothers, a rivalry exacerbated by his beauty, his brilliance, and his dreams of his own exaltation. Both Mann and the Bible emphasize those dreams—his brothers’ sheaves bowing down to his, and so forth—and tell how, in anger, they finally strike back, tearing his coat of many colors

(conceived by Mann as Rachel’s bridal veil). But instead of killing him outright, they throw him down into a well and then sell him to traders who will take him to Egypt. Upon returning home, they tell their father Jacob that a wild beast has slain his favorite son.

Mann’s third volume takes place in Egypt, where Joseph works as a steward in the house of Potiphar, a eunuch high in Pharaoh’s service. Potiphar’s wife asks Joseph to go to bed with her; he chastely flees, leaving his garment in her hands; she cries rape, and Joseph is sent to prison—here begins Mann’s fourth volume—where he proves adept at interpreting the dreams of two prisoners, formerly Pharaoh’s butler and baker. This leads to an interview with Pharaoh, Joseph’s successful interpretation of the Egyptian ruler’s dreams about a coming scarcity, his elevation to high office as administrator of Egypt’s granaries, and his ultimate reunion with his brothers.

From drought-stricken Canaan, they have come to Egypt for grain. In one of the Bible’s most moving episodes, they encounter Joseph the Egyptian. They do not know who he is, but he knows them, and he orchestrates a recognition scene in which he forgives them their past violence. Their father Jacob is now brought down into Egypt—into Goshen, close to the border. Genesis, and the *Joseph* tetralogy, end with his deathbed speech and burial back in Canaan.

Mann had many reasons for wanting, à la Goethe, “to carry [this Genesis narrative] out in all its details,” but one in particular deserves mention. “We were talking about God and religion today,” he wrote to a friend in 1941, “and I said that with the best will in the world I can’t tell whether or not I believe. Nevertheless, I sometimes suspect myself of believing; for without a faith I don’t suppose one could hate ‘l’infâme’ as much as I do.” *L’infâme* was of course Nazism, whose beerhall deity was but the reincarnation of Baal or Moloch. A wicked god could be declared wicked only if one was willing to hold fast to a good one. Religious myth had been hijacked by Hitler’s propagandists, and Mann was determined to take it back—a process similar, he said, “to what happens in a battle when a captured gun is turned around and directed against the enemy.” The enemy was fomenting a barbarous faith. Mann met it with a civilized faith.

NOW, CHAPTERS 27-50 of Genesis fill 43 pages of my edition of the Bible; the new *Joseph* runs to over 1,500 pages. This means that Mann has expanded each biblical page to about 35. Some

of the additional material comes from the Quran (Sûrah XII) and from Persian poems devoted to Joseph's career, some from the scholarly excavations of rabbinic experts like Jakob Horovitz and Louis Ginzberg or historians of Egypt like J.H. Breasted, and a great deal from the psycho-mythic findings of Carl Jung and Sigmund Freud.

Mann was proud of the soundness of his Oriental researches, and of the artistry with which he had assimilated them. The question is whether his account reads like dry-as-dust history, or like psychological jargon, or like what he himself called the musty "archaeological brocade" of *Salammbô*, Gustave Flaubert's 1863 romance about ancient Carthage. In the event, Mann avoids these and many other traps—a feat all the more amazing in that he is hardly averse to letting his story cool its heels for long stretches of philosophizing and motive-hunting. But, through taut action, quick dialogue, penetrating monologue, and sensuous description, he brings his biblical principals and a host of secondary characters vividly to life. We cluck over yet adore Joseph, revere and sympathize with Potiphar, love and fear his wife, jeer yet cheer Pharaoh, and by turns flare with anger and dissolve in sobs at episodes involving the favored son, the envious ten, the youngest Benjamin, and their father Jacob.

A masterpiece of character and plot, the *Joseph* novels are also a tour de force of moral, political, and especially religious ideas. Here Mann's literary achievement is to make antique psychology real for us. This he does in a number of ways. In the foreground is, for instance, a Jacob who says "I" as you or I would but whose ego is always open to his own vast and significant background. This Jacob is forever thinking about his forebears Isaac and Abraham; at the same time, as a younger son himself, he merges his identity with the countless other "younger sons" of countless Isaacs who have lived during the centuries that have passed since the original Abraham.

Each character in this tale, and especially the three patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, is thus necessarily plural, the myths about them being summary legends of corporate Hebrew identities. History proper, as it were, begins with Joseph. His sojourn in Egypt is dated by Mann to the time of Amenhotep IV, who renamed himself Akhenaten (here called Ikhnatôn), meaning "glory of the sun-disc" (1352-1338 B.C.E.). Even Joseph, however, understands himself mythically. Not only is he part of a family chosen by the one God, but his story is like the story of the forefathers who had to suffer

before they could rejoice. Joseph's being thrown down the well, or into an Egyptian prison, is analogous to Isaac's being nearly sacrificed by his father Abraham, or to Jacob's being exiled east of Canaan, in each case only to find himself raised up. It is also like the story of the folk heroes or mythic gods Tammuz and Osiris, who had to go down (be killed, dismembered) before they could come up (be resurrected, deified).

At bottom, in other words, the story we are reading is, in Mann's conception, an "invention of God" and not of man. But it cannot happen without man's cooperation—something of which Joseph is much more conscious than the patriarchs before him. They have done their part in what amounts to a divine comedy, but there are immense gaps in the script. Joseph, though well aware of the stories about God and man's cooperative dealings, is more noticeably on his own, left to improvise in ways that both stay within and expand upon his scripted role.

Mann's point about ancient psychology is also a point about modern psychology. Individuality, which the West in particular has valued, can have significance only within a tradition. Just being different or unique does not count. One needs to be different in a recognizable way, unique in one's manner of adding to what has gone before.

BUT WHICH tradition is one a part of? After all, individual Nazis, too, had their "roles" to play within a mythic drama. Here is where Mann's philosophical and especially theological intentions in the tetralogy become most pertinent.

In brief, Mann's position, built on Jewish and Christian theologies and expressed at length in the overtures to volumes one and four, is a variant of the mystical doctrine of Gnosticism. Our material world was created not by God Himself but by a divine delegate, and the job of human beings is to return, as pure spirits, to the God from Whom they essentially derive. Their passport on this voyage is their secret knowledge (*gnosis*) of their high derivation.

Mann's development of his ambitious heterodoxy invites comparisons with the opening of the book of Job in the Bible, Goethe's "Prologue in Heaven" in *Faust*, and Raphael's recounting of the war in heaven in Milton's *Paradise Lost*. In it, Mann gives body to the spirits of God, Satan, and those discontented courtiers known as angels; and, improbable as this may sound, the drama they act out is quite as gripping as any palace intrigue put on stage by Shakespeare.

In Mann's theosophical scheme, Joseph is at

once a model for provident living in the time between the creation of the first cosmos and the creation of a second, and an anticipation of the one whom God has secretly appointed to come and redeem history. That redeemer will, like Joseph, “know what to do,” because he will be aware of how his predecessors have acted *their* parts. The terrain will have changed, but the footprints will still be visible.

The least one might expect from this rather unsystematic version of divine history is some idea of progress: in the in-between time, God *ought* to be shaping a drama that, from humanity’s point of view, promotes long and happy, or at least happier, life. And that is what we get. A single example: when Jacob goes east to the house of Laban, his mother’s brother, he notes a general gloominess and learns that his uncle and aunt have no sons. He later finds out that “early in their marriage the couple had indeed had a little son, but that when building the house they had sacrificed him by burying him alive in its foundation inside a clay pot, along with lamps and keys, so as to call down from on high blessing and prosperity for both house and farm.”

No such blessings have come, of course, and the adult Jacob knows why. On his way to a reunion with his brother Esau, Jacob would wrestle at night with an angel and afterward be renamed Israel—“God goes to war,” in Woods’s translation. Child-sacrifice of this kind, infamous in Canaan as the worship of Moloch, is exactly what God would war against. Jacob’s son will in turn tenderly remind his father of this same principle when the old man frets that he loves his favorite son too much ever to emulate Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice Isaac at God’s command. No, Joseph says, the moral of the story is that God sends an angel to stay Abraham’s hand and to point to the animal substitute. Times have changed: pious people—who have kept pace with God, and vice-versa—no longer slay their children.

By the time of Joseph’s rise in Egypt circa 1350 B.C.E., we are a long way from the “idyll of the arch-fathers” and well into a culture where old and new are in dialectical competition. On the one hand, there is the polytheistic religion of Amun, with its harlotries, devotion to animal gods, and preoccupation with the dead. On the other hand, there is the monotheistic religion of Atôn, with its puritanism, devotion to the sun-disc (or to the one God the sun-disc symbolizes), and stoicism in the face of death. Joseph’s role is to help Pharaoh articulate, refine, and, when he is not busy providing bread, promulgate this monotheistic reformation.

Mann underscores the *fin-de-siècle*, latecomer ambience of this Egypt. The descendants of the great Pharaohs of old have lost confidence in the traditions of their own culture. Joseph, himself a latecomer in relation to Abraham but with the advantage of being an outsider, a colonial from Canaan, fits right in. Knowing the religions of the Near East along with that of his fathers, he can recognize affinities between the myths of Amun, Osiris, *et al.* and the “strange gods” of his earlier neighborhoods, or between Pharaoh’s rhapsodies about Atôn and the gently proselytizing speculations about El Elyon, the Most High, that his father Jacob would engage in after dinner with his pagan business partners.

Under Joseph’s tutelage, Ikhnatôn has the freedom to choose: sun god, or the God of the sun, moon, stars, the whole show? Even though Ikhnatôn will in fact fail, his ideas and monuments effectually erased from the record until uncovered by modern archaeologists, he understands where history is going. So does Joseph and, if somewhat more obscurely, so do the patriarchs before him.

That is why it will not do to say, as many critics have, that Joseph, the versatile and cosmopolitan Canaanite/Egyptian, could have taken on any persona in the extant cultural repertory. It is not Mann’s tolerant notion that, for instance, Laban’s sacrificing his infant son by burying him alive in a clay pot beneath the house was acceptable—efficacious—for his time and place, but not for another. The law against child sacrifice held before Laban’s sinful gesture, as it has held ever after. Only, it takes time for prophets like Abraham, his grandson Jacob, and many of their descendants truly to puzzle it out.

THE SAME holds for at least three other universal moral laws that the *Joseph* novels do much to illustrate as they argue the case for the superiority of the Judeo-Christian tradition over the barbaric competition (Baalism historically, Nazism contemporaneously). The three laws have to do with preserving our sexual virtue, forgiving our personal enemies, and being firm with our political, especially our foreign, enemies.

By Jacob and Joseph’s time, the Most High may have progressed beyond the tribal deity who would knock on the head anyone He arbitrarily took a dislike to, but when it comes to the issue of human love, He has remained very much Himself. Mann never sounds more like Freud (or Jung) than in interpreting circumcision, the mark of the covenant between God and His chosen people, as an assertion of divine connubial rights. The pious man’s

generative organ belongs to God, and is to do its work within the marital conditions He has set. Those conditions may be subject to progressive change—in the old patriarchal manner, Jacob fathers children with two wives and two concubines, while Joseph has only one wife*—but God’s “jealousy” endures, and more for our sake than for His.

The proof-text lies in a chapter titled “Joseph’s Chastity” in *Joseph in Egypt*. Mann was justly proud of his presentation of Potiphar’s wife Mut or (more sweetly) Eni. In best romance fashion he understands, sympathizes with, and nearly (but not finally) justifies her thought and action. Eni the seductress is the feminine triumph of the third volume, as Rachel is of the first and Tamar of the fourth.

For his part, Joseph is no deadwood, clueless or incapable in matters sexual. He knows all about it, and wants to “put heads and feet together” with Eni almost as much as she does. But he is “cautious.” Why? Mann posits several reasons, the chief of which centers on the rule that restricts “fleshly intercourse” to fathers and requires sons to wait. The anthropological evolution of this rule was also a theme of Freud’s *Totem and Taboo* (1913), but Mann the novelist has the advantage. Tracing Joseph’s own “working through” of its implications, he links the rule to a whole history of family relations with *the Father*, a history now challenged by Baal-associated sensualities and complicated by Joseph’s concerns for a surrogate father, Potiphar, whose asexuality reminds him of God’s, and for a surrogate mother, Eni, whose madness has made incest, murder, and the invocation of demons shockingly thinkable.

The ultimate lesson is that sons are supposed to wait until they themselves are married and ready not just to inseminate but to become fathers. Then they may know in the flesh what Joseph already knows in imagination.

Sparring with danger and death in order to familiarize himself with his sexy enemy, Joseph seems to be playing with fire in order to be burned. And, it is clear, he *must* be burned—thrown into a pit, the prison, for a second time—because he has again “allowed the effects of his amiable charm . . . to run wild,” assuming that he can play godlike with people’s emotions (his brothers’ hatred, Eni’s love) and ‘scape whipping.

THIS BRINGS us to the second law, forgiving our personal enemies, which is thematically illustrated in the final volume, *Joseph the Provider*. A brilliant “court Jew,” Joseph has stored grain during the seven flush years so that Egypt will be able

to live through the seven lean ones and coincidentally achieve economic hegemony over the region. That, again, is why his ten brothers have come down to buy grain, offering Mann an occasion to segue to Joseph’s spiritual gifts.

Those gifts have manifested themselves in his interpretation of Pharaoh’s dreams and even more in the pair’s brilliant dialogue on monotheism—“The Cretan Loggia” section that marks the theological watershed of the story. The crescendo, however, is reached when the supplicating brothers tremble in fear before the all-powerful figure whom they encounter in Egypt. Joseph has considered the possibility that his father Jacob may be dead, and also that the ten may have “mistreated [Benjamin] the way they once did me.” In which case, he reasons to himself, they will find “a stern stranger as their judge.” As things fall out, however, he forgives them. What is he thinking?

His prompt comes from Judah’s spontaneous confession of the brothers’ guilt in the matter of the “true son”—an unscripted moment that Mann adds to the Genesis account of Judah’s speech. With this, a heavy rock is removed from the family shoulders, and Joseph’s forgiveness is given its moral logic. He not only forgives them, he asks them to forgive him for his young moral foolishness, which had effectually taunted them into hatred. More, he tries to help them regard all such who-did-what-to-whom questions from God’s point of view:

Under His protection I had to rouse you, by my brazen immaturity, to do evil, but God indeed turned it to good, so that I fed many people and matured a little myself besides. But if it is a question of pardon among us human beings, then I am the one who should beg it of you, for you had to play the evildoers so that everything might turn out this way.

These words, at the very end of the tetralogy, sum up Mann’s variation on the “fortunate fall” interpretation of Adam and Eve’s disobedience in Eden. The evil is folded into the good, namely, God’s redemptive scheme of law and grace. It is a

* Despite the imaginings of academics who have colonized Mann’s life and work under the empire of “queer studies,” Mann does not discern any such “progressive” attitude toward homosexuality. In *The Stories of Jacob*, where homosexual sporting between Ishmael and Isaac leads to the former’s expulsion, Ishmael is the homo- or pan-sexual corrupter while Isaac and others carry “the blessing” associated with propagating the race. As for Joseph’s own adolescent beauty, Mann first lavishes on it the kind of praise he gives Tadzio in “Death in Venice,” then insists that when his hero comes to manhood he properly becomes interesting to, and interested in, women. Potiphar’s wife, for instance.

scheme that, in the Christian story that the Jewish story in Mann's telling so frequently prefigures, will climax historically in the death and resurrection of Jesus.

Not that Mann has written a Christian book, however. His survey of mythology, undertaken during the struggle against Nazi anti-humanism, was meant to affirm all of the pillars that upheld the roof of Western culture. He himself, as he wrote to a correspondent in 1944, was promoting a "new *Humanism*," but one annexed to the structure of the old. Hebrew monotheism did not so much supersede Ikhnatôn's as subsume it—gather it in. By implication, though no more, Mann suggests that, for its believers, Christianity similarly subsumed Judaism, just as the Enlightenment and, now, his new humanism subsumed Christianity. And so on.

THE MORAL seriousness of this scheme becomes still clearer when we come to the third law: being firm with our political, especially our foreign, enemies. Would Mann have us extend a Joseph-like forgiveness to "brother Hitler" and the other monsters who had killed 6 million of "Abraham's seed" and all but destroyed Germany? *Doctor Faustus*, the novel he wrote next, cries out no. Forgiveness is a move God obliges us to make in circumstances like Joseph's—among family and friends. But those who make deals with the Devil deserve hell: indeed, they are in hell already.

On this point, the key passage occurs in one of Joseph's colloquies with Ikhnatôn, who is a sentimental pacifist. "Purify the idea of god," Pharaoh says, "and you purify mankind"; love your enemies and you will bring them into the peaceable kingdom. Joseph replies, realistically, that his great-grandfather Abraham had known better. He had been spiritually vigorous, but also, Joseph insists, "vigorous in other ways, a man of strong hands, and when the robber kings from the East attacked, burning and plundering," he gathered soldiers to defeat them.

Was this before or after he discovered God?, Ikhnatôn asks. "In the midst of discovery," Joseph answers. "In the midst of laboring at it and in no way weakened by it." And he continues:

What can you do with robber kings who burn and pillage? You cannot teach them the peace of God, they are too stupid and wicked for that.

Only by striking them can you teach them so that they feel it—feel that the peace of God has strong hands. For it is your responsibility before God to see that things on earth occur halfway according to His will and not entirely according to the intentions of incendiary murderers.

Mann would have been thinking here of Nazi and Japanese murderers, and of the "strong hands" of the Allied forces opposing them—as we today are encouraged to think of other "Us-Them" situations in which idealists have to arm themselves against ruthless aggressors. "The sword is stupid," Joseph says, magnificently, "but I would not wish to call meekness wise. Wise is the intermediary who advises meekness to be vigorous, so that in the end it does not stand there stupidly before God and man."

AT THE close of a lecture on the Joseph novels at the Library of Congress in 1942, Mann recalled his schoolboy fascination with Egypt—and how, at age twelve, during religion class, a teacher familiar only with the Hellenistic or Latinate equivalents of Egyptian names had put him down for calling the holy steer "Chapi" instead of "Apis." "I knew better than the good man," said Mann, "but discipline did not allow me to enlighten him about it. I kept silent—and all my life I have not forgiven myself for this silence before false authority. An American boy," he added, "would certainly have spoken up."

That, if I read it right, was more than a polite compliment to Mann's American hosts. It was a gesture toward the tension between (German) discipline and (American) cheek, respect for authority and love of liberty, adherence to tradition and the boldness of the individual talent. The strands continually unravel, but the novelist's job is to weave and reweave.

That is how he both upheld Western culture and extended it. Do we not owe it to ourselves, and to the traditions that America defends now as when Mann lived here and became a citizen, to re-acknowledge our own debt to the culture that produced a genius like him? A propitious occasion offers itself in John Woods's wondrous translation of *Joseph*. The "pyramid" of Mann's career, it is more than a towering monument to Western culture, good for staring at. It is a site to explore and, for a while, to live in.

MUSIC

The Dorsey Sound

Terry Teachout

FOR JUST over a decade, from 1935 to 1946, American popular music was dominated by the instrumental groups known as “big bands.” These groups, which consisted of three or four trumpets, two to four trombones, four or five saxophones, one or two singers, and a “rhythm section” of piano, guitar, bass, and drums, crisscrossed the country playing for dances and on the radio. In between public performances they made records and appeared in films and (on occasion) in concert halls. Nearly all of the hit records of the day were made by the big bands, many of which were “swing bands” influenced by jazz and not a few of which were full-fledged jazz bands.

Most of the bands launched in the 30’s and 40’s closed shop after World War II, killed off by changing musical tastes and economic conditions. A few of their best-known leaders, including Count Basie, Duke Ellington, Woody Her-

man, Lionel Hampton, Harry James, and Stan Kenton, managed to keep on working into the 70’s and beyond. But pop music moved in other directions, and after the rise of rock in the 50’s, no big band would ever again be widely popular, even among older listeners.

Though the big bands of the Swing Era long ago passed into history, their music commands to this day a smaller but still loyal audience, a significant percentage of whose members were born after 1946. Not only do big-band recordings continue to be transferred to CD, but books and scholarly monographs about the music and its makers are now being published. The latest of these, Peter J. Levinson’s *Tommy Dorsey: Livin’ in a Great Big Way*, is a biography of the trombonist who led one of the half-dozen most successful bands of the period.¹ It appears simultaneously with the release this month of *The Sentimental Gentleman of Swing: Centennial Collection*, a three-CD set commemorating the centenary of Dorsey’s birth.²

DORSEY, who died in 1956, is not nearly so well remembered today as the bandleaders who outlived him,

even though such noted critics and commentators as Max Harrison, Gunther Schuller, and Richard M. Sudhalter all rank him among the key figures of the Swing Era. The reason for this comparative neglect is that Dorsey’s orchestra was not a pure jazz band but a dance orchestra that played both “swing” and “sweet” music throughout its twenty-year existence, thereby appealing to a broad base of fans. This eclecticism helped make Dorsey a celebrity, but it also diminished the posthumous appeal of his music to a new generation of big-band listeners primarily interested in jazz.

A critical reconsideration of his recorded legacy is thus long overdue, and so it is unfortunate that neither *Tommy Dorsey: Livin’ in a Great Big Way* nor *The Sentimental Gentleman of Swing* is likely to bring this about. Levinson, the author of biographies of Harry James (1999) and Nelson Riddle (2002), is not a musician but a publicist with a slapdash prose style. While his anecdote-laden book, based in large part on interviews with Dorsey’s

¹ Da Capo Press, 352 pp., \$27.50.

² Bluebird/Legacy 82876711672, three CD’s.

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surviving friends and colleagues, provides a vivid and generally reliable account of the trombonist's famously tempestuous life, it has little of value to say about his music and is full of small but irritating factual errors.³

By the same token, *The Sentimental Gentleman of Swing* is an interesting but ultimately inadequate retrospective. One entire CD of the set is devoted to early recordings made by Dorsey between 1925 and 1932 as a sideman or in collaboration with his older brother Jimmy, who played clarinet and alto saxophone. While some of these recordings are memorable (especially the ones that feature Tommy's Louis Armstrong-like trumpet playing), most will be of interest mainly to antiquarians. A second CD contains an erratic selection of two dozen studio sides cut between 1936 and 1955 by Dorsey's big bands, too few to give more than a fragmentary sense of the stylistic diversity of his music. The third disc, devoted to "air checks" of live radio broadcasts by the Dorsey band, fills in some gaps, but once again the choice of material is unrepresentative of Dorsey's work as a whole.⁴

To be sure, those already familiar with Dorsey's career will need no further reminding of the case that can be made for calling his orchestra (in the oft-quoted words of the big-band chronicler George T. Simon) "the greatest dance band of them all." But others are less likely to be convinced by the flawed advocacy of *Tommy Dorsey: Livin' in a Great Big Way* and *The Sentimental Gentleman of Swing*, from which they will not learn what made the Dorsey band unique.

DORSEY WAS the second son of a Pennsylvania coal miner who took up music in order to escape the desperate and dangerous life that was the collier's lot at the turn of the 20th century. Determined to keep his boys Jimmy and Tommy out of the mines, Pop Dorsey (as their fa-

ther was known) began teaching them to play instruments when they were children. By the mid-20's, the Dorsey brothers had left home to tour with the Detroit-based Jean Goldkette band, one of the most influential white ensembles of the period.

Like Bix Beiderbecke, another of Goldkette's musicians, the Dorseys moved on to the Paul Whiteman band, then the most popular group of its kind, later becoming part of the highly paid nucleus of radio and recording-studio musicians based in New York City. By then, both Dorseys were known throughout the tight little world of jazz for their virtuosity—and their versatility.

In 1934 they sought to cash in on the growing popularity of jazz-flavored dance music by putting together their own band, the Dorsey Brothers Orchestra. But Tommy, unlike his easygoing, good-humored brother, was a detail-obsessed bully with a violent streak. He was also an alcoholic (and, later, a prescription-drug abuser), and when he drank he not infrequently became vicious and vindictive to the point of sociopathy. According to the trumpeter Max Kaminsky, "His temperament was so volcanic and his rages so explosive that you could smell the fire and brimstone." Though he could also be charming when it suited him, no one was less deserving of being called "the sentimental gentleman of swing," a publicist-coined nickname bestowed on the trombonist in tribute to the title of his theme song, "I'm Getting Sentimental Over You."

The two brothers, who since childhood had fought constantly, quarreled on the bandstand in 1935, and Tommy quit to start his own group. Benny Goodman had already paved the way for swing orchestras that played a goodly amount of jazz along with the ballads that were part of every dance band's repertoire. But Tommy, unlike Goodman, sought to put together a group that would graceful-

ly straddle the divide between sweet and swinging dance music.⁵

ONE REASON why he did so was that he was never a distinctive jazz soloist, at least not on trombone, his primary instrument. Instead, he cultivated the lyric side of his playing, developing an exclusively melodic approach that became his trademark. Though the silken-toned ballad style of such hit records as "I'm Getting Sentimental Over You" had nothing to do with jazz, it won Dorsey the admiration of fastidious and knowledgeable listeners. These included Arturo Toscanini, who reportedly called him "the world's greatest trombone player," and Gunther Schuller, himself a brass player, who spoke of Dorsey in *The Swing Era* (1989) as "one of the greatest trombonists of all time—in any field." Marcel Tabuteau, the principal oboe player of the Philadelphia Orchestra under Leopold Stokowski, urged his students to emulate Dorsey's perfect legato and breath control (just as Dorsey had in turn been influenced by the violin playing of Fritz Kreisler).

At the same time, Dorsey went out of his way to hire jazzmen like the trumpeter Bunny Berigan, the tenor saxophonist Bud Freeman, and the drummer Dave Tough. The brilliantly original playing of these

³ As early as the second page of Levinson's book, one finds him referring to *Appointment in Samarra*, John O'Hara's most famous novel, as *An Appointment in Samantha*.

⁴ Except as indicated, all recordings mentioned in this essay are included in *The Sentimental Gentleman of Swing*. Alas, no acceptable collection of Dorsey's best studio recordings is currently available on CD. *Stop, Look and Listen, Yes, Indeed!* and *The Post-War Era*, three well-chosen single-disc compilations released on Bluebird in the 90's, are out of print, doubly unfortunate since their digitally remastered sound is superior to that on *The Sentimental Gentleman of Swing*.

⁵ Jimmy's orchestra, never as successful as Tommy's, was nevertheless both popular and admired, and Jimmy himself—in sharp contrast to his brother—was universally regarded as one of the most likable bandleaders in the business.

men contributed greatly to such Dorsey hits as "Marie," "Song of India," and "Stop, Look and Listen" (all recorded in 1937). But they were expected to subordinate themselves to the total effect of the band, which Dorsey rehearsed with the fanatical perfectionism of a symphonic conductor, unhesitatingly firing on the spot any player who failed to give his best at all times.

Despite his rigid discipline, Dorsey did somehow inspire his band to play with a danceable blend of precision and ease not always heard in the recordings of the similarly obsessive Goodman. By 1938, his orchestra had become one of the Swing Era's biggest successes, grossing an estimated \$600,000 in that year alone (the equivalent of \$7.7 million in today's dollars).

What Dorsey's band lacked was an unmistakable stylistic profile—a characteristic of the big bands led by such highly individual soloists as Goodman, Count Basie, and Artie Shaw, or by similarly idiosyncratic composer-arrangers like Duke Ellington. For all the suavity of his ballad playing, Dorsey was incapable of supplying that kind of individuality, and he knew it. Instead, he ran his band in the manner of a musical entrepreneur, hiring only well-known soloists and arrangers of proven ability. Already notorious for "raiding" other dance bands, he would now embark on a series of raids whose effect would be to transform his own band almost beyond recognition.

ACCORDING TO the composer Johnny Mandel, Dorsey "had begun to feel bored with his own band. He saw that the country was swing crazy." Whatever the reason, in the summer of 1939 he hired Sy Oliver, the head arranger of Jimmie Lunceford's band.

Oliver, the chief architect of Lunceford's relaxed yet swinging style, soon began contributing similar scores to the Dorsey book. Dorsey cooperated by recruiting a

cabal of unusually aggressive jazz soloists, among them the trumpeter Ziggy Elman (formerly with Goodman) and the drummer Buddy Rich (formerly with Shaw). Rich was skeptical, dismissing Dorsey's group as "like a society band," but soon the ensemble was playing Oliver's scores as if to the manner born.⁶

At the same time, Dorsey moved to shore up the band's "sweet" side by hiring two promising young vocalists, Frank Sinatra and Jo Stafford, both of whom promptly became stars in their own right. (Sinatra had been singing with Harry James, but as yet had attracted little notice.) In addition, he also hired the songwriting team of Matt Dennis and Tom Adair to contribute special material. They responded with such enduring standards as "Everything Happens to Me," "Let's Get Away From It All," and "The Night We Called It a Day."

As always, Dorsey ruled over this unruly collection of world-class talent with an iron hand. The results were musically remarkable, especially after 1942 when he added a ten-piece string section and a harp. What started out as a mere dance band had now evolved into something approaching the pop-music equivalent of a symphony orchestra, moving with ease from elaborately arranged ballads like Ferde Grofé's "Daybreak" to instrumentals like "Opus #1." In the latter, Sy Oliver blended the thrilling solos of Rich and the clarinetist Buddy DeFranco with the lush sounds of the string section—an improbable piece of musical legerdemain brought off with apparent effortlessness. While other bands approached and at times even surpassed Dorsey in specific areas of expertise, no big band of the 40's could do so many things so consistently well.

Not until after World War II did Dorsey start to lose touch with the changing tastes of his aging audiences. Young married couples who had once flocked to their local ball-

rooms to dance to the big bands now began staying home at night with their new families, embracing the balladry of vocalists like Frank Sinatra (who had left Dorsey to launch a solo career in 1942) in preference to the swing songs of their youth. At the same time, young musicians, tired of what they saw as the clichés of late swing, cultivated a complex new jazz idiom called bebop that was better suited to small combos than big bands.

Seeing the writing on the wall, Dorsey let his strings go and retreated to a more modest instrumentation. Though he would never be receptive to bebop (as late as 1955, he was referring to boppers as "musical Communists"), his post-war band went so far as to perform and record such harmonically sophisticated instrumentals as Bill Finegan's "Pussy Willow."

But Dorsey was fighting an uphill battle. In 1953, he and his brother settled their differences and spent the rest of their lives playing together, billed as "the fabulous Dorseys" and appearing on TV under the auspices of the jazz-loving comedian Jackie Gleason. Their new popularity was a fluke, however, as was proved in 1956 when the Dorseys accompanied Elvis Presley on "Heartbreak Hotel" in one of the singer's first TV appearances (it can be heard on *The Sentimental Gentleman of Swing*). Their day had all too clearly come and gone.

EIGHT MONTHS after sharing the small screen with Presley, Tommy Dorsey at last fell victim to years of substance abuse, choking to death in his drug-induced sleep on the aspirated remains of a heavy dinner. By then the Swing Era had become a fast-fading memory, kept green only

⁶ Incredibly, none of the instrumentals written by Oliver for Dorsey in 1939 and 1940 is included in *The Sentimental Gentleman of Swing*, not even the popular "Well, Git It!" A later side, the 1944 "Opus #1," gives some indication of what Oliver and Buddy Rich brought to the band.

by middle-aged bandleaders who persisted in playing one-nighters for nostalgia-prone audiences.


On the other hand, the *sound* of the big bands would continue to be heard long after the fact of their demise. Frank Sinatra and other singers preferred working with big-band-plus-strings groups similar in instrumentation to the orchestra Dorsey led in the early 40's. And though the deaths of Buddy Rich and Woody Herman in 1987 marked the end of the full-time touring bands, such groups continued to play for TV variety and talk shows until 1992, when Johnny Carson retired from NBC's *Tonight Show* and his orchestra (led by the Dorsey alumnus Doc Severinsen) was disbanded.

More important, "concert-style" big bands that played for listeners, not dancers, had long since become an important part of the jazz scene. From the Gerry Mulligan Concert Jazz Band, founded in 1960, to present-day ensembles like the Maria Schneider Orchestra and the Vanguard Jazz Orchestra, these bands have specialized in a sophisticated yet accessible brand of large-group jazz that appeals to younger musicians and listeners. While the economics of touring make it impossible for them to operate on anything but a part-time basis, their recordings and public appearances have kept the big-band idiom fresh.

Meanwhile, the original recordings of the bands of the 30's and 40's are finding their way to compact

disc, where they are heard by listeners whose parents were not yet born when the Swing Era ended. That these recordings are no longer "contemporary" long ago ceased to be relevant. They are classics of their kind, exemplary in every way of the very best that pre-rock popular music had to offer.

Nor is the jazz content of a big-band record the only valid measure of its enduring significance. As Tommy Dorsey proved throughout his career, there was more to the big bands than swing alone. One thus hopes the time is not far off when a selection of his finest recordings will make it possible for today's listeners to be properly introduced to one of the greatest instrumental ensembles of all time—in any field.



What we call the “culture war” is in part a running feud over religious diversity that's liable to erupt at any time—in the middle of judicial confirmations, school board meetings, or holiday celebrations. One side demands that only their true religion be allowed in public; the other insists that no religions ever belong there. As the two sides slug it out, the stakes are increasing. An ever-growing assortment of faiths insists on an ever-wider variety of truths. How can we possibly all live together and keep both the peace and our integrity (not to mention our sanity)? How can we end the war without surrendering our principles?

In *The Right to be Wrong*, Kevin Seamus Hasson skewers both extremes in this conflict. He calls them the “Pilgrims”

and the “Park Rangers.” Pilgrims want to outlaw diversity by declaring their religion the official one. The truth, they say, licenses them to restrict others' freedom. Those he calls the Park Rangers are the opposite extreme. They say freedom requires them to banish other people's truths and want to eliminate religious expression from public life altogether.

Hasson shows us how to avoid both pitfalls. He draws lessons from a series of stories—some old, others recent, some funny, others not. They tell of heroes and scoundrels, of riots, rabbis and reverends, Founders and flakes, from the colonial period to the present. The book concludes that freedom for all of us is guaranteed by the truth about each of us: Our common humanity entitles us to freedom—within broad limits—to follow what we believe to be true as our consciences say we must, even if our consciences are mistaken. Thus, we can respect others' freedom when we're sure they're wrong. In truth, they have the right to be wrong.

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Books in Review

Soldiers of Fortune

Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground

by Robert D. Kaplan
Random House. 421 pp. \$27.95

Reviewed by
Gabriel Schoenfeld

IS AMERICA an empire, and, if so, is that a good or a bad thing, either for the U.S. or for the world? This question has been kicked around in recent years by polemicists from Noam Chomsky on the far fringe Left to Patrick Buchanan on the rabid Right and, more reflectively, by numerous scholars and intellectuals nearer the center. As the title of his new book suggests, Robert D. Kaplan is among those who believe America is indeed an empire. And as his subtitle makes clear, he means to grasp the nature of this empire by surveying the military forces and personnel that exert power on its behalf.

GABRIEL SCHOENFELD is the senior editor of COMMENTARY.

Kaplan's preferred literary form is the travelogue, but here, as in his numerous previous works, he does much more than describe the scenery—although he does that exceedingly well. In *Balkan Ghosts* (1993), Kaplan wrote about some of the most venomous ethnic hatreds of the last century, while in *The Coming Anarchy* (2000), set in West Africa and other desolate locales, he laid out an apocalyptic vision of the post-cold-war era. Both books asked and answered fundamental questions about the world in which we live.

To produce this latest volume, Kaplan spent months as a reporter embedded with small units of the American armed forces, descending into desert gullies and jungle swamps with the “grunts” and the men who command them. Using as a road map the Pentagon's division of the world into five regional commands, Kaplan journeyed to destinations in each. The result is a series of telephoto snapshots of how the U.S. military operates, not only in the hottest of hot spots like Iraq but also in other, far less familiar strife-torn corners of the imperium—if an imperium is what it is.

Two SUCH corners are the Philippines and Colombia. In the former, Kaplan gained a bird's-eye view of American efforts to combat Abu Sayyaf, an Islamic guerrilla movement and al-Qaeda affiliate that, from its base on an archipelago of southern islands, has been engaged in an insurgency against the government in Manila. The Philippine army is a study in weakness, its fear of the guerrillas more than outweighing its willingness to fight them. Since a transformation of the army is unattainable, the essential American task has been, instead, to help the government in Manila “win hearts and minds.”


The phrase is redolent of Vietnam. But these days, Kaplan notes admiringly, it is uttered by American military officers, and practiced by their troops, without a smidgen of irony. He describes a medical-aid program run by the U.S. Marines in the high mountain village of La Paz:

I saw that several pockets of Marines had secured a perimeter. Rain and sunlight sprayed simultaneously through a fine mother-of-pearl mist. In long lines in the rain, people waited to have their teeth pulled, their

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—Milton Friedman

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eyes checked and treated for cataracts, their children examined, and to get medicines for a variety of minor ailments. I overheard a U.S. Navy doctor sadly tell a man that he could do nothing for his daughter's three-chambered heart. But every child was treated for worms and vitamin A deficiency.

In short order, more than 1,800 villagers had their ailments ministered to, garnering good will not so much for the U.S. (which kept a low profile in the operation) as for the central Philippine authorities.

Colombia, the "kingdom of cocaine," sitting astride vast untapped fossil-fuel reserves, is a country wracked by a four-decade-long war against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a narco-Marxist guerrilla movement. Although U.S. interests there are immense, Congress, fearful of "mission creep," has imposed a "force cap" of no more than 400 U.S. troops at any one time—this, in a country of 40 million.

Kaplan spent a portion of the winter of 2003 with U.S. Special Forces: elite army soldiers with expertise in counterinsurgency. Far too few to make a difference in combat operations, they play the primary role of training the ineffectual Colombian army to fight the cocaine-trading guerrillas on its own.

Kaplan devotes some attention to the function of weapons, tactics, and strategy in this struggle. But here and elsewhere in the book—besides the Philippines and Colombia, he covers Yemen, Mongolia, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and Iraq—these are not what engage his interest most passionately. In his tour of America's faraway military outposts, his central focus is, rather, on the personalities, the beliefs, and the character of the individuals who serve at the pointy end of the spear, laying their lives on the line to carry out America's imperial objectives.

KAPLAN'S LOVE for this subject is wholly undisguised—the burden of "imperial maintenance," he writes, is "genuinely inspiring" when experienced up close and at first hand. To it, he brings an ear and a pen eager to absorb and to convey the feel of everyday life in the field. He regales his readers with the vocabulary of "militaryspeak" and numerous useful tricks of the trade, including such items as survival tips for walking through the minefields of Afghanistan. ("Stay on the goat trail," one of his interlocutors explains. "Goat shit means we're safe from mines.")

What emerges most sharply from *Imperial Grunts* is a portrait of soldiers who are highly disciplined, refreshingly well educated, committed to serving their country, and striving hard to stay within the rules of engagement set by higher-ups in the chain of command, no matter how incomprehensible these might appear from the perspective of the trenches.

In his visit to Afghanistan, for example, Kaplan finds himself in the Gardez firebase, a small and primitive American installation well to the southeast of Kabul, in the midst of a merry band of self-described "Guard bums," members of their states' National Guard. These men signed up for service out of ardent patriotism mixed with a hearty appetite for adventure—"we're like tourists with guns" is how one of them puts it.

Most of the soldiers in this particular unit are from northern Florida. Typically, they are the sons of Vietnam veterans and in private life policemen or firemen—heavily tattooed, avid NASCAR fans, completely gung-ho about their mission of fighting the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Accompanying them on patrol, Kaplan offers a gripping account of military operations in the murky battlefield of post-Taliban Afghanistan. Pointedly, he writes of them: "While the media was full of lugubrious stories

about the great sacrifices being made by reservists in Iraq and Afghanistan, these guys were having the time of their lives."

IN ATTEMPTING to make sense of what he has seen, Kaplan reflects back on the Vietnam war. Drawing on an old essay by James Fallows about those who served and those who escaped service in that war, he recollects a scene at the Boston Navy Yard in which a busload of Harvard draftees came "armed with carefully manipulated medical records to show their lack of fitness for duty, while another busload of working-class kids from Chelsea went smoothly through the induction process." Today, in the age of the volunteer army, the axis of division within American society remains the same. Those willing to spill blood for their country come primarily from the working class, while soldiers recruited from Harvard and similar citadels of enlightenment are few and far between.

What accounts for this intractable gap? Kaplan does not say, but he does note the ways in which the attitudes and ideas of the working-class cohort differ from the conventional wisdom among "porcelain shitters," as those of us not enduring the hardships of the battlefield are referred to by one of Kaplan's Marines. Among the soldiers, an "unapologetic, literal belief in God" is common. So are an "unblinking courage and straightforwardness . . . both revealed and obscured by [their] profane language." Above all, these are young people secure in the view that America must play an active role in the world, and cannot run from its obligations even in the face of casualties. As one of Kaplan's interviewees puts it, "If five firemen get killed fighting a fire, what do you do? Let the building burn?"

Kaplan manages wonderfully to bring into view the character of these young men and women (actually, mostly men) who now serve in the U.S. armed forces. As a short


course on existence inside the American fighting machine at the turn of the 21st century, *Imperial Grunts* is undoubtedly the next best thing to getting embedded as a reporter oneself. But how well does it stack up as an analysis of its ostensible subject: America's allegedly imperial role in the world?

IN A brief introductory chapter, and in intermittent comments later on, Kaplan sketches the contours of the American empire as he sees it. Even before the surprise attacks of September 11 propelled us into a series of distant wars, he writes, the U.S. had bases or base rights in 59 lands and the Army was conducting operations in some 170 countries every year. By 2000, the U.S. military had "appropriated the entire earth, and was ready to flood the most obscure areas of it with troops at a moment's notice." To get a sense of what this means, he suggests a visit to the Philippines, "where the white baronial U.S. Embassy fronting Manila Bay occupies the most beautiful downtown real estate in the same way as British and French embassies in their former colonies."


That, at least, is one of Kaplan's main claims. But as we have seen in the case of Colombia, the picture he paints of the American empire on the ground is rather different. In fact, the average size of the Army's 170-country deployments, we learn, is a mere nine soldiers. In some places, like Mongolia, a tiny handful of officers collect intelligence and do good works while showing the stars and stripes. Much of our military involvement in little-heard-from countries is what Kaplan himself characterizes as "protean," only beginning to take shape and highly limited in scope.

Kaplan attempts to reconcile these contradictions by describing America's dominion as something historically unique, an imperium "without colonies, suited to a jet-and-information age in which mass


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
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movements of people and capital [have] diluted the meaning of sovereignty." But to invoke these shapeless terms only thickens the analytical fog, especially since elsewhere in his book Kaplan defines imperialism rather categorically as a quest "for absolute, undefiled security at home [that] leads one to conquer the world."

Nor are these the only knots in which Kaplan becomes entangled. At various junctures, he appears to criticize the U.S. for using insufficient force in carrying out its objectives—arguing, for instance, that the failure to insert Special Forces along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the search for al-Qaeda fugitives reveals a "feckless" reluctance to offend General Pervez Musharraf. But in the very next sentence, Kaplan lays out the evidence suggesting that Washington is doing precisely what he recommends, only covertly, employing the "black," or secret, side of Special Forces, as well as the Army's Delta Force and the SEALs for cross-border infiltrations into Pakistan.

Kaplan similarly faults the Bush administration for "fecklessness" in Iraq, where American hesitancy in reclaiming the city of Falluja from Sunni insurgents in the spring of 2004 is said to have demonstrated "the weakness of nation-states against the thundering new forces of a global media." Writing in a hawkish vein on one page, Kaplan calls the hesitation part of a "classic American syndrome: an aversion to sustained engagement overseas that leads to more carnage rather than less." Writing in a dovish vein on another page, he tells us that the lesson of Falluja "was clear; the more subtle and cautious its application of power, the greater would be America's sustaining impact."

This back-and-forth and up-and-down mode is either a sign of intellectual confusion or a dodge by a writer unwilling to commit himself. Either way, it induces vertigo. In the end, *Imperial Grunts* remains a col-

lection of coherent and wonderfully rendered anecdotes, woven together with another collection of reflections and assertions, much less coherent and some of them highly debatable.

Over the Wall

Divided by God: America's Church-State Problem—and What We Should Do About It

by Noah Feldman

Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 306 pp. \$25.00

Reviewed by
Adam Wolfson

IS IT constitutional for public institutions to display the Ten Commandments? Well, it depends—or so the Supreme Court held this past June. With Moses himself gazing on—a frieze in the chamber depicts the lawgiver holding a Hebrew version of the two tablets—the sharply divided Justices ruled that framed copies of the Decalogue on display in two Kentucky courthouses violated the constitutional ban on the "establishment" of religion; by contrast, they found the state of Texas within its rights to allow a six-foot-high, three-and-a-half-foot-wide monolith of the Ten Commandments to stand on the grounds of its capitol building. The Court's reasoning, such as it was, need not detain us here. Even a layman could see the disarray in this area of jurisprudence.

As Noah Feldman explains in his engagingly written new book, *Divided by God*, such cases may seem trivial, but they "go to the very heart of who we are as a nation." As he sees it, America is currently di-

ADAM WOLFSON is a consulting editor at COMMENTARY.

vided into two warring camps: "values evangelicals," who argue for more religion in the public square, and "legal secularists," who argue for less or none at all. Feldman's aim is to bring these two sides together. Raised an Orthodox Jew and now a law professor at New York University, he puts himself forward as someone with unique personal insight on these issues, a thinker capable of seeing beyond the usual boundaries of our culture wars.

MOST OF Feldman's account is historical, covering the main debates in church-state relations over the past three centuries. He starts with the American founding. For legal secularists, the heroes of this era are Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, statesmen who, in their view, wished to build a high "wall of separation" between public and religious authority. Values evangelicals contend that, to the contrary, the founders were "nonpreferentialists," that is, believers in allowing government to support religion in general or all religions equally.

Feldman accuses both sides of anachronistically reading their own views into the past. The founders, he suggests, would have balked at spending so much as a penny in tax dollars for religious institutions. At the same time, however, they would have had no objection to public displays of religion. In separating church and state, Madison and Jefferson sought to achieve not a *secular* republic but one that would safeguard the liberty of conscience of all Americans. The source of our devotion to "liberty of conscience," Feldman writes, was the "politics of religious diversity." This, and not "common religious-moral values," was our guard against persecution based on faith.

Feldman gives credit for this insight to Madison, who in *Federalist* 51 argued that the best security for both political and religious rights was to ensure that no one "faction" was capable of "capturing the reins

of government and turning it to its own interests." Since Madison's day, Feldman observes, this diversity has often been recognized as "a blessing and a source of strength."

In Feldman's reading of history, however, the 19th century saw the founders' ideal of diversity replaced by something else—Christian "non-sectarianism." Two political skirmishes exemplified the new approach. First, with the introduction of public schools, there arose the question of how to teach and inculcate morals. To America's Protestant majority, the answer was obvious—with readings from the King James Bible. When Catholics complained, asking for either truly secular schools or state-supported Catholic schools, they were refused in the name of the separation of church and state.

Next to challenge the Protestant majority were the Mormons, who insisted on their religious right to polygamous marriage. Here the question was whose "family values" should prevail, and whether it was even the business of the state to favor one over the other. The country solved the problem by establishing monogamy as a secular norm, even though it was, at least according to Feldman, really a manifestation of American Christianity. In both of these episodes, he believes, Christian nonsectarianism undermined the founders' idea that "religion belonged in one sphere and temporal government in another."


TOWARD THE end of the 19th century, American elites began to embrace what Feldman calls "strong" secularism, a new ideology that sought to eliminate religion's influence not only in the public square but in society at large. Though this movement failed, a more limited secular impulse, what Feldman calls "legal" secularism, has had an enormous impact on American life. The key event in this connection is the case of *Everson v. Board of Educa-*

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BY JOSHUA MURAVCHIK


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— *Washington Post Book World*

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tion (1947), in which the Supreme Court enshrined the principle that no level of American government may "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." In a succession of cases, culminating in *Lemon v. Kurtzman* (1971), the Justices largely completed Jefferson's fabled "wall of separation": to pass constitutional muster, a law must have a secular purpose, mainly secular effects, and involve no entanglements with religion.

Yet legal secularism's very success spawned a counterrevolution in "values evangelicalism," the last historical episode in Feldman's chronicle. By emphasizing values rather than theology—for example, the abortion question rather than Bible readings in the public schools—advocates for this view successfully brought an end to old religious rivalries and hostilities. The movement's impact can be seen in the Court's greater willingness to countenance certain types of church-state partnerships, like nonpreferential school vouchers. Still, as the recent Ten Commandment cases demonstrated, the Court remains suspicious of public displays of religion.

Should we be happy with this *modus vivendi*? Not according to Feldman, who would like to reverse the results. We should, he argues, welcome religion of some sort back into the public square—but only so long as no government aid is involved. In his view, this would restore us to "the two guiding rules that historically lay at the core of our church-state experiment": namely, that the state may "neither coerce anyone in matters of religion, nor expend its resources so as to support religious institutions and practices."

Is FELDMAN right about the history to which he lays claim? He is certainly not the first to argue that the Constitution, in its original intent, does not allow the government

"to support religion generally or nonpreferentially." Yet many widely respected historians and scholars, relying on the same materials, have reached the opposite conclusion. It is an old debate, and Feldman offers no new evidence to buttress his side of the argument. Indeed, he hardly engages the vast body of scholarship in this complicated area.

Feldman's more original contribution is to say that the founders—and Madison in particular—were avatars of "diversity." On its face, this is a dubious claim. Contrary to Feldman, Madison did not write in *Federalist* 51 about religious diversity but, more prosaically, about the value of having a "multiplicity of sects." The founders, in fact, were not big fans of diversity as such—and the 19th-century suppression of polygamy, for instance, can hardly be seen as somehow "undermining" their ideal.

Indeed, the very first sentence of the Constitution speaks of forming a "more perfect union," and it is no accident that the national motto is "E Pluribus Unum." Even on questions of religion and morality, the founding generation could speak eloquently of the need for some basic commonality. Jefferson himself once commented on the good fortune of the American people to be "enlightened by a benign religion, professed, indeed, and practiced in various forms, yet all of them inculcating honesty, truth, temperance, gratitude, and the love of man."

The basic point, though somewhat uncongenial to Feldman's scheme of things, is that Madison's multiplicity of sects and interests could work its magic only within the horizon sketched by Jefferson. That is, the American experiment in free government and religious liberty presupposed, at least to some extent, an underlying unity. Madison himself wrote, without irony, of justice, natural rights, and "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."

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—R. Larry Todd, Professor of Music, Duke University


For scholars since World War Two have assumed that the composer Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1809-1847) maintained a strong attachment to Judaism throughout his lifetime. As these commentators have rightly noted, Mendelssohn was born Jewish and did not convert to Protestantism until age seven, his grandfather was the famous Jewish reformer and philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, and his music was banned by the Nazis, who clearly viewed him as a Jew.

Such facts tell only part of the story, however. Through a mix of cultural analysis, biographical study, and a close examination of the libretto drafts of Mendelssohn's sacred works, *The Price of Assimilation* provides dramatic new answers to the so-called "Mendelssohn Jewish question."

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
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IF FELDMAN's historical account is suspect, what about his proposed solution to our culture wars, in which religion of some sort is allowed back into the public square on the condition that religion itself receive no financial support from government? Here the problem is not so much what Feldman has read into his story as what he has left out.

From the founders' day through the early 20th century, the federal government was minuscule; thus, what it did or did not do in relation to religion was hardly consequential. Moreover, the First Amendment's proscription against religious establishments was taken to apply only to the national government, leaving the states free to support a particular faith or to aid religion on a nonpreferential basis.

Our situation today is very nearly the opposite. The federal government is all-pervasive; meanwhile, by "incorporating" the First Amendment and applying it against the states, the Supreme Court has ruled out most support for religion even at the lesser levels of government. Under Feldman's "compromise," the values evangelicals would have to surrender what little ground they have gained over the last ten years.

What they would get in return is supposedly greater leniency on the question of public displays of religion. But here too they would be likely to lose out, since Feldman's condition for a return to the public square is the multiculturalist dictate that religion be "inclusive, not exclusive" and that it "accommodate and honor" diversity. It seems unlikely that the Ten Commandments—with their insistence on worshipping "the Lord thy God" and having "no other gods" before Him—would fare any better under this test than under the old one.

After the Flood

Collected Poems 1954-2004

by Irving Feldman

Schocken. 464 pp. \$28.50

Reviewed by
Michael Weingrad

FOR THE last half-century, the American poet Irving Feldman has been loping along a course uncompromisingly his own. A graduate of City College and Columbia University, Feldman has spent four decades on the faculty at SUNY Buffalo; neither his poetry itself nor the rare biographical sketch adds much in the way of journalistic detail to this spare account of his life. Now, however, in *Collected Poems 1954-2004*, drawn from ten published volumes with new material as well, we have a thorough view of his life's work.

Feldman's first books, *Works and Days* (1961), *The Pripet Marshes* (1965), and *Magic Papers* (1970), established him as a poet of expert diction and a churning metaphysical unease. He was also recognized, properly, as a substantially Jewish writer, notable among his contemporaries for the sober generosity with which he lamented the faith he lacked. Thus, in "Psalm," he confessed that "my profaneness is/in-sufferable to me," while in "Arabian Night" he found his patrimony reduced to "some guilt/merely sentimental; a little childish loyalty;/a little useless pity." In "The Lost Language," a self-flagellating satire of Jewish intellectuals circa 1960 (when the poem appeared in *COMMENTARY*), he stepped forth as a modern Noah after the Holocaust, that most relentless of historical floods.

The Holocaust was unavoidably Feldman's burden in his early work. The title poem in *The Pripet Marshes*

MICHAEL WEINGRAD, a new contributor, teaches Hebrew and Jewish literature at Portland State University.



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enacts with discomfiting honesty the compulsion of an American Jew to imagine his friends and family into the European annihilation, in the shadow of whose horror even the stupid and the petty among us become precious. In the same collection, "To the Six Million" turns plangently to the Song of Songs to describe a poet longing after murdered Israel. Feldman sounds his grief through the grasping desperation of a panicked groom:

Dear ones, what can I say?
You died, and emptied the streets
and my breath, and went from
my seeing.
And I awoke, dying at the
window
of my wedding day, because
I was nowhere; the morning that
revived
was pain, and my life that began
again was pain,
I could not see you.

What can I say?
My helpless love overwhelmed
me,
sometimes I thought I touched
your faces,
my blindness sought your brows
again,
and your necks that are towers,
your temples that are as pieces
of pomegranate within your
locks.

These two poems join with the title poem of *Magic Papers*—which is not a Holocaust lament—as the most unforgettable of Feldman's early and more overtly Jewish poems. Chronicling the gulfs of often violent need that divide men from women, fathers from sons, "Magic Papers" is both an account of a child's sorrowful rainy day and a cosmic myth of banishment in which the poet assumes the role of God, begetting and destroying:

I am the father of rainbabies
shepherd of jewels, of jews,
of boys in holiday skullcaps,
shining and white.

With studious rapture

I lean over their gleaming
shoulders
and behold the texts of light . . .

I tap my finger
on the pane; they slide,
they run down in streaks of light.
I rage, I cannot understand my
rage.

The "rage" is of a man severed from the fullness he associates with women. Indeed, in "Magic Papers" the sexual-psychic fate of man and woman is conceived as terrifically, tragically brutish. ("And the day's head splits the darkness,/breaks forth, bruises her womb;/she screams; he burns and rises./He carries a message across the sky/from darkness into darkness,/mounting furiously toward vengeance,/falling asleep so soon. . . .") It is redeemed nowhere in that poem but only in a touching aubade, "To Waken You With Your Name," that ends the collection:

Awake, my dawn, my daughter,
sings the day, I have no
tenderness that is not you,
no distance untouched by you
idling and singing here,
for whose sake I have
abandoned the night.

THERE ARE distant but suggestive affinities between Feldman's poetry and the work of Maurice Sendak, another Brooklyn Jew born in 1928. As in Sendak, Feldman's oeuvre stocks dark and surreal visions of children; ogres, witches, and gnomes that seem garbed in the cross-hatching of old woodcuts or Rembrandt ink drawings; and sons facing in memory their parents and their vanished neighborhoods, its gangs and games.

Though in an obviously different way from Sendak's illustrations of I.B. Singer tales, Feldman was also one of those dedicated servants who helped bring modern Yiddish writers to an English-language audience by means of solid translations (not included here) of poets like Kadya Molodovsky, Joseph Rolnik, and

Zishe Landau. But the God-wrestlings of a Molodovsky, given fine form in Feldman's English, fade in the course of his own poetry. By mid-career, just as his syntax has eased into a more relaxed line that still maintains its sure control, so the theological dimension of his poetry is mostly set aside in favor of equally urgent but this-worldly concerns.

By the 1970's, neither the God of the Jews nor Jewish destiny makes the center-stage appearance they both did in his early collections. Instead, Feldman has put the Old Man to sleep:

They name me *sacrifice*—their
old man
is snoring; call me *sabbath* and
ending
—the death consumed in clarity
—the clarity that makes birth
clear;
call me *distance*—and I depart;
the universe—I disappear
and am immortal and forget.

This passage is from "Three Tales," in Feldman's *New and Selected Poems* (1979). In the same volume we find his "Elegies," ruminations on confronting that "bully," death, and the counterfeit it makes of a life without God as the possible guarantor of authenticity. "Fragment," a later poem in the same humble mode, supposes the task of the poet might be "to tell, for example, how they/received their names—the gods—/who die in every generation."

With the laying aside of theological questing, what emerges as Feldman's chief concern is the diminution or falsification of human sympathies in our postmodern, house-of-mirrors world. In *All of Us Here* (1986), Feldman presents what most critics take as his two major long poems dealing with this moral-epistemological anxiety. The first is the title poem, a twenty-section work that takes as its occasion the unsettling white figures of the sculptor George Segal. The second is "The Flight from the City," a dire, urban

apocalypse somewhere between Blake, Kafka, and the John Carpenter movie *Escape from New York*. As Kleinwort, the martyred subject of the poem's interrogation, explains:

I, too, felt the city's acquiescence,
and rapture, in ruin. I, too,
wished
the end to come quickly; our
concern
and constancy—our being
human—
had been too little to hold us
together;
so many abandoned, so much
forgotten.

Feldman's recent collections evince an intentionally modest brand of wisdom, coupled with an older man's earned right to grouse or affirm and have (so to speak) the final word. His later vantage point has brought a loving recollection of youth and its casualties, as in "*Sono un poeta . . . Scrivo*," and "Beautiful, False Things," a superb monologue about Dante delivered by a fictional Albanian poet. But he has also written meditations on literary celebrity, his own included—he has won Guggenheim and MacArthur awards, and honors and prizes from the Academy of American Poets and other august bodies—and the way age and death pull the rug out from under it. And he has authored a few poems mercilessly skewering some of his fellow writers for crass things they have said in interviews, or for their bad behavior and bohemian pretensions. Through these latter poems runs a certain honest resentment of the young or the famous, a certain disgust at the stupid and the cruel—wittily done, if not very instructive and perhaps not worth the effort.

FELDMAN'S POEMS can be hermetic performances. This is not a matter of their being difficult or demanding—some are difficult, and all require care—but rather of a certain agile self-sufficiency, a distance that sometimes jars with their quite hu-


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
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
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mane concerns. They presume an audience, they even crack jokes—and funny ones—but it isn't always clear that they need us. This sense of privacy is increased by Feldman's apparent lack of interest in turning out prose writing.

Still, in the recent comic poem "Heavenly Muse," in which he and his feminine inspiration kibitz and joust like old lovers, he genially pulls aside the curtain. He imagines his muse not in Parnassian get-up but "just stepped off/the Metroliner from Washington," showing up late ("as usual") and rain-soaked, her "flowered broolly dropped, upended,/weeping on the welcome mat."

This poem reminds us that, despite poignant exceptions like "To Waken You With Your Name," contemporary domestic life, family life, does not enter Feldman's work very frequently. But here we find the poet very much at home, gently mocking his own exasperation as well as its object. Though he will not put aside his wounded self-regard, in the course of their repartee he musters a certain harrumphing sympathy for muses, those much put-upon women.

"[W]e swim in oceans of male-ness," he allows her to complain, "every instant refreshes our pain/with some new blunt, blundering obtuseness!" At the end, he has her accusing him of demanding inspiration only on his own terms: "you/who want the roll, the rise, the carol,/the dictation—without your submission./This is eavesdropping, this is stealing,/unless, until, you give yourself to me. . . ." A bedroom ultimatum, to which he seems, with a smile on his face, to bow.

Whatever the arrangement of his menage, literary or otherwise, Feldman continues on his own terms. In the pages of this long and very welcome collection he goes by like the sprinting gingerbread boy in the poem "As Fast As You Can," a figure for the tremulous, lung-straining joy of being alive, inviting us to catch him as we can:

Shimmering and redolent, his
spirit
tempts our subtlest appetite—
there he runs!
freely on the wind. We sniff a
sharp
intelligence, lunge and snap our
teeth
at the breathable body of air
and murmur while it is flying by,
Life is unhappy, life is sweet!

Behind the Blacklist

Red Star Over Hollywood:
The Film Colony's
Long Romance with the Left

by Ronald Radosh
and Allis Radosh

Encounter: 309 pp. \$29.95

Reviewed by
Mark Falcoff

EVEN THE most casual observer of American film culture is aware of the degree to which Hollywood remains in deep thrall to the Left. Over the last 30 years, aside from its well-publicized extracurricular involvement in assorted left-wing causes and political campaigns, the industry has served up an almost uninterrupted menu of anti-business, "environmentalist," and "anti-imperialist" fare. To add insult to injury, it also still regularly casts itself as the aggrieved party—as, in short, an innocent, put-upon victim of the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy. After all, Hollywood types like to remind us, it happened before, didn't it?

The "it" in question is of course the events of the 1940's and 1950's known collectively as "the blacklist." This episode—when persons of known or suspected Communist af-


MARK FALCOFF is resident scholar emeritus at the American Enterprise Institute.

filiation were denied the ability to work in Hollywood, or at least to work under their own names—has dominated the industry's image of itself ever since. And by means of movies about the suffering of blacklisted writers, like *The Front* (1976), *Guilty by Suspicion* (1991), and *The Majestic* (2001), Hollywood has done everything it can to keep its storied martyrdom alive in the minds of the American public.

In *Red Star Over Hollywood*, Ronald Radosh and Allis Radosh have now returned to the scene of the crime, examining with care and discrimination the events of the blacklist era and those leading up to it. Professional historians with a longstanding interest in the cold war, the Radoshes have ranged far and wide in their research. In addition to interviewing many of the surviving participants, they trawled through the records of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), the University of Southern California film collections, and the theater and film collection at the University of Wisconsin Historical Society. Nor have they neglected the mountain of scholarship on the era that has been accumulating for many years now. The story they tell is far more complex, and compelling, than one might have anticipated.

ALMOST FROM the very beginning, the Radoshes show, members of the California film colony—particularly screenwriters—were fascinated by the Soviet Union and especially by the artistic innovations of the Moscow Art Theater and the motion pictures of Sergei Eisenstein. Before this romance could bear fruit, however, history intervened. As Stalin consolidated his power in the late 20's and early 30's, Communists worldwide were ordered by Moscow to assume an ultra-radical posture; involvement with "fellow travelers" and "bourgeois leftists"—circumlocutions for mere liberal sympathizers with the "great Sovi-

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
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et experiment"—was frankly discouraged.

Only when the Soviet dictator switched gears in 1935, instructing Communist parties to join with liberals and others on the Left in a "popular front," did Hollywood's relationship with the American Communist party reach its fullest flower. The rise of Nazism in Germany and, above all, the Spanish civil war provided a sudden burst of new recruits for the party—most of whom were told to keep their membership secret—and, even more importantly, a flood of financial resources as most high-salaried members agreed to donate a percentage of their income to the cause. At its peak in this period, the party became so entrenched in the unions and guilds of the film industry as to foreclose the possibility of non-Communists organizing themselves independently of its influence.

Then, in 1939, four years after the inception of the Popular Front, the tide was suddenly reversed again. The Hitler-Stalin pact—an event that shocked the faithful all around the world—caused a hemorrhaging of support and, by indirection, encouraged the emergence of an *anti*-Soviet Left within the film community. But still more reversals were to come. In June 1941, the party's sagging fortunes were abruptly revived by Hitler's betrayal of the 1939 pact and invasion of the Soviet Union—"the Motherland," as the playwright Lillian Hellman, the party's leading literary eminence, uninhibitedly referred to it.

WITH PEARL HARBOR and the U.S. entrance into the war on Stalin's side, all restraints were loosened. Hollywood cranked out a slew of pro-Soviet productions, the most egregious of which were *Mission to Moscow* (1943), *North Star* (1943), and *Song of Russia* (1944). The script to this last film, written by Hellman herself, depicted (in the Radoshes' words) "a thriving col-

lective farm of healthy, happy Soviet peasants, all of whom look and act like Americans, and who frequently and spontaneously burst into silly songs." The songs were composed by Aaron Copland.

But victory in World War II was followed by the collapse of the U.S.-Soviet alliance and the onset of the cold war. Matters now took another turn. Long before congressional committees would begin poking around Hollywood to find subversives, a group of Hollywood liberals, led by Ronald Reagan, the president of the Screen Actors Guild, moved to challenge Communist penetration of the industry. Most of the leading figures in this initiative were, like Reagan himself, registered Democrats and supporters of the Truman administration; but they vigorously disputed the notion, shamelessly retailed by party members, that America's postwar opposition to Soviet ambitions was a harbinger of domestic fascism, and they were determined to let no such political line dominate the industry.

Unfortunately, the House Un-American Activities Committee, instead of letting the industry police itself, now stepped in to roil the waters. Setting up shop in downtown Los Angeles, the committee proceeded to subpoena witnesses in a slapdash attempt to ferret out Communist influence. In their account of this dreary episode, the Radoshes trace more or less the same trajectory as Sam Tanenhaus in his 1997 biography of Whittaker Chambers.* In effect, for many unscrupulous Republican partisans, most notably HUAC chairman J. Parnell Thomas, the real target of the investigation turned out to be not so much the Communist party as the Democratic party, in the form of the New Deal and the Roosevelt administration.

Some in Hollywood who had been victims of the Communists

* I reviewed *Whittaker Chambers* in the February 1997 COMMENTARY.

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
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during their hegemonic days in the Screen Writers Guild and elsewhere—the Radoshes go into considerable detail on the Communists' methods of controlling who got work in Hollywood and who did not—were happy to cooperate with HUAC and to tell what they knew. A group of ten Hollywood screenwriters and directors, following Communist-party instructions to appear before the committee and make a spectacle of themselves by invoking the Fifth Amendment, ended up serving prison sentences for contempt of Congress. Still others fled abroad—not, of course, to the great socialist motherland but to more comfortable climes like Mexico, England, and France, where they were often able to find productive work.

The eventual outcome of the HUAC hearings was the creation of a blacklist, consisting mainly of actors, directors, and screenwriters, whom the studios were forbidden to employ—although not immediately, and not without a fight. As the Radoshes show, the studio heads were not prepared simply to roll over for the committee. Whatever their personal politics, they were accustomed to unquestioned authority in their own domain, and in general were less interested in the politics of their writers than in scripts that would lead to success at the box office. Thus, even after they had supposedly buckled to political pressure, the studio heads continued to employ some of the blacklisted writers under fictitious names.

BY THE late 1960's, the political and cultural tide within the United States had turned sufficiently for many of the blacklisted to resume work under their own names. Those who had gone to prison for contempt of Congress were rehabilitated as martyrs to the cause of political and cultural freedom. Subsequent generations, ignorant of the historical details, and nudged along by such mendacious films as

The Front, have all too readily bought into the myth of innocent liberals on the run; in fact, the real liberals, like Reagan, had all along been on the other side of the fence.

As for those writers and filmmakers who had cooperated with HUAC, they would stand condemned in the court of Hollywood opinion. The classic example was the late Elia Kazan, the director of such landmark Broadway plays and/or Hollywood movies as *Death of a Salesman*, *A Streetcar Named Desire*, *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*, *On the Waterfront*, *Gentleman's Agreement*, *Viva Zapata!*, and *East of Eden*. As recently as 1999, a huge scandal was provoked when the board of the Motion Picture Academy voted to grant Kazan a special award for distinguished artistic achievement. Marlon Brando even tried to prevent the showing of clips from one of Kazan's movies in the presentation of the award.*

It speaks volumes about the current moment in American culture that the single afternoon Kazan spent testifying before a congressional committee—an afternoon, moreover, without serious consequences for particular Communist writers—should be considered enough to outweigh a lifetime of extraordinary contribution to American theater and film. But such, as I noted at the beginning, is the nature of Hollywood's continued enthrallment to the illiberal Left. The Radoshes' *Red Star Over Hollywood* is an indispensable account of how this enthrallment came to be.

* The film critic and historian Richard Schickel begins his engrossing and authoritative new book, *Elia Kazan: A Biography* (Harper Collins, 489 pp., \$39.95), by revisiting this sorry episode.

Classic

A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War

by Victor Davis Hanson

Random House, 416 pp. \$29.95

Reviewed by
Clifford Orwin

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, who does not mince words, once introduced himself to me as the most hated man in the classics profession. I figured he must be exaggerating, but he wasn't. Classicists detest Hanson for *Who Killed Homer?* (1998), his blistering critique of their faddishness and irrelevance. Proclaiming himself an academic populist, Hanson believes that the Greek classics can and should matter to ordinary people. *A War Like No Other* is his latest effort to make them matter.

As readers of COMMENTARY know, Hanson is also a military historian, which helps account for his meteoric rise as a commentator since 9/11. Military historians lack status in the academy because professors, who live in a world of talk, do not like to admit how often things in the broader world are settled by force or the threat of it. But the public snaps up military history, and the prolific Hanson knows how to write for it.

A War Like No Other displays the gifts of Hanson the historian. It recounts the Peloponnesian war, the greatest conflict of Greek antiquity. Just two generations after the glorious pan-Hellenic defeat of the invading Persians, the two foremost allies in that conflict, Athens and

CLIFFORD ORWIN, a professor of political science at the University of Toronto, is the author of *The Humanity of Thucydides* (1994) and is currently completing a book on the role of compassion in modern politics.

Racism in the Islamic World

How can peace prevail in the Middle East in the face of Islamic bigotry and hate? When will moderate Muslims speak out?

For years, the U.N., led by Islamic and Arab nations and their sympathizers, has accused Israel of racism, but the world consistently turns a blind eye to open, seething anti-Semitism in Islamic society.

What are the facts?

In one of the most astonishing propaganda coups ever, a United Nations conference on racism, which took place in Durban South Africa in 2001, declared that Zionism is racism. No wonder the U.S. and Israel walked out of the meeting, which was dominated by representatives of Islamic and Arab states and other anti-Israel forces, and whose conclusions were predictable from the outset.

The supreme irony of this conference was that it accused no other nation of racism—only Israel. In truth, Israel is perhaps the most racially and ethnically diverse and tolerant country in the world. More than half of Israel's Jewish population consists of people of color—blacks from Ethiopia and Yemen, as well as brown-skinned people from Morocco, Iran, Syria, Egypt and Israel itself. In addition, Israel's population includes more than one million Arabs, who enjoy the same civil rights as Jewish Israelis. In Israel hate speech is banned, and it is against the law to discriminate based on race or religion.

In contrast, anti-Semitism—a poisonous form of racism directed specifically against the Jewish people—is rampant in most all Islamic societies. Not only is anti-Semitism commonplace in Muslim nations, but it is propagated shamelessly by their leaders, in state-sponsored media, and by Muslim clergy.

For example, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed declared in a 2003 speech to the Organization of Islamic Conference that, "today Jews rule the world by proxy. They get others to fight and die for them." Imagine if an American president had made a similarly sweeping and bigoted statement about blacks, Latinos or any other race—what a justifiable uproar, perhaps even an impeachment, would ensue. Yet there was no condemnation by the Muslim world of Mohamed's comments. Rather, virtually all of the conference's Muslim leaders actually voiced their approval.

In response to a terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia in May 2004, Crown Prince Abdullah declared that "Zionism is behind [these] terrorist actions in the kingdom." (Zionism

is the code word often used by Islamic anti-Semites for Jews.) U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos called the Prince's assertion "an outrage . . . blatant hypocrisy," but Islamic leaders were silent. In fact, millions of Muslims still insist that Zionists were behind the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center.

Anti-Semitism is expressed so freely and ubiquitously in most Islamic societies that no citizen can escape it. During

"Until Muslims reject racism in all forms, they can't expect Islam to enjoy full respect as a political and spiritual force."

Ramadan in 2002, Egypt's state-controlled TV aired "Horseman Without a Horse," a program based on the notorious forgery, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, in which Jews allegedly use the

blood of non-Jews to make Passover matzot. In Iran, a TV series, "Zahra's Blue Eyes," portrays "Zionists" kidnapping Palestinian children and harvesting their organs.

Perhaps nowhere is the hatred of Jews more virulent than among the Palestinians. Most perniciously, Palestinian children are taught in school that Jews are descended from apes and pigs and that the most noble thing they can do is to kill Jews. Muslim clerics like Imam Ibrahim Madiras, an employee of the Palestinian Authority, declared in a 2005 television sermon, "Jews are a cancer" and later that, "Muslims will kill the Jews . . . [and] rejoice in Allah's victory." No surprise, then, that the 1982 doctoral dissertation of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas makes the astounding claim that "Zionists" collaborated with the Nazis to annihilate the Jewish people in order to drive the survivors to Palestine.

Anti-Semitism and the prospects for peace: Islamic anti-Semitism permeates the Arab Middle East and creates an atmosphere in which Jews are reviled and represented as subhuman. How can the Palestinian people embrace peace with a people represented by their religious and political leaders as dehumanized, evil beings? Even more importantly, how can Israel be expected to trust a so-called peace partner who expresses abject hatred and murderous intent toward Jews on a daily basis? Yet the U.S. and many European nations continue to demand that Israel make one-sided sacrifices for peace with a people steeped in racism and committed to its destruction.

Until Islamic leaders muster the integrity to relentlessly condemn anti-Semitism (and its evil twin, anti-Zionism), we can't expect Israel to accept a forced peace with the Palestinians. Likewise, until moderate Muslims reject racism in all forms, they can't expect Islam to enjoy full respect as a political and spiritual force among the world's people.

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JERUSALEM VIEWPOINTS

Wartime Witch Hunt: Blaming Israel for the Iraq War

DORE GOLD

While some have charged that the primary interest of the Bush administration in going to war against Saddam Hussein was to defend Israeli security interests, by 2003 Iraq was clearly not Israel's primary concern. Instead, Iran was viewed as "the main existential threat to Israel."

Will a Gaza " Hamas-stan" Become a Future Al-Qaeda Sanctuary?

MAJ.-GEN. (RES.) YAAKOV AMIDROR AND
DAVID KEYES

Would a security vacuum in a post-withdrawal Gaza facilitate al-Qaeda's entry there? In the past, al-Qaeda sought to establish itself wherever there was a security vacuum—in economically weak, failed states.

JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEFS

Undermining Mahmud Abbas: The "Green Revolution" and the Hamas Strategy to Take Over the Palestinian Authority

LT. COL. JONATHAN D. HALEVI

From Hamas's standpoint, gaining political power will actually strengthen its ability to preserve its military forces and resort to terrorism when circumstances are appropriate. As Abbas opens the door to radical Islamic elements, an unwanted possible outcome may be the strengthening of Hamas and furthering the preconditions for eventual militant Islamic rule over the West Bank and Gaza.

Are There Signs of a Jordanian-Palestinian Reengagement?

DAN DIKER AND PINCHAS INBARI

King Abdullah's approval of Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas's request to send the Jordanian-based Badr Brigade, which is part of the Palestine Liberation Army under the command of the Jordanian military, to help restore order in parts of the crime-ridden West Bank may represent the most significant sign of Jordanian reengagement in the West Bank since former King Hussein formally severed legal and administrative links there in July 1988.

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NEWEST BOOKS

Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace

DR. YUVAL STEINITZ, MAJ.-GEN. (RES.) YAAKOV
AMIDROR, DR. MEIR ROSENNE, AND DR. DORE GOLD



Israel's decision to disengage from the Gaza Strip has placed the future of the disputed West Bank at the top of the international agenda. Israel's rights and requirements for

defensible borders, as proposed by President George W. Bush, are now placed squarely on the global diplomatic agenda. This multi-disciplinary study focuses on Israel's minimal territorial requirements to enable it to defend itself in the post-Iraq War Middle East.

Israel and Europe: An Expanding Abyss?

MANFRED GERSTENFELD

In a reconnaissance mission into the essence of European-Israeli political relations, the author illustrates how Israel and often European Jewry have been made to pay for Europe's major strategic mistakes in defense, energy, and immigration policies. With comments by Jeffrey Gedmin, Andrei Markovits, Robert Wistrich, and others.


Human Rights of Christians in Palestinian Society

JUSTUS WEINER

Tens of thousands of Christians residing in areas "governed" by the Palestinian Authority have abandoned their holy sites and ancestral properties to live abroad, while those that remain do so as a beleaguered and dwindling minority.

Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos

DORE GOLD (new, updated edition)



The UN was originally created in 1945 to halt aggression and safeguard human rights. But it has utterly failed at its mission, particularly in the 1990s when it repeatedly failed to stop acts of genocide, and expedited global chaos. Newly-expanded paperback just released with previously undisclosed "oil-for-food" details.

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Sparta, squared off against each other. Each boasted powerful allies of its own: the Spartan or Peloponnesian alliance dominated on land, while Athens with its maritime tributaries ruled the sea.

As Hanson stresses, following his great source Thucydides, the war was to prove far less glorious than disastrous. It dragged on for 27 years in all (431-404 B.C.E.), and the losses, both human and economic, were enormous. While Sparta finally won, the victory proved empty. Neither city would fully recover, nor would Greece as a whole: the rise of Macedonia marked the end of the heyday of the *polis* or Greek city-state.

The Peloponnesian war offers a great story; the problem, for Hanson as for all other modern historians, is that it has already been told. Thucydides' contemporaneous account—he was born ca. 460 B.C.E., died ca. 395, and fought in the war as a general for his native Athens—continues to dwarf all competitors. Not only is it our sole intact and reliable literary source for the war, all others being fragmentary, but Thucydides is one of the greatest writers of any genre ever to put quill to parchment. His profundity and intensity, his narrative and rhetorical brilliance, and his unique blend of analytical rigor and imaginative sympathy make his book one of the most thrilling ever written.

True, the war lasted until 404 B.C.E., and Thucydides' account breaks off in 411 (to be taken up by another great historian, Xenophon). True, too, there are numerous minor sources for the war, documentary and archeological, and 2,500 years' worth of scholars second-guessing Thucydides' interpretation. Still, Hanson appreciates Thucydides' greatness too much to set out to rival or supersede him.

What he has chosen to do instead is to amplify one of Thucydides' themes. His subtitle indicates his emphasis: this is a "how they did it" book, where what they did was

bloody. Its subject is "the thousands of ordinary Greeks who were slaughtered for nearly three decades for the designs of fickle men, shifting alliances, and contradictory causes." Such deep sympathy with the obscure victims of the violence of war is genuinely Thucydidean, albeit only one strand among many in Thucydides' account. Hanson moves it front and center.

He also adopts a different method. While Thucydides narrates the war season by season, Hanson's chapters bear titles like "Terror," "Plague," "Armor," "Walls," and "Ships" (this last, with its thorough account of naval warfare among the Greeks, being especially vivid and evocative). Each chapter focuses on a particular epoch of the war, but also on the particular aspect that dominated it. Frequently interrupting his narrative for a schematic treatment of a chapter's featured motif, Hanson finds himself ranging both forward and back-

ward in time for evidence, but throughout his account he skillfully maintains both focus and cohesion.

TWO ELEMENTS emerge from Hanson's valuable treatment that are largely missing from Thucydides. While the Greek historian assumed a reader's acquaintance with the modes of warfare of the day, Hanson obviously cannot. So episodes that Thucydides merely sketches Hanson painstakingly and very usefully re-creates. The desperation of siege and plague, the strange interplay of strict order and blind bloody chaos that pervaded hoplite (heavy-armed) warfare, the unsurpassed intricacy of the seamanship required of the crew of a trireme, the massive cruelty that came to dominate the treatment of the vanquished—all take on concreteness through Hanson's patient accumulation of detail.

In this connection, the fact that Hanson has always been an agrari-

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an historian in addition to a military one serves him well, not least because these two aspects of life were closely intertwined in ancient times. Thus, one of his finest achievements in *A War Like No Other* is to explain the puzzling fact that the combatants invaded each other's territory repeatedly but hardly ever with decisive effect. A practicing farmer, Hanson conducted the relevant experiments himself. Burning wheat fields and uprooting vines and olive trees proved slow, exhausting, and only sporadically successful. It is no surprise, then, that the invaders usually retreated with their work of destruction unfinished or even hardly begun.

The second way in which Hanson's work augments that of Thucydides is in the richness of its statistics. Ancient writers often neglected these, and never provided them consistently or cumulatively. Some of Hanson's numbers are well grounded, others highly conjectural; all, however, reflect his determination to leave no ancient stone unturned in the search.

Hanson's statistics, moreover, are anything but dry. We learn, for instance, that Athens' estimated total losses in the war were proportionate to American losses in World War II not of 400,000, the actual American figure, but of 44 *million*. This alone allows us to grasp what a catastrophe the war was—and how amazing was the city's recovery in the decades thereafter. Similarly, the grievous losses in the final and most chaotic stage of the conflict, involving years of major naval battles, fell heaviest on the Athenian lower classes, which supplied the rowers, and thus altered the political balance within the city for a long time to come.

Hanson's statistics also help to crack some thorny riddles. Why (even apart from the hardness of

vine, olive, and grain) did the early Spartan invasions of Attica prove so ineffectual? By reckoning the likely acreage of the land under cultivation there, Hanson shows that the manpower available to the Spartans simply did not permit them to ravage more than a small percentage of it. Similarly, he calculates the vicissitudes of public finance on both sides of the conflict, and the effect of these on the course and eventual outcome of the war.

THESE LAST examples are typically Hansonian. Where Thucydides is sublime, Hanson is businesslike and prosaic. Not for him the almost biblical resonance of Thucydides' concern with ultimate human questions of justice and piety. He leaves both deep thinking and stirring eloquence to the master, writing for readers whose curiosity about just how things were done in the past matches his own. His distinctive achievement is to show how great a contribution this approach can make to understanding *why* events unfolded as they did—as well as to grasping the plight of those condemned to endure them.

There are, of course, other valid approaches to the history of the war, generating the vast secondary literature to which I alluded earlier. Hanson offers many footnotes but largely spares the reader his disagreements with other scholars. Of these the most estimable, certainly in the English-speaking world, is Donald Kagan of Yale, who beginning in the late 1970's published four massive volumes on the war and has more recently issued a condensed and revised one-volume version.

Kagan's emphasis, unlike Hanson's, is on diplomacy and strategy. He provides a detailed reconstruction of every major episode, relying on Thucydides where he can, cor-

recting him where he feels he must. To put it very roughly, Kagan offers a "top-down" rather than a "bottom-up" perspective: his is the statesman's viewpoint, from which he assesses the performance of those within each city who bore the terrible burden of decision. Hanson's viewpoint, as we have seen, is that of those who bore the consequences of those decisions.


Obviously, we need not choose between these contrasting and ultimately complementary emphases. If Kagan's book lacks the in-the-trenches and on-the-benches detail of Hanson's, Hanson's lacks the careful development of the big picture of Kagan's. No understanding of the greatness and misery of war is complete without both perspectives.

A War Like No Other is very much a post-9/11 book. Certain of Hanson's emphases—on the role of terror in the war, on the nature of "asymmetrical" conflict—reflect this fact. His purpose, however, is not to draw facile lessons for today from these events of so long ago. He is much too careful a scholar not to maintain a wall between his historical efforts and his journalistic ones. His appeal is to the serious reader who shares his interest both in this most fateful of Greek wars and in the anatomy of war as such. He evokes for us, today, the harsh fates of so many ordinary men of a vanished epoch, concluding with a litany of the obscurely fallen and the injunction to remember them, for if the study of war and its lessons is for all of us, the fighting of the Peloponnesian war was "theirs alone."

Last and perhaps best, Hanson's achievement encourages us to return to the masterpiece upon which it depends. You can never be too rich or too thin, or have too many reasons to reread Thucydides.

The False Promise of Autocratic Stability

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In my travels to roughly fifty countries, I have been thrown out of only one—Uzbekistan—just a few months after its emergence as an independent state under its first and only president, Islam Karimov. My crime: meeting with human rights activists.

At that time, Karimov's campaign to limit contact with Westerners was not considered a strategic concern for U.S. officials. Immediately following the USSR's collapse, the central aim of American foreign policy in Central Asia was to strengthen Uzbekistan's independence, thus ensuring that the Soviet Union was not reconstituted. Karimov has ruled Uzbekistan as a dictator, yet his repressive ways never impeded his developing close ties with the United States. In the 1990s, Uzbekistan emerged as an active participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace program and appeared eager to check Russian influence in the region.

The early strategy of engaging with Karimov's regime reaped huge short-term benefits for the United States in the immediate aftermath of September 11. Without hesitation, Karimov allowed U.S. and other NATO forces to use Uzbek air bases during the invasion of Afghanistan. The Uzbek base in Karshi-Khanabad proved a great asset in deploying U.S. forces in the region.

Moreover, Karimov's regime looked as though it would be an asset in fighting the war on terror because he claimed that it was successfully fighting the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a fundamentalist terrorist organization. Karimov's method of rule seemed both pro-American and stable, atypical of that region.

Autocrats, however, never make for good allies in the long run. First and foremost, the internal stability that dictators provide is never permanent. In the face of societal unrest, oppressive autocrats eventually fuel societal resistance by resorting to even more repression to stay in power, sidelining moderates and strengthening extremists, such as Islamic fundamentalists. These situations rarely serve U.S. interests. Second, they answer to no one and can reverse external commitments at a moment's notice. Friendly dictators quickly become hostile.

Karimov today is demonstrating the limits of relying on autocrats as allies. On May 13, he ordered troops to fire on unarmed demonstrators in Andijon, killing hundreds. The circumstances that sparked this massacre remain murky, but his response has been crystal clear: more repression. Even more surprising has been his decision to blame the West for the Andijon tragedy and turn against the United States. Our once stable and solid ally in Central Asia has now embraced Russian president Vladimir Putin and called for the eviction of U.S. forces. Our close association with Karimov is also an embarrassment to President Bush's liberty doctrine.

Even more threatening is the combustible political situation in Uzbekistan. Thirteen years of dictatorship have not reduced the terrorist threat to Uzbekistan or the region; any regime that must slaughter its citizens to remain in power is not stable. In banking on Karimov as our ally, we are squandering the opportunity to foster the kinds of democratic institutions that make for more enduring U.S. allies.

—Michael McFaul

Michael McFaul is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.


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


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
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


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